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Regional Oral History Office

Earl Warren Oral History Project

Richard Perrin Graves

THEORETICIAN, ADVOCATE AND CANDIDATE IN CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT

An Interview Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris

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Richard Graves

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PREFACE

The Earl Warren Oral History Project, a five-year project of the Regional Oral History Office, was inaugurated in 1969 to produce tape-recorded interviews with persons prominent in the arenas of politics, governmental administration, and criminal justice during the Warren Era in California. Focusing on the years 1925-1953, the interviews were designed not only to document the life of Chief Justice Warren but to gain new information on the social and political changes of a state in the throes of a depression, then a war, then a postwar boom.

An effort was made to document the most significant events and trends by interviews with key participants who spoke from diverse vantage points. Most were queried on the one or two topics in which they were primarily involved; a few interviewees with special continuity and breadth of experience were asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. While the cut-off date of the period studied was October, 1953--Earl Warren's departure for the United States Supreme Court--there was no attempt to end an interview perfunctorily when the narrator's account had to go beyond that date in order to complete the topic.

The interviews have stimulated the deposit of Warreniana in the form of papers from friends, aides, and the opposition; government documents; old movie newsreels; video tapes; and photographs. This Earl Warren collection is being added to The Bancroft Library's extensive holdings on twentieth century California politics and history.

The project has been financed by four outright grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and by gifts from local donors which were matched by the Endowment. Contributors include the former law clerks of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Cortez Society, many long-time supporters of "the Chief," and friends and colleagues of some of the major memoirists in the project. The Roscoe and Margaret Oakes Foundation and the San Francisco Foundation have jointly sponsored the Northern California Negro Political History Series, a unit of the Earl Warren Project.

Particular thanks are due the Friends of The Bancroft Library, who were instrumental in raising local funds for matching, who served as custodian for all such funds, and who then supplemented from their own treasury all local contributions on a one-dollar-for-every-three dollars basis.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical intervies with persons prominent in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative supervision of James D. Hart, Director of The Bancroft Library.

Amelia R. Fry, Director
Earl Warren Oral History Project

Willa K. Baum, Department Head
Regional Oral History Office

1 March 1973
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EARL WARREN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

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EARL WARREN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interviews Completed by October 1973

LABOR LOOKS AT EARL WARREN. 1970
- Germaine Bulcke, A Longshoreman's Observations.
- Joseph Chaudet, A Printer's View.
- Paul Heide, A Warehouseman's Reminiscences.
- U.S. Siminds, A Carpenter's Comments.
- Ernest H. Vernon, A Machinist's Recollections.

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- With an introduction by Charles A. Gulick, Professor of Economics, Emeritus.

Robert B. Powers, LAW ENFORCEMENT, RACE RELATIONS: 1930-60. 1971.

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- Maryann Ashe and Ruth Smith Henley, Earl Warren's Bakersfield.
- Omar Cavins, Coming of Age in Bakersfield.
- Francis Vaughan, School Days in Bakersfield.
- Ralph Kreiser, A Reporter Recollects the Warren Case.
- Manford Martin and Ernest McMillan, On Methias Warren.

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- Russel VanArsdale Lee, M.D., Pioneering in Prepaid Group Medicine.
- Byrl R. Salsman, Shepherding Health Insurance Bills Through the California Legislature.
- Gordon Claycombe, The Making of a Legislative Committee Study.
- John W. Cline, M.D., California Medical Association Crusade Against Compulsory State Health Insurance.

Merrell F. Small, THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR UNDER EARL WARREN. 1972

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- With an introduction by Allen F. Breed, Director, California Youth Authority
- Karl Holton, Developments in Juvenile Correctional Techniques.
- Kenyon Scudder, Beginnings of Therapeutic Correctional Facilities.
- Heman Stark, Juvenile Correctional Services and the Community.
- Kenneth Beam, Community Involvement in Delinquency Prevention.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 1972
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Volume I

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Edith Balaban, Reminiscences about Nathan Harry Miller, Deputy District Attorney, Alameda County.
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Mary Shaw, Perspectives of a Newspaperwoman.
Willard W. Shea, Recollections of Alameda County's First Public Defender.

Volume II

Richard Chamberlain, Reminiscences about the Alameda County District Attorney's Office.
Lloyd Jester, Reminiscences of an Inspector in the District Attorney's Office.
Beverly Heinrichs, Reminiscences of a Secretary in the District Attorney's Office.
Clarence Severin, Chief Clerk in the Alameda County District Attorney's Office.
Homer R. Spence, Attorney, Legislator, and Judge.
E. A. Daly, Alameda County Political Leader and Journalist.
John Bruce, A Reporter Remembers Earl Warren.

C. L. Dellums, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER. 1973
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Richard Graves, THEORETICIAN, ADVOCATE, AND CANDIDATE IN CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT. 1973

Helen S. MacGregor, A CAREER IN PUBLIC SERVICE WITH EARL WARREN. 1973
With an introduction by Earl Warren

William Byron Rumford, LEGISLATOR FOR FAIR EMPLOYMENT, FAIR HOUSING, AND PUBLIC HEALTH. 1973
With an introduction by A. Wayne Amerson

Paul Schuster Taylor, CALIFORNIA SOCIAL SCIENTIST. 1973
Volume I, Education, Field Research, and Family.
With an introduction by Lawrence I. Hewes, Fellow, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara
Volume II in process.

EARL WARREN AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE. 1973
Frank F. Tallman, M.D., Dynamics of Change in State Mental Institutions.
Portia Bell Hume, M.D., Mother of Community Mental Health Services.

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With an introduction by E. S. Rogers, M.D., Dean, UC School of Public Health, 1946-51.

Malcolm H. Merrill, M.D., M.P.H., A Director Reminisces.

Frank M. Stead, Environmental Pollution Control.

Henry Ongerth, Recollections of the Bureau of Sanitary Engineering.

Kent A. Zimmerman, M.D., Mental Health Concepts.

Lawrence Arnstein, Public Health Advocates and Issues.

THE GOVERNOR AND THE PUBLIC, THE PRESS, AND THE LEGISLATURE. 1973

Marguerite Gallagher, Administrative Procedures in Earl Warren's Office, 1938-1953.

Verne Scoggins, Observations on California Affairs by Governor Earl Warren's Press Secretary.

Beach Vasey, Governor Warren and the Legislature.

INTERVIEW HISTORY

Richard Perrin Graves was interviewed for the Earl Warren Project of the Regional Oral History Office to preserve his recollections of a long working relationship with Warren. Their association began when Graves was a graduate student in UC Professor Samuel May's pioneering school of public administration and continued through Graves' tenure as executive of the League of California Cities, which concluded not long after Warren went to Washington, thus creating the situation which impelled Graves himself into elective politics, ironically as the Democratic candidate for governor.

Preparation for the questions to be discussed was greatly facilitated by discussion with Professor Eugene Lee, who is presently director of the Institute of Governmental Studies, the lineal descendant of May's efforts to provide technical assistance to public officials, and was also a member of Graves' campaign staff in 1954. Relevant papers of Roger Kent were also consulted. An outline of these topics was sent to Graves before the first meeting. In 1971, Graves was active in commercial real estate development, requiring considerable travel. Therefore the interviews were conducted back-to-back in the afternoon and evening of April 12 and 13. They were recorded in the comfortably appointed office-study of Graves' handsome contemporary home in Bel Air, looking over Los Angeles to the Pacific. An attractive gentleman with traces of his Virginia forebears in his speech and manner, he addressed himself to the discussion with candor, occasional wry humor, and concentration, which one imagines to be characteristic of his way of working. Perhaps due to this brief elapse of time, the memoir has an unusual cohesiveness and an internal rhythm, the afternoon sessions narrative recollections of events and personalities followed by evening sessions expanding on the broader implications of these experiences.

In a curious way, Graves' career parallels and complements Warren's. He was a shining member of the first generation of professionally trained public administrators when he was assigned to District Attorney Warren to assist in preparing a handbook on the administration of justice, a theme of major concern to Warren at each stage of his career. With enterprise and ingenuity, Graves became executive of the League of California Cities, developing it into a highly effective advocate organization for which he was the spokesman, and one of the people with whom Governor Warren discussed ideas on program and tested their acceptability; he was also successful in encouraging the state senate to accept many of his approaches to emerging urban issues.

At several points in the interview, Graves comments that Warren filled each office he held to the utmost of its potential, expanding his own understanding and awareness at each stage. Graves and others have said that, as Chief Justice, Warren was freed to apply and develop concepts of justice previously constrained by the realities of day-to-day administration and politics. In a similar way, as an economic development consultant in Philadelphia, Graves had an opportuity, which his description indicates he thoroughly enjoyed, to demonstrate the efficacy of an out-front working coalition of elected officials, professional staff, and the financial and business establishment, and to bring it to include unheard-of segments of the community in decision-making.

As Graves notes, he was never a social, hunting companion of Warren's; however, he was center stage at several points critical to Warren. The two he discusses most fully are civil defense and an early round of revenue-sharing. As head of civil defense in 1940, Graves was a catalyst in Warren's decision to challenge Culbert Olson for the governorship. After Warren's election, Graves returned to the position to get the agency's spending under control. The famous Christmas Tree Bill of 1946 was, Graves admits, something of a grandstand play on behalf of the League of California Cities to obtain surplus state funds to build sewers. It was the sole instance of the legislature overriding Warren's veto and also proved to be an opening salvo in the environmental issue of water quality, which Graves followed up by quarterbacking the equally contentious Water Pollution Bill of 1949 for the State Department of Public Health against industrial interests.

Although these were highly political events, Graves insists that, with one brief exception, he was never a political man in the partisan sense. He must be given full marks, however, as should Warren, for expert understanding of the application of leverage to issues and individuals to achieve desired results. Graves makes an interesting distinction in regard to public life: that there are those for whom elective politics is merely the means to achieve a position from which one can accomplish something constructive, and that there are others for whom the political process is all-absorbing and the chores of governing an unavoidable drudgery. Warren he places in the first category, of those with a vision of a well-functioning system operating for the greater good of a greater number of citizens, where Graves is also most comfortable.

The exception, when Graves did venture into politics as Goodwin Knight's challenger for governor in 1954, is a remarkable story. Copies of several newspaper clippings about the campaign are included as illustrations. Graves could be forgiven a certain bitterness about the course of his candidacy. Insteand, he says,

> "The best thing I did at that point in my life was to run for governor, and the next [best] thing was to lose respectably."

Wryly and dispassionately and, one suspects, with a full awareness of ramifications which are never laid out in their entirety by anyone, he touches on a number of factors: the Republican candidate's alliance with normally Democratic segments of voters, the support he received from Stevenson-minded Democrats between Stevenson's own presidential campaigns, the equivocal role of other Democratic hopefuls, and the presence of William Bonelli, about to be compromised and defeated for reelection to the Board of Equalization, as another new Democrat.

As the recording of that final interview progressed, Graves talked about the financing of campaigns, his own, Warren's, and national ones, with moral repugnance at their byzantine economic and personal implications (which echo through the federal Watergate investigations being conducted as this is written).

> "I don't know how to cure it, but there is no way to win public office, great office, without making compromises which are totally adverse to the public interest."

Earlier in the interview he speaks of some of these implications in touching on the relationships of local planning bodies and economic interests and the financing of urban development, which he finds in some cases to have included abuses of the uses of land.

It is as a practitioner and exponent of technical competence and human understanding in public administration that Graves made a national reputation. In describing his work, he conveys a sense of exhilaration at the dynamics of positive interaction between legislative and executive branches of state and local government and the community

served. Raising questions, challenging the system to respond to new issues at professional meetings and seminars over the years, his enthusiasms undoubtedly influenced the thinking of the present generation of public administrators, a number of whom he points to with pride. In a fascinating soliloquy, he wound up the first evening's recording session with a brisk summary of these ideas and a capsule version of the evolution of the city manager form of government.

Several months later, the edited transcript of these interviews was sent to Graves for review and to Professor Lee. From his own experience of the events discussed, Lee sent Graves two pages of further questions, which he intended to answer in revisions to the transcript. However, illness intervened and the deadline of the present project. It was agreed that the memoir would stay in its original form, with hopes that Graves would find time to address himself to Lee's questions in a separate manuscript. Graves read the transcript with care, changing occasional words or phrases to clarify a point, deleting a few comments he found irrelevant, and adding a carefully thought and moving final paragraph in tribute to Earl Warren. "The man he had become could best articulate and implement his now mature philosophy in the free environment of the Supreme Court, as its Chief Justice."

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer-Editor
Regional Oral History Office

1 June 1973
The Bancroft Library
University of California/Berkeley

ADDENDUM: *A copy of the editorial "Who is Dick Graves," referred to on page 66, is among the papers Mr. Graves has donated to The Bancroft Library. In addition to other memorabilia of his 1954 campaign for governor of California, these include a number of speeches and reports on his various professional interests dated between 1959 and 1970.*

[Recorded: Afternoon, 13 April 1971]

I BOYHOOD IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY

Morris: I see you keep a picture of Earl Warren there on the bookshelf.

Graves: Well, over the years, as a result of my association in a variety of ways with Earl Warren, I would occasionally get a picture like a campaign picture of Earl Warren. And it seemed to me he was exceedingly careful about the number of pictures that he gave personally inscribed with any affectionate greeting. "With best wishes, Earl Warren." But not "to my friend, Dick Graves," you know.

I wondered about it, and I finally concluded (I never really challenged him with it at the time), that as a former district attorney and law officer in all those years he learned that whoever may be a dear friend and a fine man today, may end up in jail. [Laughter] I really believe that! So, about seven or eight years ago, I guess, I wrote him a letter, and said, "One of the things I have always wanted to have is your picture with my name on it, and it seems to me that now that you are on the court and removed from the activities of politics, and that I'm old and out of it, I'm unlikely to do anything to embarrass you, and I <u>would</u> like to have it!"

Morris: I should say so.

Graves: And so I got back this picture with a note saying that if he had ever known I really cared that much about it,

Graves: I would have had one many years before, but that I was not wrong in thinking he did not distribute them indiscriminately. [Laughter]

Morris: That's marvelous. What does the inscription on it say?

Graves: Oh, it doesn't say very much, really. It's just "For Richard Graves, with the best wishes of Earl Warren" -- that's all. But not being a sentimental man, anyway, I don't know that he ever does much more than that.

Morris: But the fact that he does it very rarely, makes it special to have your name on it.

Graves: It has always seemed so to me, because I had and have such great admiration for him, that it's the only one I've ever really wanted. I never have gotten -- oh, when I was in the League of Cities I had all sorts of mayors and people, you know -- but in terms of great men I never wanted or asked for a photograph except from Warren.

Morris: I don't know how we come to have it in our office, but we have a photograph that Warren gave to Oscar Jahnsen.

Graves: Yes, well that was a very personal intimate relationship.

Morris: Very long standing.

Graves: Yes.

Morris: Now, about yourself. Would you tell us something about your boyhood?

Graves: My life in a small town, Hanford, California, population seven thousand. It was a very typical small town, and, I think, very typical of the times. What was it then? I graduated from high school in 1924 -- let's see -- I was born in 1906, so --

Morris: The year of the great earthquake.

Graves: Yes, two things that shook the world. And, so when I

Graves: went to high school, I had to start in 1920 when I was fourteen. In 1920 the world's first world war was over, and in a way you can't say any more the world was at peace. There may have been strains and stresses in the country -- but they were not apparent (certainly to me), but I don't have any recollection of there being any crises in the country at that point in time when it was --

[interruption from phone call]

I was just saying that there really wasn't an awful lot to remember about high school. I remember the principal by the name of Neighbor and that he was an uninspiring man. I remember some number of teachers of no consequence -- in fact no one at all.

Morris: How about your parents and brothers and sisters?

Graves: My father was a lawyer like his father's fathers before him, and like I was supposed to be. He wasn't terribly interested in being a working father, and I don't know that I encouraged it anyway. [Laughter] So, there wasn't really much -- I just kind of grew up in a very small town as what you might call "normal" (if there really is any such a word) --

Morris: Was this farming country at that point?

Graves: This was farming country, oh yes. I worked in the fields from the time I was seven years old. I cut apricots and peaches, and then I graduated from that to picking. I still have one of my strongest recollections of the whole period, of getting out into the apricot fields at 6:00 in the morning when the dew was still on the fruit and it was cool. I'd reach up and pick an apricot that big that you've never seen.

Morris: Oh my!

Graves: You've never seen -- sweet as honey and full of sugar, and that's your breakfast.

I graduated from that to driving a team of mules and a low-bed wagon and loading fruit lugs all day -- that put some size and strength in my hands and arms. I went all through the fruit work routine for a long while.

Graves: The thing I remember, I guess, that had any real bearing on my intellectual life was that there was a girl in my class named Wilma Waite, and she was awfully smart, and so we ran a four-year competition as to who was the smartest and she won.

Morris: Oh, that's very interesting.

Graves: And she was the valedictorian and I was the salutatorian of our class. But I finally topped her. I was the leading man in the senior play and she wasn't even in it -- so there! [Laughter]

Morris: Remember what the senior play was?

Graves: Oh heavens, no. Oh no, I haven't the faintest. No, I really don't. I remember the night of the senior play because I almost got thrown out of school because the principal, Neighbor, caught me and another fellow smoking cigarettes behind the stage and we almost got thrown out of school before the play was over. But no, I don't remember what it was.

I remember that, and I remember what a pleasant thing it was to run into Wilma Waite, a very senior librarian, somewhere, somewhat later, and what a nice person she was.

I think the only other thing that would have any particular bearing on my adolescent years -- or whatever -- an odd thing. A great football player from the California Wonder Teams came to coach at Hanford High School and his name was Crip Toomey. Well, he was a great football player on the Wonder Teams and he was the greatest drop kicker, I guess the game had ever seen. He was our coach and I weighed about 129 pounds, I think -- maybe 130. And so, I went out for football and the first night I got knocked out and the second night I got kicked in the head and I saw stars for twenty-four hours, and the third night somebody stepped on my wrist and fractured my wrist. And then, Crip called me over and said, "Now look, Buddy" (Buddy was my name)

Morris: Buddy <u>was</u> your name?

Graves: Yes, sure, almost all the way through college. "You can't play football with heavyweights."

So I did my playing as coach, captain and quarterback of Hanford Union High School's first lightweight football team. So I was the coach, the captain, and the quarterback. And I had a really, wonderful, League of Nations football team. There were maybe eighteen fellows on the whole squad, or something like that. Hanford being an agricultural area, I had on my team -- my friends -- two Negro boys (there weren't many black boys in Hanford). I had a Chinese, I had at least one Japanese. I had two or three Portuguese. In the terms of Anglo-Saxon, I don't think there were four of us or five of us in the whole group -- just plain old white boys, you know, just Anglo-Saxon types. But the dirty trick Toomey played me was that I developed a (not because of my talent, but because of the kids' talent) -- I developed some pretty good football players. And every time I got a good one, he moved him up to the big boys. [Laughter] Infuriating!

But that was quite an interesting experience, too. It had something to do with his trust in leadership and a responsibility situation. It was the first time that I'd ever had to assume a leadership role, except insofar as in any group you run with you're a leader or a follower -- I'd been sometimes one, sometimes the other. But this was an organized leadership role, and it had some effect on me. I don't know how to evaluate it, but it did. And thus endeth the saga of Graves in high school except that I did manage to get a scholarship to the university at Berkeley.

Nothing very important, I mean it wasn't a worldshaking scholarship, but at least I --

Morris: I take it it wasn't an athletic scholarship?

Graves: Oh no, it was an ordinary scholarship. Oh heavens, no.

Morris: It's kind of interesting, it sounds like it was a departure for your young coach to --

Graves: Oh, there were lightweight football teams around and

Graves: he just wanted to get all of us small guys together. But he would come over and help us. He was all right. We had a ball, we had a lot of fun. We actually won two or three games. [Laughter] It was all right. He was a good fellow and he was always my friend.

His brother Lloyd Toomey -- he looked me up when I was on campus as a freshman and invited me to their fraternity and offered to pledge me. And that was one of the mistakes I made -- maybe that I should have accepted it, yes.

Morris: You should have accepted?

II INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING

University of California Freshman

Graves: I should have accepted the pledge to Lloyd Toomey's house, yes.

Morris: And what did you pledge?

Graves: I went to Sigma Phi Epsilon because they were big on athletics at the time and I saw all these Big C's running around and all this beef and muscle (I shouldn't speak that way about it, it's my own fraternity, but I was never entirely comfortable in it).

However, so, anyway, I go to college. And, they just assumed in my family that I'm going to be a lawyer, and I never assumed anything else. Truly, my father's family, I think for five generations consecutively, were all lawyers and judges down in old Virginia, and I was just expected to be a lawyer. And I had intended to be until I met Sam May. But that's a jump. Let's see now.

Yes, one interesting thing happened to me when I was a freshman that's relevant. I took Political Science I-A, Comparative Government. David Prescott Barrows; teaching fellow, Roger Traynor --

Morris: This is the Roger Traynor who just retired as chief justice of the California Supreme Court?

Graves: Yes. Easily the most brilliant man I met in the purely academic sense, intellectual capability,

Graves: academically, in more ways than that I can say. But anyway, he was my teaching fellow.

Morris: Was he studying law, himself, then?

Graves: He was at the same time finishing his work for a JD and a PhD in the same year.

Morris: That's quite a schedule.

Graves: Yes, quite a fellow.

And, this Political Science I-A then (I don't know how they do it now) but you attended a lecture in this enormous Wheeler Aud filled from wall to wall with literally thousands of students, it seemed like. Then, of course they broke it down into smaller groups with teaching fellows. Much later in my academic life I was a teaching fellow in Political Science IA, but anyway --

So, after the first midterm, Roger Traynor held me after the class and he said, "Why are you in college?"

"Well," I said, "I'm going to get an education."

He said, "Not this way."

And I said, "Well, what's that supposed to mean?"

And he handed me my blue book and I had a C. And he said, "That blue book is not a C in relation to the other blue books in this group. It is a B-plus. But I've given you a C, and I'm going to continue to give you a C until I see some evidence that you are using your intelligence, studying and getting an A. And he gave me a C right straight through.

Morris: What had you done to make him --

Graves: In the class and in discussions I guess he saw some glimmer of the fact that I might be a good student if I wanted to be. And he gave me the shock treatment. And I never forgot it. I never forgot it. At that time I was like everybody else (not everybody

Graves: else, but you know), I was Joe College. I knew everybody on campus, you know. [Laughter]

Morris: It was a much smaller campus.

Graves: Well, no, not that much smaller. I don't know how big it is now, but it was, oh, 18,000, or something like that.

Morris: That's a sizeable number.

Graves: And those were full-time students.

So, anyway I remember Roger Traynor from that, of course. And I remember him many times after that, as he did one distinguished thing after another. That was really an interesting thing, and it's one of the things that you never forget. When I ran for governor he was one of my earnest, warm supporters, and remembered that -- reminded me that if I should get elected, he would give me an A. [Laughter]

Morris: He felt that you'd live up to your early promise.

Graves: Oh, no, I don't think that! He never would say a thing like that, but he did say that if I did get elected and did well he'd give me an A instead of a C.

Otherwise, I played freshman basketball, I was too small, but I stuck with a squad of ten and took my beating every night and loved it.

Morris: And the fraternity life?

Graves: I went out for the Daily Cal because my fraternity brothers made me go out for something and that was the reason I went to the Daily Cal. I didn't care much for that. I qualified as a junior what-ever-it-is.

Morris: Reporter?

Graves: No. Editor, or whatever they call it. But, I was not very distinguished at that. I didn't really care much about it. I hadn't learned to write at the time. I wasn't really doing editorial work, I was doing the dirty work of putting out a newspaper.

Morris: That sounds like managing editor.

Graves: Yes, something like that. Junior manager, that's

Graves: what it was.

Morris: Lay-out, paste-up and stuff.

Graves: Yes, yes, that's what it was. Miserable job. What did I do of any significance in my freshman year? Nothing really.

Morris: Did you live in the fraternity house?

Graves: Yes, I lived in the fraternity house and I got passing grades -- B's and C's. No ball of fire.

In any respect, I paid absolutely no attention to campus politics, none --

Morris: None?

Graves: No, I hadn't the slightest interest in politics. You see, you should realize that I've never been interested in politics.

Morris: OK.

Graves: Before, during or after -- I have no real interest in politics. I have an abiding interest in government. But not in politics. To many people, politics is the name of the game. It is the be-all and end-all. That's all they care about. And if you happen to have a public office you endure it, but you endure it because you love politics.

Morris: I see. This is something that has interested me moreso the more I read and the more I talk to people who have been involved in government and politics.

Graves: There are just two kinds of (well, there are more than two kinds of people in government) -- but we're talking now about a group of people who are either in politics or very much of it -- they're the higher level of administration or whatever.

There are a great many people in politics, and who run for office and get elected. What they really love is the politics. The political process. The speech-making and the shaking hands and the people to people kind of relationship.

Then there are other people who are deeply

Graves: concerned about government and the state of the nation or the state or the city or whatever it is, and they accept the burdens of politics in order to govern. You can almost turn that around and say that a politician accepts the burden of government in order to get in politics, and a person who really cares about government endures politics in order to govern.

Morris: It sounds like you feel that you cannot separate government and politics.

Graves: Well, we'll come close to that when we talk about Earl Warren and some others, yes, and some others. But, Warren was almost a didactic case that points this out. I think.

He began as a politician who had to learn something about government. He got terribly involved in the mission of government and used politics as the necessary tool in order to govern. I can give you some illustrations of that.

The Influence of Professor Samuel C. May

Graves: But anyway, the first truly significant event in my intellectual life after being born was walking into a course in Political Science 181 the first week of my junior year in college. Professor Samuel C. May, who in my view was the greatest platform teacher that ever was -- by no means a scholar, but an inspired man. If he could have ever written down what he said -- remember now, we're talking about the fall of 1926, and in that first incredible lecture Samuel C. May described the SEC (as yet unborn), the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (as yet unborn), the NRA (as yet unborn). He described the entire New Deal (as yet unconceived). And he described it agency by agency!

Morris: How had he come to this vision?

Graves: Certainly he didn't borrow it from anybody else! He was a missionary. He had the vision. Really! Remember that Samuel C. May was trying to create a

Graves: library of public administration by collecting a bunch of old pamphlets and junk with no money. But he knew we had to have libraries of public administration. He knew we had to have great collections of documents. He just knew what was going to have to happen to the role of government in the changing society. And believe me, he could tell it, oh my could he tell it! I walked out of that room ten feet tall. I wasn't even walking on the ground, and I was a student of public administration -- that's all there was to it -- from that moment until 1955.

Morris: That's a very exciting thing to have happened.

Graves: It dictated the course of my life, and that was one lecture and one man. With all of his faults (and he had a million, just like everybody else), and with his unhappy faculty for alienation of people -- alienation of other members of the faculty -- he was never really accepted in the community of scholars even in his own field. And, the men who came along years later, and who were the great prophets, all they were doing was quoting Sam May.

Morris: Who were these people who came later?

Graves: Those fellows from around the University of Chicago and "1313."* May was the real pioneer. He created the field. He had a curriculum in public administration, and they wouldn't let him break away from political science for years. My master's degree is in political science, it isn't in public administration, that's just a major. [Laughter]

Anyway, Sam May was the first great man I ever met, and --

Morris: How come he didn't alienate you?

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*The number "1313" is verbal shorthand for the address in Chicago's East Sixties of a clearing house of information and service widely used by public administration people in the 30s and 40s.

Graves: I think we loved each other in a very special way. He adopted me in a manner of speaking, and then some other things were happening at the same time.

But I know I loved him in the sense that I properly use the word (and it's like any kind of love in that I knew his faults better than the people who didn't like him, and sometimes I could help and sometimes I couldn't). We used to walk and walk that campus while he poured out his troubles with people and things and I was a student [laughter] and here was Herr Professor. We had a very close relationship, very warm, and I never think of him except with real love and affection.

Well, at the same time, at the end of my sophomore year, there was a small depression in the raisin economy of the San Joaquin Valley. My father called me in and told me at the end of my sophomore year that I had to make the choice -- I could go to work or I could go to college and go to work. [Laughter]

But that was all the choices there were because there wasn't any more money from home! So then, Joe College paid off, all of a sudden, having been Joe College. My grades were better in my sophomore year than in my freshman year, but not that much.

I had to become self-supporting.

[phone call interrupts]

I always bought my clothes in a place called Herman's. Herman Rosenberg. He was a nice man; he had a terrible wife. And I talked him into giving me a job on a commission basis. I would bring all my friends in the store and I would sell them clothes and I would get a commission. This was the beginning of the semester and I was there ten days early, or so. I started bringing people in there like mad and made about $300 the first month. Remember, this was 1926.

Morris: That's fantastic.

Graves: I was only spending in the store like from 4:00 to

Graves: 6:00 o'clock and all day Saturday except when I went to the football games. And, I was making an average, I guess, for the first three months or so of about $250 a month. And I didn't have a friend in the world left that I hadn't dragged in the store. Absolutely every one I knew! Every one I knew!

Morris: You must have been a pretty good salesman once you got them there.

Graves: Well, I sold. I did the salesmanship. I put them on and took them off.

Then he called me in and said, "Dick, I've got a problem."

I said, "What's the problem?"

"Well," he said, "You know you spend almost no time in the store, and you're making money."

I said, "You're making money."

He said, "I'm making money. But the salesmen on the floor are working fulltime for less money than you make."

I said, "Well, what do you want from me?"

He said, "I want you to get a kind of flat salary."

I said, "That's the deal for the rest of the year -- the whole academic year?"

He said, "Yes."

I said, "What are you offering me?"

He said, "A hundred fifty dollars a month."

I said, "How much time do I have to spend in the store?"

He said, "From about 3:00 o'clock and all day Saturday."

I said, "Herman, what are you doing to me?" So

Graves: yes, I took the job. It saved my life. I was one of the well-to-do young men on campus that year.

Morris: I should say so. That must have been quite plush.

Graves: This is the same year I met Sam May, you see, and this is the same year I started to get straight A's. If I had had the grades in my first two years that I had in my last two years, I would have been Phi Beta Kappa.

But these are the awakenings, you see. Sam May awakened me as a student, and my financial extremity awakened in me the sense of purpose. You don't work as hard as I worked because -- I couldn't take a class that came after 2:00 o'clock in my junior year. In my senior year I went to work every day at 1:00 o'clock in a shoe store so I couldn't take any class that did not come in the morning. And you don't work that hard -- well, not "that hard," but, I mean, you go to class all day, you work all afternoon, you work all day Saturday, and you study at night.

I made some money on the side because I ran a raffle on the side -- it was English shoes called Lotus Shoes, and they sold for $25.00 in 1926. It was a double shoe with heavy grained leather. It was the greatest shoe in the world.

Instead of going home to my own fraternity, I would have somebody invite me to somebody else's fraternity, and I would raffle off a pair of Lotus Shoes, price per chance, $1.00. Sell 30 chances, somebody gets a pair of shoes and I make five bucks. [Laughter]

That kind of training has helped me a number of times since. But, anyway, I began to be a serious student, and I did well academically in my junior and senior years, and I was now really exhausting the field of public administration, and everything I could lay my hands on, and then into some of the related areas. There were at that time no schools of urban planning or the things I had some impact on when I came back in later years, they weren't there then, so you didn't really have much in the way of

Graves: studying the city -- the urban thing was not there.

Morris: It didn't exist yet.

Graves: It didn't. So, I would guess that except for my continuing very intimate association with Sam May -- not much else in the way of significant teachers, truly.

Emerging Issues of Urban Society

Morris: Could we talk a little bit about the kinds of ideas that Sam was bringing to you?

Graves: Well, what he was saying was -- you must remember, I can't document this, but you will know that it's true, (I can document it but not with numbers), you must remember that we're talking now in 1926. We haven't yet had the boom and bust of 1929-30. Sam was not talking about what was going to happen in the up-coming Depression because he obviously wasn't a seer. We were in 1926 and everything was just rolling.

Morris: Beautiful and expanding.

Graves: Oh, boy. And you could make money, and no problems. But, he saw the problems. He saw them up-coming. He didn't see them in terms of Depression, he saw them in terms of economic dislocation. He saw them in the sense of the growing urban industrial society and its impact on people, and how it would reshape the role of government and administration. He was talking then about the disparity between the farm income and farm prices in the market place and the disadvantage of the farmer in what he bought as against what he sold. Hence this whole discourse came on farm subsidies, unheard of. He didn't call it exactly that. He talked about "How do you equalize the prices farmers pay for things as against what they sell at?" There must be some way, and it can only be done by government."

He saw the up-coming power of the unions. Remember, the unions were not that big in 1926.

Morris: They were still fighting for the right to organize.

Graves: Existence, yes. He saw the big unions coming because of the great concentrations of corporate power and that in the end the unions would win their places as a counterbalance. And this would be done under (in a manner of speaking) the auspices of government as, indeed, it was.

He saw in this extraordinary way where our economic and social evolution was leading us, and described it as it would happen, and indeed it did.

And, he prescribed the governmental remedies, and wrote the prescriptions. Extraordinary.

I looked around me in that 1926 class and saw that 90% of them didn't react to what he was saying at all. And I thought that was unbelievable. I thought the whole world should feel the way I felt.

Morris: Did any of them go on into --

Graves: Well, when I graduated -- (I stayed out a year. I'd worked a little too hard or something, anyway I stayed out a year, then came back and got my A.B. degree in 1929 instead of 1928.) Then I went to work for a while. After that I came back and got my master's degree in public administration in 1931.

I was running a store in San Jose when May called me up. He said, "Wouldn't you like to come back to school?"

I said, "How can I come back to school? I'm married and have a job here." It wasn't much of a job. It wasn't what I was making; I knew I was in the wrong place, doing the wrong thing. So, I went back and was a research assistant in the Bureau of Public Administration.

Morris: Then he had gotten it out of the political science department?

Graves: The bureau, not the academic rig, though. Sam May finally got a very substantial grant from the

Graves: Rockefeller Foundation, from Laura Spelman, I think it was. Anyway, it was Rockefeller money, and a very substantial sum of money. That's when he brought in Adler and Wilson and all those people and organized a study of criminology. I wrote my master's thesis for pay.

Morris: Did you, now?

Graves: Oh, I tell you. I was paid to write my master's thesis and I went all over the state of California and I wrote a dissertation on the administration of criminal justice in California. That's when I met Earl Warren.

See listings for Graves, Richard, in Research & Service: A Fifty Year Record, compiled by Dorothy Campbell Tompkins. Bureau of Public Administration/Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1971.

III FORMULATING NEW GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY

Earl Warren's Administrative Skill as District Attorney

Morris: He would then have been the district attorney.

Graves: Right, he was district attorney at the time and a right wing Republican.

Morris: Did he seem a right wing Republican?

Graves: He was a right wing Republican, he didn't seem like it, he was.

Morris: He was.

Graves: At that time he was more political. He was a great master of politics. He was created by Knowland (but you know that) as a political figure -- by the old man, Joseph R. Knowland, who bought the Oakland Tribune.

Morris: How did Knowland come to chose Warren as --

Graves: As a vehicle?

Morris: As a vehicle, yes.

Graves: Well, I guess he saw what was there. He didn't see it all, but he saw what was there at the beginning, a man of great personal magnitism and great political potential. Very much Joseph R. Knowland's kind of Republican at the time. I guess he picked himself a horse and he picked himself a hell of a horse.

Morris: Yes. When you say "created," do you mean before

Morris: this Warren was --

Graves: No, Warren, I think, was just applying for a job, I think he was assistant district attorney, and a young man.

Morris: He was an assembly law clerk for a while, then came back to Oakland and was in private practice.

Graves: I don't know, but as I remember, he was an assistant district attorney when Knowland started to really move with him. I could even be wrong about that because I wasn't really interested.

But then, of course, was the great power of the Tribune. That's the point in time when the press did have power -- they don't have it anymore, you know that -- but there was a point in time when there was no way to get elected in Alameda County without the support of the Oakland Tribune. There was no way to get elected to a statewide office in California without the support of the Los Angeles Times. None of this is any longer true, as we have all kinds of evidence. But at that time the power of the Oakland Tribune was enormous, and it was in coalition with the Los Angeles Times and some of the other major metropolitans.

Morris: And the Bee?

Graves: I wouldn't put the Bee in the same group. I don't think the Bee has ever been part of this group. I think they've always been an independent and, in a relative sense, liberal force. I have no recollection of any point in time, even in the last days of McClatchy when the Bee was like the L.A. Times.

Morris: In other words, the Bee was its own separate power?

Graves: It had it's own power, it was agriculturally oriented. It was Sacramento and Fresno -- it was Carlos McClatchy's personal empire. But I have no recollection of him trying to wield a big stick in state politics or national politics -- other than just what he'd take positions about. But you take the power of the press, and they ran the political organizations in a very literal sense -- they and their cohorts.

Graves: It was this continued support -- always praise and never criticism of Warren from the major metropolitan press which was inspired by Knowland -- that created Warren as a great political force. But he was also (it's curious that even though he was what I had called a black Republican, and I truly think he was) -- he was a cop. Through and through. He wanted to be the best cop there was. He wanted to be the best district attorney in the country. Warren had real feel for administration.

You see, this is what I'm saying -- right there, as far back as that, the typical district attorney was purely political and Warren was the national leader in upgrading the administration of justice. It was no bleeding heart that did it. It was this deep, unavoidable -- or he was just interested in getting the job done -- well. And, he became the outstanding district attorney in the United States without regard to politics. In the administration of his office, in the routines that they developed, in the approaches to improvements in the criminal process, the whole thing -- Warren, great national leader.

Politically -- you see, when the man changed, that part of him didn't. It changed his focus, it changed its content in a manner --

Morris: The political skill?

Graves: Well, still a political animal. But always, he wanted to get the job done. I guess he just has a feel for it. He had very much a sense of order all the time, anyway. I never saw anything around him in a state of chaos or confusion. So that I would say that as a district attorney he showed these two capabilities, which took a very different form later, just like the Court. Warren was the first Chief Justice who ever got the Court organized. Isn't that right? Don't you know that?

Morris: I didn't realize that he was the first one who had ever --

Graves: He was the first one who seriously addressed himself

Graves: to reorganizing the judicial process administratively. Warren Olney, a brilliant young man who followed Warren as one of his deputies as a district attorney, as a deputy attorney general, as [a] very confidential, administrative -- secretary, or whatever you call it -- when Warren was governor, and he brought him back when he was Chief Justice and put him in charge of reorganizing the administrative procedures of the whole federal court system. The same kind of approach. It always comes through, you see. He can't stand administrative chaos. [Laughter] And it always happened. These things remained the same, his interest and his focus and his sense of purpose changed. The tools always remained the same.

But, to get off of that, let's see, I was getting a master's degree, wasn't I? Yes, getting a master's degree and writing a thesis on administration of criminal justice. About that time I was still working with the Bureau of Public Administration, and I didn't have enough money. (I'm very money oriented.) I was reading some statutes. In 1932 the California legislature had created the California Crime Commission and given it a small appropriation.

1932 California Crime Commission

Morris: This was the Wickersham Commission?

Graves: No. This was State of California. The man who was director of finance then was Rolland A. Vandegrift -- an extraordinary character, right straight out of the California Taxpayers Association.

Morris: They used to wield quite a bit of power, didn't they?

Graves: Yes, sure, that was before the world changed. Now they get a hearing, and that's all. Who was governor, then?

Morris: That would be Merriam.

Graves: Yes, it had to be Frank Merriam. He brought in

Graves: Vandegrift. He did a good job for the then concepts. He didn't create anything, but he did what they were doing and did it well. I had never met him in my life. I was trying to help a graduate student (he was in worse shape than I was). So I saw this statute. So, between us we raised enough money to make a long distance telephone call to Sacramento. Called person-to-person to Rolland Vandegrift.

Morris: Beautiful.

Graves: The secretary tried to detour me and I said, "No, I've got to talk to Mr. Vandegrift about that crime commission statute. You've only got seven months to make that report."

She said, "Hold on a moment."

He comes on the line. He says, "That's been worrying me. I'm aware of that. I haven't done a thing."

"Well," I said. "My friend here and I are perfectly capable of being your staff, and I'd like to come up and talk to you about it."

So, we go to Sacramento. Howard Gardner, who worked with me later in the League of Cities went to Sacramento with me to meet Vandegrift.

I'm not a nervous type, really, I'm just not. I'll never get an ulcer. But this time I was nervous. Because I was really a little over my head. And I got the hiccups just as I walked into Rolland Vandergrift's office.

Morris: Oh, that's a dreadful sensation!

Graves: It was horrible, just horrible. And I had just a terrible attack of hiccups which I never get anyway, and I did something which was totally out of character. I was absolutely desperate.

I said, "Mr. Vandegrift, I am nervous about this, it's important to me, (hic-hic) and I want you to be tolerant if you would, and I'm going to put my head back and I'm not going to hiccup again." And that was the only time in my entire life I have

Graves: ever exercised that degree of will. I willed myself not to hiccup again and I didn't! [Laughter]

Morris: Beautiful.

Graves: Vandegrift said, "That's the damndest thing I ever saw!" He said, "Anybody who can do that can organize the California Crime Commission." He said, "What kind of deal?"

I said, "Well, I work for Sam May down at the university on a part-time basis, and I think maybe a couple of hundred dollars a month for me part-time and something like that for my friend plus out-of-pocket costs.

"Yes, very reasonable, that's fair."

My income suddenly went up to $350 a month from $150.

And then we organized this crime commission -- an extraordinary group of people, and that's where I got introduced to the prisons -- the California prison system, then State Board of Prison Directors.* There was no Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, and no intermediate institutions. There was Folsom and San Quentin. There was just the Board of Prison Directors, and they ran it all.

Morris: Oh, my.

Graves: They were all political and they were all remarkable men. Can't even remember all their names, now. It was just about that time or shortly afterwards they created the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. Anyway, we put together this report, and Earl Warren was a member of this group.

Morris: On the study committee.

Graves: Yes, he was a member of the State Crime Commission. The members were all leaders in their fields and all

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*See appendix for correspondence about these arrangements.

Graves: political fellows, and unprofessional as you can get. [Laughter] And, the greatest man of all was Mark Noon. Mark Noon was clerk of the Board of Prison Directors and weighed about three hundred and fifty pounds. He was a Hiram Johnson Bull Mooser in his earlier days in San Francisco and he ended up as clerk of the Board of Prison Directors and spent his life at it. He was a wonderful man, just a wonderful man.

That reminds me, there is a story I want to get in along here about how I met Artie Samish, and what that meant later.

So, anyway, I did a decent enough job for them and that led to two things. It led to Warren asking me to work with him to write the handbook for district attorneys, which he was doing for the Bureau of Public Administration.* And so, I worked with him on his handbook for district attorneys, which --

Morris: Did that ever get written?

Graves: Oh yes. I don't know if it ever got published, but I put an awful lot of words on paper, and he edited and changed, and there was sort of a manuscript. I don't know if it ever got printed or not.

Morris: One of our other interviewers talked with Ronald Beattie.

Graves: Yes, he was around when I was around.

Morris: He didn't think it ever got written because he worked on it for a while and --

Graves: Ask Gene Lee to find out, he'll find out. He has access to the facts. I wrote an awful lot of stuff and I spent an awful lot of time with Warren when he was district attorney and writing this handbook.

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*An outline and some working papers for this handbook are among Samuel May's papers in Bancroft Library. In January, 1972, it was hoped that the draft manuscript would be located among the papers of Earl Warren, Jr., in Sacramento.

Morris: As we got the story, that was done on a Rockefeller grant.

Graves: That's right.

Morris: That Dr. May had asked someone to produce --

Graves: O. W. Wilson, who became nationally a very distinguished chief of police, was brought in to help Berkeley.

Morris: Gus Vollmer?

Graves: Gus Vollmer was quite a fellow, but he didn't understand English. He couldn't write it, and O. W. Wilson came in. And, oh, there were all sorts of people around there.

Research for Prison Boards

Graves: The other thing that happened was that I became researcher, or whatever you want to call it, to the State Board of Prison Directors, and one of the best things that I ever did to influence the course of human events was I wrote a series of reports to the State Board of Prison Directors over a period of a couple of years and also then for the State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, which, so far as I knew, was the first serious discussion of intermediate and minimum security institutions in California.

It was the first serious effort to establish psychiatric classification for prisoners. And these things began to happen while I was still there.

Morris: As a matter of policy.

Graves: As matters of board policy and then putting it in their reports and recommendations to the legislature and actually getting some appropriations for intermediate institutions, for getting psychology and psychiatry as a classification tool for the assignment of prisoners, and work opportunity and all the rest of it. These things I say immodestly were first enunciated, so far as I knew, and certainly it's true in so far as California -- were first written in the reports I wrote for the State Board of Prison Directors.

Morris: How had you come across this --

Graves: Oh, I went to a meeting of the American Prison Congress. It was in Indianapolis, and Sam sent me back there. And I got talking to a lot of people, and these were questions that were being raised and thoughts that were being expressed, and nobody had ever tried to organize them into (at least I don't know that) -- And I came home and thought about them and worked at it, and talked to a lot of people and talked to Mark Noon and we began to evolve it, and it was elementary in modern terms. But, it made a tremendous impact on the board, and it was done. Not just for that reason, I don't mean that, but I do take a great deal of satisfaction in the fact that I took a board -- two boards -- of very good men, very political men and persuaded them to adopt significant new approaches.

Morris: Where was Kenyon Scudder?

Graves: Oh, Ken Scudder. He was probation officer, I think, of Los Angeles County, at that time. He was part of this crime commission group too, I believe, and he was a wonderful man. He got very much involved in the actual implementation of what I was just talking about.

Morris: Yes, he was the one who set up Chino as the minimum security facility. Had he been working on these same kinds of ideas in Los Angeles?

Fact-finding for the Legislature

Graves: Oh, I was just around the university at Berkeley, and then in 1931 Sam wanted me to go up to the legislature and just see if there was some way the Bureau of Public Administration could be of help to the legislature. You see, this was just the beginning of the legislative service! So, I was telling Mark Noon that I had to go up there and he said, "I'll go with you, I know all those guys and I'll introduce you around."

So Mark and I went up to Sacramento and he

Graves: introduced me to everybody. Oh, he knew everybody and would say, "Oh, this is my boy, this is my boy. He's going to be around a long time. You look out for him."

Morris: What an entré!

Graves: We walked up on the steps of the Senator Hotel, and there's a great big fat man, as big as Mark Noon (and that's big), sitting in a great big old chair on the porch, and Mark says, "Artie, I want you to meet my boy. This is my boy, Dick Graves. Dick, this is Artie Samish." He says, "Now, Artie, I think this boy is going to be around here a long time. If he ever gets in trouble, you help him."

And Artie says, "Of course I will, Mark."

Now I jump, so many years, clear to the Christmas Tree Bill, where Warren and I parted company, but good, and I want to talk about that later. Right now I want to tell you that when Warren had vetoed that bill and I had passed it over his veto in the senate (it was the only bill that ever passed over Warren's veto) and I was in the assembly, and I didn't have enough votes. Two-thirds, you know, is a lot of votes, and I didn't have the votes. I had a roll call checklist and I knew where everybody was and all of a sudden I started getting some more votes, and I kept looking at these names, and I kept saying, "What the hell's going on here? This is Artie Samish."

You picked this up before anywhere?

Morris: No, I haven't. But I've heard that you could tell by the names which were Artie Samish's boys.

Graves: Sure, this was Samish! I had never asked him for anything. Everytime I walked by him over the years I said, "Hello, Artie," and he'd say, "Hello, Dick," and that's all. That's the only contact we ever had. I was never in his room, never ate any of his sandwiches, never drank any of his liquor or any of the other goodies he had around. I called him up and said, "Artie, on the Christmas Tree Bill --"

He said, "Yes, what about it?"

Graves: I said, "Why?"

He said, "You've got a short memory! Don't you remember when Mark Noon came up and told me to take care of you if you ever were in trouble?"

I said, "Gosh, Artie, that's twenty years ago," or what ever it was.

He said, "So what is twenty years, this is the first time you've ever been in trouble.

[Laughter]

And, honest to God, Artie Samish gathered the votes to pass that bill in the assembly over Warren's veto because Mark Noon had told him to take care of Dick Graves if he ever got in trouble. Now, he might have had some other reasons too, that related to him and Warren, but I'm inclined to doubt it. But he did it, anyway. And that's why I'm the only man that can say I had a bill that passed over Warren's veto. Nobody else can ever say that.

Morris: And with Artie Samish's help.

Graves: Indeed yes. But anyway, that's a very interesting story and we'll come back to it another time.

So there I am and now it's getting to be --

Morris: So what did the legislature say to your offer of help?

Graves: Oh, I started to get a few assignments to go back and find out about this and that, mostly statistical. Fact finding, gathering stuff, and seeing fellows around the bureau that were helpful. We filed a number of reports for some of the few members who would respond to that at the time.

Morris: Who would be --

Graves: Oh, I honestly don't remember. It's too far --

Morris: Would this be different from the interim study kinds of things?

Graves: The present legislative process is pretty well staffed -- I'm not judging the level of competence or otherwise, I've been away from it. But, the staff resources which the legislature now has available to it, of which the legislative auditor is only a small part, actually, because most of the major permanent committees of the legislature have their own permanent staffs, now. This was, of course, absolutely nonexistent. What interim committees did generally in those days was to go around to a whole lot of meetings and have one sort of staff man who wrote up what everybody said. But, in terms of research in depth, zero. So, that when I would talk to them, and I don't really remember much about the details, I would see something where I thought we could be of some help and I would go to the author of the bill or the chairman of the committee, somebody like that, and talk with them about whether we might not be able to do some good. They were mostly pleased, and we did some good. I was out of it before the next turn of the wheel, but the next time the legislature met the bureau service began to grow.

Morris: When you were going up to that first session, for Sam, were you being paid for this?

Graves: Oh yes, I was employed by the bureau. I was no longer working for the prisons and I was research associate for the bureau, and that was a full-time job.

Morris: Was the Rockefeller grant just to do the prison study?

Graves: No, it was for many purposes. It was oriented to the administration of criminal justice.

Morris: Had Sam picked this as the topic, or had Rockefeller requested that this subject be studied?

Graves: I think Sam picked it and submitted the names of people that he would like to gather. For example this is where I met Raymond Moley.

Morris: Was Milton Chernin part of that, too?

Graves: Oh yes, Milton and I were around there together.

Graves: Yes, that was the first time I wanted to kill somebody because of anti-Semitism.

Morris: Yours or his?

Graves: Vollmer's.

Morris: Vollmer's?

Graves: Gus Vollmer, yes. Gus Vollmer in his relations with Milton Chernin was my first exposure to true anti-Semitism. On the part of Gus Vollmer. Sam May was a Jew, but he would never say so. Chernin was a Jew and everybody knew it. There was no doubt about it, but Vollmer was an anti-Semite, and he made Milton's life pretty bad.

But that's the kind of stuff I'm perfectly happy to have on the record.

Morris: It's this kind of thing that kind of gives one pause, because around Berkeley Vollmer is a legend.

Graves: It's a legend to me, too, but it's not exactly the same legend in any way.

Yes, Milton was there, very much a part of it, and happily became all of the things or some of the things that he showed great promise to become. He's somebody else I've completely lost track of and remain intensely fond of.

Morris: He's an advisor to our project. I'll give him your regards.

Graves: You give him my deepest, most affectionate regards.

Morris: I'll do so.

Graves: He's a fine person. You can also tell him if he doesn't want that on the record I'll take it out. [Laughter] I'd like to leave it in.

Morris: I think it probably is more a part of the story of the things in California than one realizes.

Graves: Say that again, please?

Morris: Anti-Semitism, although it never has been as overt as it has in other parts of the country, probably is a factor in --

Graves: It's a very great factor in Los Angeles today. Notwithstanding all the get-togethers and the men of good will, and all the stuff, it's a real fact. I have found very little of that in the areas or the levels of San Francisco business that I've been exposed to, although I'm sure it's just as true there or almost as true there as it is in some other places where the blue collars or the hard hats or some others carry their bigotries on their sleeves.

The sophisticated, intellectual leadership element of San Francisco, no. But, here, yes, definitely. That's a degression, although it has some things to do with my life as it later developed.

Morris: Going back to corrections. Why did Sam May pick the prisons and the correction system as an area of study?

Graves: At that point in time it was an area of very bad adminustration, very bad facilities, historically already a governmental function and purpose being very badly done and this was something he could get into because we were still not yet in the big governmental stages.

I think he just marked out this area because there was a great deal of attention being paid to it elsewhere. There were all kinds of crime studies and I think perhaps it could have been triggered by such a thing as the national Wickersham Commission to study crime and the inadequacies of the tools they used to really get at the deeper problems that were involved. Hence Adler as a psychologist or psychiatrist involved with Sam May's group, bringing in a wholy different discipline that obviously is involved, yet had never been involved. So, I think Sam saw all this mishmash being generated around the administration of justice with not enough depth, and I think he thought if he could pull the right people together that he could give it a dimension which it lacked altogether up til then. That's the way I think about it now, looking back. It was a byproduct, I think, of the great interest around the country at the time.

Graves: I'm sure there were very good reasons for it, I don't know exactly what they were, but I wonder if the gangster bit and the bootleg problems might have focussed attention on corruption as a byproduct of prohibition and its related vices. This may have been the focus. Because, wasn't it just a little while later that we repealed the Prohibition Amendment?

Morris: I think so. 1933.

Graves: I think this was the direction and was probably why that area was picked, I would think. It wasn't just prison, you mustn't overemphasize prisons in what Sam May was doing. He was studying the cop on the beat, to professionalize the police, and every level of the administration of justice. So, the whole ball of wax was involved here. Hence, Warren was a prosecutor being involved. No, it wasn't a prison focus, that was one area. The work I did on the prisons I did not do for Sam May, I did directly for the prisons, and was paid by them.

The prisons were involved, of course, in Sam's studies, but not by me.

IV THE VOICE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES: 1933-1953

Graves: So, we are on the threshhold of my adventure into the League of Cities. I was sent by Sam May to the annual meeting of the League of Cities; it was called then the League of California Municipalities, and I changed it because the then governor could not say "municipalities." [Laughter] And in his speech as governor to the League of California Municipalities, meeting, said, "min.. muna... why don't you change that?" [Laughter]

And the next day, to a great roar of applause, we submitted an amendment to the constitution and bylaws changing it to the League of California Cities. And I got a note from the governor, who was that?

Morris: That was still Frank Merriam.

Graves: When I went out on tour, Sam sent me to a meeting of the League of California Municipalities representing the bureau (as he sent me other places in the same capacity). I thought that it was kind of an interesting group. Of course, the demigods of the students of public administration then were city managers. It was an evolving profession in those years. There were only about twenty cities in California that had a city manager, and we had more than any other state.

I thought this was all very interesting, and then they decided at that meeting that they were going to change the direction of the organization and go out and get a full-time executive, and here I was a great,

Graves: big boy. Let's see, that was 1932. So I decided that I was going to be a candidate for (it couldn't have been '32, that's when Roosevelt was elected -- it had to be '33 -- yes). There were two jobs. One was the new executive secretary, as they called it then, of the League of California Municipalities, and the other was a field representative of the League of Municipalities to set up a WPA program.

Federal Public Works

Graves: You see, the WPA program was actually set up to a very considerable extent by the organizations of public officials, and in order to implement the program and implement it quickly, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Fund made a large grant of money to all the Leagues of Municipalities and all the other associations of government officials and the council of state governments, and everybody. They hired people not with federal funds, but with Laura Spelman Rockefeller money, and put them on the staffs of these organizations to go out and get these things going.

Morris: Even though it was federal legislation?

Graves: Even though it was federal legislation. The federal machinery was just getting cranked up and there was no field force, and they were still writing the red tape, the rules and regulations, and sending you out all the forms. Nobody was there to help anybody, so all these people went back to Washington and were as well grounded as the feds were then able to ground them. Then they would go back into the field and go to the city halls and sit down with the mayor or whoever, and get a WPA program started.

I think it also had something to do with lesser urgency, because it was more time-consuming, but I think maybe it also related to PWA, which was more normal course of construction kind of stuff. But the neighborhood jobs were WPA, and they were largely organized in the city halls with the help of the fellow that got one of the jobs that I went after.

Graves: So anyway, I went after the top job, what else! And, as usual, I was broke and had a good automobile, also as usual.

Morris: We haven't gotten into this side of things, yet.

Graves: What?

Morris: The automobiles and the girls.

Graves: Oh no, we aren't going to do that. [Laughter] The automobile story is a disaster. I would be a rich man if I'd had as much sense about automobiles when I was younger as I've had in the last ten years!

I used to have, goodness, I think over one period of five years as a two car family, I think I had sixteen automobiles, something like that.

Well, anyway I got in my car and I took the list of the board of directors of the League of Municipalities. I started in Eureka and I ended up in San Diego. And I called on every single one of them.

Morris: Fantastic.

Graves: And there were about fifteen of them, something like that. And the leading candidate for the executive secretary job was the just-retiring city manager of Pasadena, John Charleville. City manager of a number of cities, awfully nice man, ineffectual, but very nice man.

The guy with the real drive that was also after the job was Harold Pomeroy, who was mayor of Southgate. The same Harold Pomeroy who became WPA administrator and state relief administrator.

Morris: Have I heard about him from Frank Stead?

Graves: Well, you might. You certainly heard about him from Milton Chernin, for one. He was a very, very dynamic man and a very effective person. He was a mayor, and here was this little old boy from the Bureau of Public Administration. Anyway, when I got there I had about four votes in my pocket. That wasn't enough, but they never left me.

Morris: Those four guys?

Graves: Those four guys -- they never left me. Wonderful men, obviously [laughter].

Charleville was chosen as executive secretary. And Harold Pomeroy was chosen as the field representative to set up the WPA, which made sense because he was a mayor and he had much quicker access to city hall. That made sense. And I came home.

But they made a mistake -- they made two mistakes. One of them was that the headquarters of the League of California Municipalities was in the Monadnock Building on Market Street in San Francisco and everybody that had just been selected lived in Los Angeles. And they were not about to move the headquarters of the League of Municipalities to Los Angeles. So, what in the world to do -- The League attorney was Louis Burke, who is on the state supreme court, now. Charleville lived in Pasadena and Pomeroy lived in Southgate, Burke lived in Montebello and the office was in San Francisco. So, they call up Sam May and they say, "Sam, we need Graves in San Francisco. Just to have somebody there."

Morris: Minding the store.

Graves: Exactly, you have no idea how apt that is. So, Sam said, "OK, I'll let him do it."

So, he continued to pay me a half-time salary, and they paid me a part-time salary, and I went to work in that office in San Francisco, and I kept the books, sent out the bills, did my own typing, I did the mimeographing for the whole operation. I was the most first-class office boy you ever did see. But I also knew how to add, and they had the hirings and other things that had occurred -- they had incurred a budgetary obligation of $20,000 a year with a gross income of $8700.

Morris: Oh dear.

Graves: So, I wrote my boss, Mr. Charleville, a letter, which he ignored, about this. And, I wrote him another letter which he ignored. And I thought, well, you

Graves: only live once, so I wrote a letter to every member of the board of directors telling them that they now had about $11,000 in the bank, total assets, they were spending money that was more than twice their annual income, and that while I might be dismissed for insubordination, I felt that I owed them the facts.

There was an immediate meeting of the board and "what're we going to do?" Well, sometimes you're lucky, and, when nobody else had any ideas, I said, "I wonder how much money we could raise if we told the cities that we were going to the legislature and try to get a quarter cent of the gas tax for the cities?"

So, we found out. We raised $50,000.

Gas Tax Sharing

Morris: Was this a general assessment based on the size of the city?

Graves: Voluntary, based on size. We said, "This is what we want to do, and if we get it this is what you're going to get out of it, and if you want to help us, fine," and their response was rather good.

Morris: I would think so. Had this ever occurred to anybody before?

Graves: No. San Francisco paid $200 a year dues to the League of Municipalities and they gave us $5000 to go get some gas tax money. So did Los Angeles -- they paid $200 a year. When I left the league, Los Angeles paid $25,000 a year and San Francisco paid $18,000 a year.

So, that was the first drive, then, for sharing of state taxes with cities. It's an incredible thing to think about, but it is a fact, that when I joined the League of Cities back in December of '33, (and left it in December of '53, by the way) not one dollar of the state gasoline tax was spent within an incorporated city for <u>any</u> purpose. The state highway came to the city boundaries and stopped and the

Graves: traffic went over city streets provided by the city with local taxes and the state picked it up again at the other end. But, of course, the counties got one cent of the gas tax for county roads.

When I left the League of Cities, if my memory is correct, eighty some per cent of the total state gas tax was spent in the cities. That may be high, but it was a hell of a lot more than half, because now the state highways within cities were called state highways, and freeways within cities were state, in addition to which the cities got money for their city streets.

And it was around that rallying cry -- the same things that's happening today nationally with the National League of Cities going for federal revenue-sharing -- that we built that League of Cities -- motivated it around the fight for the gas tax.

Morris: That was very much a political fight, wasn't it?

Developing State Senate Support

Graves: Oh yes. It sure was. We got one-quarter cent, then we went back and got a half-cent, and then I learned something, and that was I was wasting my time in the assembly just because most of them came from the cities. I spent all my time after that in the state senate, and I spent my time with rural senators.

And, most of the things I was able to accomplish with all the help I had (I don't mean this to be first person singular, but I was the one that was there at that time) was because of my relations with two senators who were men of enormous capabilities and force and strength. One of them was George Hatfield, sometime lieutenant governor and candidate for governor, I think, and a senator from Imperial County, Ben Hulse. And all the things that we were able to accomplish in that legislature over a period of twenty years were because of the relationships we developed with the senate and in particular with Senator George Hatfield and Senator Ben Hulse, both

Graves: rural, but both able to see. They knew that what had been no longer could be, and that we would prevail, and if they worked with us to help us prevail, they would make a better deal than if they worked against us to keep us from prevailing, because in the end, the urban population was going to prevail, and they knew it, and they were my dear friends quite apart from the politics of the thing. We were real friends, and they are both dead, but the meetings that we held--Bud Carpenter, who is a wonder, one of the wonders of the world in terms of a person, and --

Morris: He's in Sacramento?

Graves: Yes, he was attorney for the League of Cities then; he succeeded me as executive director and general counsel. Some of my fondest and most exciting recollections of Sacramento were sitting in a hotel room half the night with Bud Carpenter and Ben Hulse and George Hatfield, scheming as to how we were going to get this thing done. They would handle the senate, but more often than not they had to bring their muscle over and handle the assembly, too. But we got it done, and they knew what they were doing, and they knew it was necessary.

George Hatfield was a citizen of the world. He was a very sophisticated man and a very civilized man. He knew. He wore cowboy boots and all this, and was from Merced County, but George was very much a citizen of the whole state and whole country. And, we changed things, a lot of things.

So, thus endeth the first session?

Morris: Your timing is beautiful. We've just about come to the end of the tape. Hatfield and Hulse were members of the capital letter "Economy Bloc," weren't they?

Graves: Oh, absolutely. They controlled the Senate Finance Committee, and they controlled the Rules Committee. There was Ralph Swing from San Bernardino, and some others, but when you went to where the muscle was, you went to Hulse and Hatfield.

[Recorded: Evening 13 April 1971]

Morris: What kind of overall impact did the league have, in addition to its legislative role?

Graves: We were in contact with other city and county organizations across the country. It was early in the city manager movement, and one of the first things we did here was draft a model ordinance on establishing this kind of local government -- the city manager count increased by about a hundred in less than a year.

The league is many things besides a lobbyist -- lawyers for cities' legal problems, consultants for technical advice on how to get things done. Of course, our lobbying results added to the impact of all the other things the league did, you see. Many times, if some local group objected to something we wanted done, the mayor would say: look at all the things they've gotten from the legislature. They must know what they're doing. We'll do it. Keeping on top of issues: we were involved in pollution control from the beginning. Water quality control and smog. We spent years trying to get smog control.

Graves' 1954 Campaign for Governor

Graves: I made one of the best speeches of my campaign for governor about smog; it had all the facts. Gene Lee put the speech together. He got the facts from the best people in the country, found the man who knew most about smog. It was a great speech, but nobody heard me. All I got was half an inch in the Pasadena Star News, and I was speaking in Pasadena on the tenth day of the worst smog attack the Los Angeles basin had ever seen. I identified the culprits then, as now, as the oil companies and the gasoline combustion engine and freeway expansion. But nobody heard me.

Morris: Knight heard you. Dr. Merrill told me that Knight gave him $50,000 from the governor's budget right about

Morris: then to start emergency research on air pollution, because he could see votes disappearing at an alarming rate.

Graves: Merrill was a good friend on many issues.

I will say for Goody Knight that after he was elected to the office, he became a good governor, better than I'd thought from prior indications. He did do what he said he'd do, and didn't do what he said he wouldn't. He was like Harry Truman that way, he had respect for his office and felt he had to live up to the image of the office. Truman did, too, except for one lapse when he went to the Kansas City funeral of a less than honest man, though that, again like Goody, indicated a loyalty to old ties.

Sometimes it came out as an awful blunder, like the time when Knight spoke to a reactionary women's group and was reported to have said he was "glad to be back with my own kind." But Knight did have a sense of bringing people together, even though he walked a tightrope between his friends.

Morris: Which friends were these?

Graves: There were his old line business and Republican friends, you see, and then his rougher union friends. Their styles were different and each wanted different things from him.

Morris: Did the prior indications affect your decision to run for governor?

Graves: There were lots of reasons why. When we get to the why-I-ran department, this will be part of it.

I think that Knight reacted to the fact that all these people had voted for him. You see, when he succeeded Warren, it was not the same thing as running and being elected, and he didn't change that much or at all, in the intervening period, not significantly.

Morris: Of Warren's unexpired term?

Graves: He changed a lot of things, but Goodwin Knight, himself,

Graves: didn't change that much. I'm not talking about policy. When I ran against him, I ran for many reasons, but one of them was my university. And it is relevant that Robert Gordon Sproul, from his own pocket, since I did not qualify for any university loan, loaned me the money to complete my graduate education out of his own pocket.

Morris: That's quite a remarkable thing.

Graves: Yes, and I repaid him with not only the money he loaned me, but with my undying regard and respect and affection, and one of the targets in the early days of Goodwin Knight was Robert Gordon Sproul. So among all the many things that motivate men, that was one. Bob Sproul was in no way able to support me, and I couldn't expect him to do that.

Morris: He was by then --

Graves: He was president of the university. Oh, he was president in all the times we're talking about. He was president when he loaned me that money.

I could not, nor did I, expect him to embarrass the university or himself with some of his friends to renounce the Republican candidate and come with me. Let us say, while he could not help me, he didn't help anybody else, either.

I think that it's fair to say with good reason that if he could have helped me, he would have. But, this was not purely a personal choice that he had to make. It involved the university. It involved many other considerations, and he didn't have this freedom.

But I challenged Knight on his attitudes toward the university. He did such preposterous things as to propose that endowment funds should be used for current expenses, and things like that.

You see, the first budget that he submitted for that university was a disaster. And it was a significant factor in my decision to run, although it was not all of it.

His attack (curious that it would be so much

Graves: like Reagan, now that I think about it -- this is probably the first time that I really sat and thought about it) -- He attacked the colleges and universities, and above all, the University of California, as Reagan has. But this is only a different way of saying you attack public education.

Morris: Because it costs so much money?

Graves: I wish I knew the answer to that. I hate to draw parallels when I have no way of knowing if they are parallels, but for the record, I would say that it disturbs me when any political leader in any country (and there have been a number) begins by attacking public education as though it were dangerous -- and of course it is, to have a literate and informed and intelligent population if you're trying to sell the wrong things. So, I don't want to draw any harsh parallels except to point out that in all the dictatorships of the world that I'm aware of, public education has been suppressed, destroyed, or certainly not encouraged. And this is not intended to be a parallel, I'm not trying to equate Ronald Reagan or Goodwin Knight to Hitler or whatever.

Sometimes men fall into traps (and they don't even recognize the trap) but I wonder, I would never for a moment suggest that Goodwin Knight or even Ronald Reagan would undertake to attack public education because they want to destroy it to substitute something else. But, conscious purpose is not necessarily the measure of the danger -- it could almost be unconscious purpose. So I don't really know, except that I do know that most of the time Goodwin Knight could afford to ignore me and everything that I said, because I had no press and I had no money and therefore I had no access to television as everybody will tell you [laughter]. Remember?

But there were two areas which I recall clearly in which he responded. Let it be said to his credit that having forced him to respond, he did what he said he would do when he was a candidate. One of them is in the field of education, particularly the University of California, and the other is in the field of mental hygiene, because that's where I think I

Graves: attacked him most successfully. Certainly in those two areas and perhaps most importantly in the second one. He was destroying the whole mental health program of the state in his budget and in what he thought and said, and I attacked. And you know better than I do statistically, just how many people in our state are directly affected by the problem of mental health. It was then almost as high an incidence as we now have of venereal disease. There are not many families who, in some branch of the family, are not in some way affected by the problem of mental illness.

For whatever reasons, I have no idea why, he was going to destroy this and the state's leadership which we had established in the country. He was going to destroy it; I don't know why.

Morris: Were those the days when mental health was considered to be a communist brain-washing plot?

Graves: Not really, no, I don't think so. It was very expensive. I don't really think it was equated to that, I really don't. I can't explain it. I really don't know, but as a sensitive politician, when I hit him with it, he knew I had touched a nerve and he responded. You see, he was destroying the department and he was getting rid of the highly skilled professional director, whose name I have no recollection of -- he was going to put something less than that in its place. He was just going to wreck that department, and I attacked.

Well, believe me, in all the whole eleven months, he didn't even bother to answer me most of the time, because I had no press, but, oh, this is something else, you see. So, he had to respond. And, everything he said he wouldn't do he didn't do, and everything he said he would do, he did do. Let it be said to his credit.

I keep wondering what would have happened if I hadn't attacked. [Laughter] But, in these two areas I touched the nerves. The rest of what I said was not important. I could talk about smog all week and nobody would print it. I mean the oil companies had tremendous economic power which was mobilized against us -- but in these areas, yes. And he was way off base.

Morris: Did the university and mental hygiene have organized economic-interest support?

Graves: No, you must realize that the only lobbyist in Sacramento who had no money to spend and no great organizations to rally was Jim Corley, the controller of the University of California. Yet, he was the most powerful lobbyist for a public purpose that existed because it was the University of California.

This situation that exists now in which the people do not find acceptable (and never should) some of the excesses of students -- they don't even understand (though more are now, it is changing and the students are changing too) -- and they never have understood the protest. Neither does the university, I would guess.

Morris: You mean the legislature has never understood the protests?

Graves: I'm really thinking about the underlying support of the University of California among the population of the state. You see, at that earlier time, the University of California just had to announce that it had a problem -- the hundreds of thousands of ex-grads, parents of students rallied, and the impact was fantastic! Nobody had to pay any money for it, they just had to say "We're in trouble."

This was back in the '30s and '40s.

Now it's not the same, although it's changing for the better, hopefully. But, in those days the university had enormous strength just on the basis of what it had contributed to the state, to the seniors and middle age groups and their children. And, it was a rallying call. My, Corley could get a story in the newspaper -- Sacramento would get thousands of letters and phone calls the next day. So, when I touched that nerve, Goodwin Knight really had to respond. He was not so sensitive to the fact of the problem of mental illness -- that it affects as many people as the University of California, but he found out and he responded quickly -- yes, he sure did.

Morris: Should we go back aways? We were on the League of California Cities, and you were talking a bit about the league having arrived at a position of strength and power.

Growth of Revenue Sharing

Graves: Yes, and I anticipated something there. You see, I told you that what is now one of the great issues of the country, which is revenue sharing as between the federal government and the states and cities, became the central issue around which we organized, mobilized and built the strength of the League of California Cities beginning in 1935, and we persisted. There were many other things that we did legislatively, each one of which had some importance in and of itself, but which were not that significant.

The real drive was the absolute need for revenue sharing, and because it has a contemporary significance, it is interesting that beginning in 1935 (that was the year that we made the first drive for the sharing of the gas tax) we went on and we got another quarter of a cent of the gas tax and later we got the right to levy sales taxes to be collected by the state for administrative purposes and refunded back. But, the great mobilizing influence which brought the cities together as a political force, not in terms of Republican and Democratic politics, but in terms of the cities confronting the state, was very basically around this central issue of revenue sharing.

And, I think it's fair to say that among all the states in the country, many of which had Leagues of Cities, most all of them had Leagues of Cities, we pioneered this in our League of California Cities. We became strong and compared with other Leagues of Cities, our budget went to $100,000 then to $150,000, then to $200,000 -- and they were struggling along on $36,000 -- to them it seemed like the beginning and the end of the road to success.

Urban Sprawl

Graves: But this was the central thrust, and then somewhere along there, and I lose again the sense of time, I raised another great issue, and it finally took the form of a phrase that "What is urban should also be municipal."

Now, I wouldn't subscribe to that now, in the exact sense in which we were making our case, but it was then and still is a fact (although very much less so) that what had happened in the state was this proliferation of urban sprawl -- going beyond the boundaries of the city, and becoming totally urban, although still administered by the county. Leap-frogging subdivisions.

When the telephone company had to extend services out into these suburban leap-frogs, the city subscribers paid most of the cost supporting a totally uneconomic extension of the telephone company service to an area one mile, two miles, three miles away, with nothing in between except farms. And this was all put on the city subscribers' costs, and still is. When the privately owned gas and electric companies had to extend services to these suburban subdivisions created totally for the benefit of a private developer who had three votes on the city council or board of supervisors, this raised the value of his land from three thousand dollars an acre to then, let us say, seven thousand dollars a lot, and four or five lots to an acre, and made him rich.

It was the city taxpayer who paid the added cost for gas or electric service in order to service these totally uneconomic, totally unwarranted areas. It was generally the larger school districts which encompassed the cities and the suburbs that were paying for schools which at that point in time had no reason for being. But what broke the camel's back was that now the county governments (and but for the city of Los Angeles, the largest city government in California is the County of Los Angeles) were providing police service which is called the sheriff's department, fire service which is called the county fire marshall, or the county fire chief (or

Graves: whatever they choose to call him), every public service to people and land, at that point in time, totally out of the general fund of the county. Anywhere from sixty to ninety percent of that general fund was taxes paid by the people in cities, who had already paid for their police department, paid for their fire department, paid for all their city services; and now they were also paying the county to provide those services to the unincorporated areas.

You have heard the name of Hal Kennedy, county counsel of Los Angeles somewhere along the line. Hal Kennedy was the voice of the counties, and in the end, I was the voice of the cities.

Well, this one really boiled the legislature. It had them absolutely bogged down -- tied in knots -- so that a thing they'd never done (as far as I knew) was that they called a committee of the whole of the senate and assembly meeting in the assembly chamber, so that Hal Kennedy speaking for the counties and I speaking for the cities could debate this bill in front of both houses assembled in conference.

Morris: I've never heard of that before.

Graves: I don't think it ever happened before, and I doubt if it's ever happened since. Hal and I were good friends before that and we are good friends still, but that was a bloody battle. I lost it in part.

Morris: This was a bill to --

Graves: To require the counties to impose upon these unincorporated urban areas a special tax so that they would pay for the urban services that they received from the county and that the city taxpayers would not thereafter pay for. One of the remarkable men in the legislature, and who (in my judgment), if it had happened early enough in his political career would perhaps have been the most gifted governor this state has ever seen with the single exception of Earl Warren, was Senator George Miller from Contra Costa County. An extraordinarily gifted man. A man

Graves: of enormous courage with great political talent, but with all the right motivations. Against all the political odds he sponsored our bill in the senate, and he never left us.

Morris: That's remarkable.

Graves: It took great courage. So we lost the bill, but we made some progress at succeeding sessions of the legislature so that to a very considerable extent our original purposes began to be carried out. The counties began to see that there was really no end to this if they continued in the direction they were going, providing a full standard of city services to areas which weren't paying for them. There was no end to the demand because there was no cost. It cost a million dollars to do this in a highly urban area which was unincorporated, but the residents of the unincorporated area paid a hundred thousand of it and the rest of the county paid nine hundred thousand of it, you know? Including all the city taxpayers.

I was never more ironically amused than in the last three weeks in this county -- the county levied the full cost of each sheriff's car on every one of these unincorporated areas, and the so-called contract cities, which was a device created to try to get the same result. Well, I forget the number, but it shocked even me, and so the number is not going to be important. It is only a scale of magnitude that one sheriff's car twenty-four hours a day costs $64,000 a year, or something -- (I don't know whether its $48,000 or whether its $84,000, but that order of magnitude, one sheriff's car twenty-four hours a day is of this order of magnitude) -- and that's what they're going to have to pay, and now they're all going to get their own police departments. [Laughter]

And this is what we were saying when that bill was in the legislature. Except for the Christmas Tree Bill, this was the most rugged fight we ever got into, and yet we were right. We lost it then, but we made our point.

When I ran for governor, oh, did that come back to haunt me. All the unincorporated areas were put

Graves: on notice by Goodwin Knight's people: "This is the man."

Morris: The man who tried to raise your taxes?

Public Employees

Graves: Oh boy! Yes! Oh, there were a number of those things.

I was then and I am still opposed to the affiliation of public employees with private labor unions. I always have been and always will be. That doesn't mean I'm right or wrong, it just means I do not believe in that because I do not really believe that a fire department which enforces the provisions of the fire code can be asked to respect a picket line put up by the building trades unions, in terms of fire prevention inspections.

I don't think the building inspectors can be members of a labor union where the contractors are on one side and the union to which they belong (again the building trades union) are on the other side. I don't think you can do that. But, there is another consideration, and that is (as a very loose generality) in the most proper sense, although the public ultimately pays any bill -- the consumers always pay the bill -- but within limits a dispute over wages in a private industry is at least theoretically involved in how much of the profits of the enterprise should capital have and how much should labor have? There are no profits in government. There are laws -- we have less of that in our state than anywhere else. But, there are no honest profits in government.

What the city council can do as a legal matter (as well as a political matter) to raise additional funds is circumscribed by law, and there are times of the year when there is no way to raise money or to commit it because they have levied their taxes, and they have their budget, and they do not have a way to go to the bank, or whatever. There are significant differences, very significant differences.

I do not for one moment argue about the right

Graves: of employees to bargain collectively with their employer, which is the city council and ultimately, the people. But, to identify this with the enormous power that private trade unions (with the interplay which exists between government and those unions) to me is a shocking thing, a terrible thing. The fact that it existed for the history of the country between government and people in private business doesn't validate it, when it gets to be under the unions.

I do not honestly believe that garbage should pile up on the streets because garbage collector people choose to strike. It's not the same thing, it just isn't. If they want to put General Motors out of business, General Motors is a private company and it has a choice and the union has a choice. To say, "I will not provide police protection for the people of this city," is not the same kind of a choice; "We will not fight a fire on a building or a home" that's being burned down. I take refuge on this in the words of Franklin Roosevelt, who was absolutely opposed to the unionization of public employees and never changed, that is to say, the unionization of public employees identified with private unions, nor did he ever recognize the right of public employees to strike. I don't really care if they want to strike if it's a matter of inconvenience, but in the protective services, life or death things, it seems to me that the acceptance of such a position in a public service is a commitment from that employee to perform it.

If, individually, you are not happy, you quit. However, collectively, if you strike, you strike at the whole community. You're not striking at a company, you're not striking at the city council. It's happened since I left, very, very extensively, but one of the things we did as a League of Cities was to deny this in the legislature to the employees and the unions. We prevented it. And I paid the price for <u>that</u> when I ran for office. [Laughter]

I still remember being at some political meeting at a house somewhere in Los Angeles County and watching

Graves: on television Neil Haggerty, who had always been my friend, and who, if he'd known I was going to run for governor I think would have taken a longer look; you know, big man in the AF of L, but he didn't know, and committed himself to Goody. When he was committed, he was committed. That's fine, he ought to be. But I never will forget him on television with the firemen's union guy, Callahan, I think his name was. That's the first time I ever saw the kind of political distortions and misrepresentations of simple facts that you can do in politics, as they attacked my position on these issues. I was so upset I wanted to call up Neil Haggerty and tell him to go back to church and count his beads.

Many of the things I did in the legislature were very adverse to my candidacy, yes they were. I wouldn't change that, but we'll come to that in a little while.

But anyway, I got in the fight on the cities versus the counties' unincorporated areas on the slogan "what is urban should be municipal." Really -- what is urban should be urban. [Laughter] People should pay for what they get, but every little urban area organized as a municipality, no, and somewhere we should find the political formula to make some compromise between city and county and metropolitan regions -- a workable formula. We're running out of time to do that. I tried to do that a long time ago with no success. It's more critical now than it was then. That gets into the fight on pure water, water pollution, Frank Stead and Dick Graves, and Malcolm Merrill and all this, in 1949.*

What the hell was the name of that assemblyman from Alameda?

Morris: Randal Dickey.

Graves: Oh, what a bad boy he was! [Laughter] I think that was the first time that I realized so clearly the areas of challenges to me that came inside the League of Cities, always using for my justification the fact that some things had to be done by higher levels of authority, whether it was a regional control board or the state. It was very difficult for the

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*See interviews in this series with Frank Stead and Henry Ongerth.

Graves: hired hand in the League of Cities to be telling his mayors and councilmen that "you must surrender this power to a higher level of authority." It not only offended their governmental sense, but it also offended their local politics. I'm not saying that either one was more important than the other, I'm just saying that it offended both, and that --

Morris: How did you cope -- ?

Bud Carpenter's Leadership

Graves: I coped, but I must say that the League of Cities, whether by the pressure of events and a leadership around Bud Carpenter which is at least as well qualified if not better than mine -- they have done things since I left that would have been too dangerous for me to do, and that I frankly wouldn't have done. I don't really know. It's kind of like saying that a great many forces come together in a confluence of some kind. The arrogance of a man is easily upset and destroyed by the fact that most of the people in the League of Cities would have said when I left it that it was the end, that it would never be the same again. It was a highly personal kind of leadership.

Well, it isn't the same. I think it's better. [Laughter] It has gone on, it has had great impact. It still has its enormous posture in the legislature. There's a kind of a thing -- like in the latter years, during which I was really very bored with my work in the League of Cities. When you're any place twenty years, there isn't much new that can arise. It's kind of repetitive. You meet yourself coming through the door. I was terribly bored, so that unless I could create a real crisis, a real fight --

Morris: Shame on you!

Graves: -- and I like to think that, while I did this deliberately, I tried to find a worthwhile cause. I like to think that.

Graves: Short of that, I was terribly bored by doing the same things and answering the same questions, and making the same kind of legislative appearances. I did very little of that.

The thing about Carpenter which is extraordinary -- It is part of my nature that if it can be said that I could command a certain amount of respect by the force that I could generate, whatever that is -- if that is so, Carpenter commands that, but he commands confidence. That is something that I'm rather inclined to think that I haven't commanded in my working lifetime. People tend to be -- I don't know exactly the word, "suspicious" is not the right word, but I don't command that degree of confidence, total acceptance, that Carpenter has. And that's just a fact, and I never tried. I don't know how.

I could appear before a legislative committee and make for all practical purposes the same kind of argument that Bud Carpenter would make. If I made it they would look for other meanings. You know, "What's this guy really after?" [Laughter] If Carpenter said it that's the way it was.

The municipal and county government committee of the legislature (if that's what they still call it) could have ten consultants, staff members, but if Bud Carpenter said it, that's the way it was. Total, just absolutely total. They might have to vote against him once in a while. I can't remember when they last did. There was a point in time when it could be said that no bill that we opposed that had to do with the cities ever passed the legislature. Now, if it was a muscle bill it was me. We had two separate roles to play. If we were in a situation, I guess more often than not of my own making, which was essentially controversial and divisive, I did it. If it was the essential nature of our business, Bud did it. So that I went to Sacramento in my latter days with the League of Cities less and less. I only went there when it was necessary, and it got to be a joke, "Dick Graves is in town, what the hell's going on?"

Morris: There's going to be an argument.

Graves: I'm sure that Bud Carpenter must have been asked a

Graves: thousand times, "How can you work for that son of a bitch?"

Land and Building Issues

Morris: One thing that I've wondered about is: what was the league's position in relation to the various industry associations that were also very powerful and very much heard from in Sacramento?

Graves: Well, it depends on what they were after. You see, one of the things that I think has been a source of strength in the League of Cities is that only when the cities as government entities are directly involved did we ever have any position at all. If it wasn't necessarily our business, we weren't involved. But, if any lobby of any kind went to Sacramento with a program which necessarily involved the cities, if it was adverse to (and I'm not talking about mayors and the councilmen, I'm talking about the municipal interests in a very basic sense) -- the public welfare, we attacked, and we never lost, as Randal Dickey will tell you, we never lost. We were in an endless controversy with the California Real Estate Association in their representation of the subdivider interests, and in trying to break down the subdivision laws.

The Association of General Contractors and the Home Builders, and the whole range of developers -- because most of the problems in the cities, and I'll put this on the record, I have no hesitation -- the most corruptive influence in local government in California has nothing to do with vice or gambling, all that sort of thing, it has to do with the uses of land. It has to do with zoning, with subdivisions, with taking raw land and creating enormous values for the benefit of the subdivider with the ultimate bill to be paid by the public. This was and is the worst single corrupting influence in our local government. Still is.

We're way past the point where you can buy a contract to build a city hall, or anything else,

Graves: we're way past that. You can't really sell the wrong parking meter any more because you've bought the city council. We're way past that.

California has the cleanest municipal government of any state in the union, and the best administered. There's no state that has the quality and the capability and the administrative management expertise of the cities of California -- nowhere. But, California mayors and councilmen and planning commissioners are not immune to petty bribery and corruption. The problem is that it's apparently too easy to see no corruption in the pressure from a developer who has x number of acres and wants to rezone it from agriculture to residential, or from residential to commercial, even though such a rezoning in the end will be very bad and very costly to the general tax payer, and bad planning and bad urban development, and in the end it louses up the environment of the city.

Somehow the mayor and council can disassociate themselves from the fact that this is in itself a form of corruption. I really think that the average mayor or councilman or commissioner would be shocked if someone offered them a bribe to do something about a contract, although there's more of that in this area than in any other one area -- there are all kinds of elected officials who will accept some form of gratuity from these developers. I found it impossible to believe that the recent charges in San Diego were really true. I knew the people, and I just couldn't believe that, for these pitiful sums of money, they would actually take a bribe to give Yellow Cab a more favorable franchise, or whatever, or rates. I just don't believe that. I think they did something foolish in accepting campaign contributions at the wrong time, but I honestly don't believe that that guy bought these rates out of that broup. I just don't believe that. I know them.

What is so distressing is that they don't equate the same standard of moral judgment to the uses of land, yielding to a developer. Somehow it doesn't seem the same to them. It's the most corruptive single influence.

Community Redevelopment

Graves: We go around and we fight all these fights and we win them. One very interesting one, that affected an alliance (how do you pronounce that word) -- mésalliance -- was when the League of Cities and the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the California Real Estate Association, got together on what was known, and still is, as the Community Redevelopment Act. I don't know where it originated, I think it was the California Real Estate Association. There was an awful nice guy who ran CREA around that time, and he's now (or was, and I think he may still be) the head of the National Association of Real Estate Boards. He was in California, and was really a first class guy, but he represented these people.

They came in with a bill the obvious purpose of which was to tear the heart out of urban renewal. It had all the stuff in it, you know, submitted to all the people and all the whole bit. We clobbered them. Do you know who really clobbered them? Hatfield and Hulse. They just locked the bill up in the senate, because all the home builder pressure and all the private real estate interest pressure was on the assembly.

There was no way to put pressure on George Hatfield or Ben Hulse. So, we sat down with them and we talked about this, again with this great insight they had into things which were urban. I can still see it, we sat for hours. We decided that some kind of a bill would be in the public interest, that urban renewal should not be totally dependent on the federal government. That there should be a way for a city to fund urban renewal without total dependence on the federal government. We wanted to give them a way to go.

Have you ever heard of a tax increment bond?

Morris: I have, but I never really understood how it worked.

Graves: Well, it works like this. The only legal authority that a city has to get into urban development comes out of the state law, not the federal. A city must have

Graves: the power and they derive it from the state law. Each of the urban renewal agencies -- while it is called the "Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Sacramento" or the "Sacramento Community Redevelopment Agency" -- is a state agency in and for (like the superior court) the city of Sacramento. So, it is a state agency created by the state and it becomes operative when the city council adopts an ordinance and appoints its members. The state statute says, "There is created in every city and county in the state of California a community redevelopment agency which shall become operative when the city council and the board of supervisors . . ."

So that you create the agency. Now, in the absence of any thing else, except the single enabling statute, the only resources that the city can turn to are those of the federal government. So, we cook up this notion and in this we had the great help of the real estate association (wish I could think of his name -- he was a hell of a good guy), and the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. We created the idea that this blighted area now produces a hundred thousand dollars a year in taxes -- county, schools, city -- the whole bit. If nobody does anything, it's not going to bring any more than that, that's it. And, it would probably get worse instead of better. So, why should the governmental jurisdiction get immediate benefit if somebody comes in there and does something?

So, with the support of the L.A. Chamber, California Association of Real Estate Boards, California Real Estate Association, and the League of Cities, and whoever else, a constitutional amendment was put on the ballot, authorizing the cities and counties to issue what were called tax increment bonds. What it said was, if a city or county declared this to be a redevelopment area, they proposed to finance the redevelopment (their part of it) by the issuance of tax increment bonds. The tax liability of that area was frozen at a hundred thousand dollars, for example, and the city could thereupon issue tax increment bonds. When new things were built there which greatly increased the taxes which would be paid in that area (because the valuation would then be higher), everything over a hundred thousand dollars went to repay the bonds for the redevelopment.

Morris: That's a very interesting idea.

Graves: And then when that was all paid off, the taxes which by now were full taxes became fully available to the county, the school districts and the city.

I am a partner in the development of downtown Sacramento, eight and a half blocks of downtown Sacramento, which was financed by tax increment bonds. We have built and are building about twenty million dollars worth of commercial property in the first three blocks of an eight and a half block area which we control. The taxes are frozen for the governmental jurisdictions. The redevelopment agency will get the additional taxes which our developments will create. They pay off the tax increment bonds and when those are paid off, then the local tax jurisdictions get the full benefit on increased tax revenue. When we get through we'll have built somewhere between fifty and sixty million dollars of taxable improvements in that area.

Morris: Which will eventually be revenue for the city.

Graves: Just take the arithmetic. Let's say it's fifty million worth of construction. It will be assessed at twelve million five hundred thousand dollars. You'll pay twelve dollars a hundred -- I can't even do that, it's so much money. It'll pay off a lot of bonds awfully fast.

So, this was a bootstrap operation, and this is one of the interesting times when you had an extraordinary alliance between groups which normally are not on the same side of issues, and with this synthesizing effect of a Hatfield, a Hulse, it went through like that and people accepted it and as far as I know, and it was true when I left the league, California was the only state in the union that had such a bootstrap. There must have been some copies, I don't know.

Surplus State Funds for City Sewers: 1946

Morris: Could we go back to 1946 and tell the story of the

Morris: Christmas Tree Bill, because that seemed to involve revenue sharing and --

Graves: It involves revenue sharing, it involves Warren, it involves the whole thing. You must appreciate the fact that during the war years, the great impact of the war effort in terms of influx of people, there were very, very rigorous federal restrictions on new construction of taxable facilities. The domestic burden of the war was on the local governments: the cities, the counties, the schools, in terms of spending dollars for local services. It had no impact on the federal government, domestically, in terms of added expenditures. It had no impact on the state, only a little bit for welfare.

Morris: Everybody was working.

Graves: Everybody was working, taxes were pouring in. Down here at the bottom of the pile were cities and counties and school districts who were supposed to absorb the enormous costs of this influx of population into California and all the services which they required, and except for a few war-impacted areas like Richmond and the other places where the federal government poured money in because it was totally defense-oriented, it was an absolute disaster.

Cities were just absolutely up against the wall, they had no place to go. The school districts were in trouble. They got more of a break than the cities did. The counties were not that involved in the direct services except Los Angeles, and maybe a few others, Santa Clara. The real impact came on the cities, at the very time when they had no resources financially, no new revenues which were reflective of this expansionary situation. Their real estate taxes were frozen, and it just was absolutely a disaster. This population influx with very limited additional building began to overtax, among all things, the sewer system. It was the hardest hit, and this was a very serious health hazard.

Morris: Was the health hazard documented?

Graves: Oh yes, oh sure. No question about it, yes. It was very serious, as the latter part of the story

Graves: will illustrate. At the same time the state of California had a four hundred million dollar surplus.

Morris: It seems incredible, the way the surplus rolled in year after year.

Graves: Oh, it was just unbelieveable.

So, Warren was sitting there on top of four hundred million dollars. I keep thinking that this just isn't right, just isn't right. So, we have a meeting of the League of Cities board and I say, "Look, fellows, this just can't keep on, we've got to do something, and I know I'm going to shock you, but I want to go to Sacramento and get a hundred million dollars of that state money for sewer systems, nothing else."

Morris: Were you already in contact with and familiar with the concerns of the environmental sanitation people? Frank Stead?

Graves: No. [Laughter] So, they said, "Well, you're really biting off one, boy, but let's go." So, I go up to Sacramento, and I go to see the governor, and I say. "Governor," (that's an interesting thing, I called Earl all the time he was attorney general, but once he got to be governor I never called him anything but governor), I said, "I've got to do something you're not going to like, but I've got to do it, and I hope you can accept it and I hope you can support it, cause I'm going to do it anyway. I'm going to try to take a hundred million dollars of surplus for city sewer systems."

He looked a little shocked [laughter], and we talked about it for a little while and he said, "Dick, I can't go for that. I'm sorry."

Morris: Didn't he have his own plans for all that money?

Graves: No, I don't think so, he didn't have any expenditure program for it, no. I think it could be argued that at that point in time he had some eyes on the presidency. I'm reasonably sure that's fact. At that point in time in a war-impacted state like California and in the whole national situation with Roosevelt --

Morris: Gone by then.

Graves: Was he gone by then? Yes, I guess he was. Well, in any case, with the national government which could easily be accussed of being profligate, here was a governor who had built up a great surplus, and I think this was part of it. I don't know that, but I think so. I never judged him harshly, but I think it may be true. He had no expenditure program for it and unless my memory is absolutely gone, I think that's true.

Morris: Well, there were general state programs for postwar building.

Graves: Oh well, that's so. What was the year we were talking about?

Morris: 1946.

Graves: I don't know what the record would say, I really don't.

Morris: There was the same kind of argument on the state level, that we've had this increase in population and we've had no building during the war years. Our capitol and court houses and the mental hospitals --

Graves: Well, courthouses is a part of the story, you see, that's part of it, you can't equate sewer systems and courthouses [laughter]. You touched the very nerve, that's part of it.

It was the only time I think the governor ever patronized me. He almost patted me on the head and he said, "Now Dick, if you think you have to do that, you go do it [laughter], but if you get the bill through, I'll veto it."

I said, "Well, Governor, I would be sorry if you did that. I would rather that I could persuade you that this is in the public interest, but if that's the way it is, that's the way it is."

Until that moment in time, I could walk into the governor's office without an appointment at any

Graves: hour of the day and walk past six senators and ten assemblymen who had appointments and see the governor just like that. There was a real rapport, personal, of the spirit, with Helen MacGregor, and suddenly, no. I was out, and that's the way it was [laughter]. She never spoke to me again until the day came, nor did he, because it soon became apparent that this was going to be a problem. But there was one thing I had to do, I needed Hatfield and Hulse. It is still a part of my philosophy that I would rather have part of something that's going to happen than all of something that isn't. So, I made an unholy deal at the suggestion, as a matter of fact, of Hulse, with the County Supervisors Association. Fifty million for the cities restricted entirely to the sewer systems, fifty million for the counties, not so restricted. That's where the courthouses came in.

I really believe even now that if I had not been obliged to make that compromise to get a part of the cake which we needed desperately, that the governor's position would have been less rigid and unbending than it became.

Morris: Had you already made the deal with the supervisors?

Graves: No, when he patted me on the head I went across the street to the supervisors. Their board of directors happened to be in a meeting, and I laid it out and they were just absolutely flabbergasted, but they came along. I had to settle for half for the cities, but I got that, and it was quite a tussle.

When you go up against Earl Warren, you go up against an enormous political force, and it took everything that we all had. It took everything that the cities could muster, everything that the counties could muster, everything that the Hatfield-Hulse people could muster, it took it all. We put it through and he vetoed it. We put it through over his veto in part on the basis I have already told you. This is when Artie Samish paid off his commitment to Mark Noon.

Morris: To help you if you ever got into trouble?

Graves: Yes.

Party Loyalty and Cross-Filing

Morris: Did Warren have a group of senators and assemblymen who were loyal to him?

Graves: Yes, I would say so. Although, while there would always be individuals who would be personally loyal to Warren, as indeed I was, except in this matter, I don't think it could really be said of Warren as the governor that he had a loyal contingent in the sense in which the President commands the Republican party in Congress. No, I don't think that the state legislature operates on that basis. I don't think it ever has with any governor.

Morris: I wondered because Hatfield and Hulse are consistently very powerful figures, but even though Republicans, there's no sense that they're --

Graves: Well, you must remember that at the time we're talking, we had this crossfiling system which practically nullified the impact of party in the state legislature or in the elections for governor. Remember when Warren won both nominations in the primary, which became an issue and was very significant in my short-lived political career.

One of the compromises that George Hatfield made and managed to persuade his senate colleagues to accept was in permitting a constitutional amendment to go on the ballot (or whatever it took) to allow party designation on the ballot, even though you could crossfile.

And that became operative for the first time in 1954 when I ran. If it had not been for the letter "D" after my name on that ballot, I would not have survived the primary. Oh no, no question about that. The entire Democratic slate survived the primary for no other reason.

Morris: Than that people were voting straight Democratic?

Graves: They were voting Democrat, whereas until then they had never really known, they had just recognized a

Graves: name and they voted. It's not a very nice thing to say about all the voting population of the state, but I would question, except for perhaps the governorship, that they had any idea of what political party some of these people belonged to.

Morris: I've been interested, in going through some old legislative handbooks, that many legislators changed party from election to election.

Graves: You see, almost in the same sense, almost, that local government elections are nonpartisan, the system of crossfiling produced a situation in the California state government which made it almost that nonpartisan, almost. In the assembly and in the senate it really wasn't a matter of what party you belonged to, you filed on both tickets. It was your overall political posture in terms of your constituency; and in the assembly, it was much more important which lobbyist would support you with money than it was which party you belonged to -- which organized groups, I should say, sometimes represented by lobby, but not necessarily. Party was insignificant in California legislature until George Hatfield made his first major political misjudgment when he actually put through against opposition that matter of party identification on the primary ballot.

Morris: When you say misjudgment does that mean you felt it was--

Graves: I don't think he really knew that he was opening Pandora's box, because once that happened, then it became absurd not to allow straight out and out party primaries, because that soon was the result of party identification on the ballot.

I was unknown in the larger context of the state. Everybody in government knew me, but I was not known in California. One of my best political friends, who published a newspaper in San Luis Obispo, wrote an editorial headed "Who is Dick Graves?" He wrote the editorial to say who I really was, and it was a very favorable editorial. But that was the central question: who in the hell is Dick Graves?

Who IS Dick Graves?

profile of a candidate

A new political figure has emerged with startling swiftness in California's election arena this year.

He is not a politician at all; he has spent his working life in non-partisan government, yet in the past few months he has proved himself an adept political campaigner and a man who can translate high principles into the slugging language of the skilled vote-getter.

This political paradox is Richard Graves, the 47-year-old Democratic nominee for Governor. Until January of this year, Graves had never attended a political meeting, never delivered a political speech, and never worked in the campaign of a political candidate.

Until January of this year he had been a Republican, and an admirer of the political philosophy and practical accomplishments of Earl Warren then California's Governor. During the last two years of Warren's tenure Graves had been disturbed, like many other Republicans, by the obvious efforts of Lieutenant Governor Goodwin J. Knight to wreck Warren's program at home and to discredit him as a national Republican figure.

Then Warren became chief justice of the United States Supreme Court and Knight became Governor—successor to a man whose policies Knight had repudiated loudly and often.

Graves made an important decision, and with his typical directness he acted on that decision immediately. He resigned from the Republican Party and became a Democrat.

He did this publicly, and almost at once he found himself reluctantly a politician. Trusted friends and advisors urged his obligations on him and after weighing the problems involved in stepping out of a secure and distinguished career as a non-partisan public servant, he acted again. He announced his decision to run for Governor against Knight.

Until that moment Graves had served as executive director of the League of California Cities for 20 years. In those years he had become known among municipal officials throughout the state—Republicans and Democrats alike—as an able, honest and forthright administrator.

He was an expert in local government—and there isn't a city engineer, a mayor or a city treasurer in California who hasn't at some time or other expressed admiration of Graves' enormous grasp of the intricate problems involved in running communities down at the working level.

That sort of knowledge is now helping him in his new career as a politician. He knows at first hand the kind of jobs Government must do to win the confidence of the people Government represents—and he knows equally well what Government must not do.

As head of the League of California Cities, Graves has acted as consultant, legal advisor and legislative representative of all the cities of California. He has made the League the major force behind practically all the forward-looking local government programs of the past two decades on both State and community levels. For 20 years he developed strong personal convictions on how to deal with such matters as public works and highways, parks and recreation, water resources, smog control, civil service, police and fire protection, schools and taxes.

Graves hasn't labored only as a technician. By Governor Warren, by President Roosevelt, and other state and national leaders he has been selected for posts of top responsibility.

During World War II, for example, when California was in a critical position as a potential enemy target, Graves served by appointment of Governor Warren as State Director of Civil Defense. He organized the regional office of Price Administration, and by appointment of President Roosevelt, he was a member of the Ninth Regional Civil Defense Board.

Graves always knew he wanted to be a public servant. He graduated from the University of California with a master's degree in political science and public administration and held his first public job as secretary to the California Crime Problems Advisory Commission. Later he became consultant to the State Board of Prison Directors and then moved over to run the League of California Cities, a tax-supported, non-partisan association of every municipality in the state.

Graves' current campaign is hammering hard at three broad points.

First, the Democratic nominee for Governor believes that "the present incumbent is neither politically inclined nor administratively capable of providing California with the progressive government needed to solve the state's great problems of population growth."

Second, Graves says: "All things for which a liberal stands depend upon a sound and expanding economy; California's government must take a greater and more intelligent part in aiding and stimulating the private economy."

And third, in the field of political philosophy, Graves declares:

"The state government must do its part to promote a free society, free from attacks of liberty of speech or thought, fredom from the threat of Communist subversion, free from racial and religious discrimination, and free from domination by any interest—political or industrial."

On the outcome of the November election Graves has unbounded optimism.

"Month by month the State registration figures have shown a mounting margin of Democratic registration over Republicans," he says. "Unlike my opponent, I am not pretending to sit on both sides of the party fence. As a Democrat I was nomination by the state's Democratic voters; but as a champion of Earl Warren's enlightened political principles, I know I will receive tremendous support as well from thousands of California Republicans who are thoroughly disgusted with the way those principles have been abandoned by my opponent in favor of callous and cynical expediency."

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Graves: I survived that primary for absolutely no other reason, but that is true of all the rest of the Democrats on that primary. We all survived it because of the letter "D". And that, I am sure, was a political miscalculation by a master politician.

Morris: I seem to recall someone else describing that and saying there were two propositions on that ballot, both having to do with crossfiling in some way or another.*

Graves: I have no recollection of that. It may be that there was going to be one on to abolish crossfiling and George thought it would be better to put this on the ballot as an alternative, that may be.

Morris: Yes.

Graves: That's possible, although I have no clear recollection of it. It would make more sense that a master politician like George would take the lesser of evils. If the abolition of crossfiling had qualified, it would probably have been by a petition. I can't imagine the legislature putting it on the ballot, and it may be, and that's probably what happened, I don't know. I have no recollection, but it would make sense, more sense than what I've been saying that George maneuvered this on the ballot as the lesser of evils. That would make sense.

But, it was enough to carry me through the primaries, yes! [Laughter]

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*See interview with M. F. Small in this series.

V CIVIL DEFENSE AND POLITICS

Morris: Going into the Democratic side of things, didn't you work for or with Olson in civil defense?

Graves: Yes, and this is a part of that period.

The League of Cities originally sponsored the Civil Defense Act in the late '30s, when Olson was governor, and it was finally rewritten in Earl Warren's office, while he was attorney general, with all of us participating, Hal Kennedy and some of the county people, and Bud Carpenter and I and some of the city people and Earl Warren and some of his people. We rewrote it and it was presented to the legislature and passed. Olson asked me if I would ask my board if they would allow me to get this thing organized and going, and so I was the first director of civil defense under Culbert Olson.

Knowing the governor, before I accepted that, we had a conversation in which as tactfully as I could, I asked him if he was prepared to make a commitment to me that I would never be asked to make a purely political appointment. I can accept the principal in politics that if you have two men relatively equal in capabilities and one of them is a friend and the other one is not, that you will appoint your friend. But, if you have two men of by no means equal capabilities, and one of them who is incapable is your friend and the other one is not, you don't appoint your incapable friend. You either appoint the other guy or you go look for somebody else. So I said to Governor Olson, "I need from you for the benefit of my constituency an assurance that I will not be asked to make political appointments." And he gave me that assurance.

Morris: You asked him this --

Graves: Before I took the job, before I took the assignment, yes.

Morris: You said, "Knowing the governor." Was Olson known for making political appointments?

Graves: Yes, terrible, terrible political appointments. He would absolutely surround himself with incompetents. You see, Olson was really in many ways a fine man; in some ways less than that, but who isn't?

He was in my view notorious for appointments of almost incompetents to positions of responsibility because he was in their political debt. If it hadn't been for the fact that this was alleged to be a wartime situation and that while I was too old to be dragooned into military service -- we all wore a kind of a hair shirt, you know, those of us who were not in the service, sensitive about it --

Morris: We weren't yet in direct hostilities?

Graves: Oh no, when I went in with Olson it was in preparation, yes.

Morris: It was 1939.

Graves: But Paul Betters who was running the U.S. Conference of Mayors was involved, and Mrs. Roosevelt, whom I greatly admired, was running around the country with LaGuardia and all this. It was all supposed to be part of the effort, and I was vulnerable to it. It would have been a disaster if anything had really happened, and anytime anything even pretended to happen it was obviously a disaster [laughter], but nevertheless I did it. And then I went into the legislature and went back to my friends and said I wanted five million dollars, and they said, "Dick, you're out of your mind. You're going to be sorry about this."

I said, "I have the governor's absolute assurance," and they said, "All right, sucker," and they gave me the money. This went on for some months. Warren was part of the Civil Defense Council and he said, "Watch it. It'll come. It's only a question of when."

Graves: So, one day, I got a call from Olson. He asked if I'd come and see him, and I did. He said, "Dick, I don't like to do this, but I need a list of jobs --" He asked me for a list of jobs and salaries, and told me that he was under such terrible pressure, and the civil service system was so rigorous, that he just had to find a way to take care of some of his people.

I reminded him of our understanding, and he expressed his regrets. I said, "Well, you think about it for a few days, because if you renew the request, I'll resign. I'm not going out and start screaming and telling the newspapers; I'll just quit and it's all yours."

And I thought, well, as long as this is about to happen, I'll call Warren. I said, here it is and here's what I'm going to do. And he said, "That's alright, that's what you should do."

We said if he really goes through with this, we start the war; and so I got the next call, and I went in and I said, "I'm not going to give you a list; a lot of people can give you a list. What I'm going to give you is this: I resign."

Morris: What had you wanted the five million dollars for?

Graves: You've got to staff this thing -- you've got to have regional offices, communication centers, all this kind of razz-a-ma-tazz.

Morris: So you were hiring people?

Graves: Oh, I was hiring a lot of people, and I tried as best I could to find qualified people for the things that needed to be done, and certainly without regard to their politics. I tried to get people who could work with the cities and counties, because that was really the way it had to work -- that were known to them and acceptable by them and knew how to deal with them. This was the way I tried to do it.

So, I resigned. And the next day I changed my registration from "decline to state" to Republican. The

Graves: first man I ever voted for was Al Smith. That was the first time I could vote, legally. It's kind of one of those things. My father was a deep south Virginian and he was a registered Republican. So what is more natural than that I should choose to register as a Democrat? It's a natural thing. We call it rebellion now, with hair, but it was the same thing then, you know.

If my father was a Republican, I've got to be a Democrat, and especially with this Virginia background. Well, no, you looked at Hoover and you looked at Al Smith, and -- anyway, I voted for Al Smith and registered as a Democrat.

Morris: Had you voted for Olson?

Graves Yes, as a matter of fact, I had. But in the nature of my work with the League of Cities, I was totally nonpartisan. You see, there was just no way to be in the posture I had to have with these people who were involved with local politics, if I was myself involved in politics. So I was a Democrat for a very long while, and then I registered nonpartisan for years -- "decline to state." I was still registered decline to state until Olson drove me into the Republican Party as a "Warren Republican."

Morris: You put it that strongly?

Graves: Oh yes, because he did, you see. At that point in time and with that situation I wanted to identify totally with the opposition, which was Warren. My identification with Warren was a great deal more than my opposition to Olson, but it was all part of the same thing. To simply resign and do nothing else was no measure at all of what I felt, so I just went all the way and I became a Warren Republican.

Morris: That's a lovely thing. Well, then the whole civil defense structure was reorganized, wasn't it?

Graves: Well, it went from bad to worse, and Olson filled it with just unbelievable people -- incredible -- and I went back to the League of Cities and more and more we depended on our own resources of communication and things, and paid less and less attention to the state unless it was unavoidable. [Laughter] And Warren decided the time had come,

Graves: so he became in many ways an active candidate early and this became an issue. It was a significant issue.

Morris: How Olson had handled civil defense?

Graves: Yes. Warren made the issue. I was still not involved in politics. I never went to a Warren meeting, I never did anything. I was the League of Cities. I was a political neuter gender in terms of my activities, although I talked constantly with Warren, but never about running a campaign, never. I told you earlier -- we never had a political discussion.

Morris: These constant conversations you had, were these about --

Graves: Programs: how to do things. People: who could do them. The governor would ask me, "Dick, I need somebody in this kind of a spot."

Morris: This is still as attorney general?

Graves: Yes, but more afterwards as governor. I would say not as attorney general. The things we talked about when he was attorney general -- even before that, I guess -- one time, after he had been attorney general for some period of time, he talked about the effect it was having on him to be in a different position than a district attorney and beginning to see the problems of people.

The thing about Warren which has always seemed to me to be the key to his whole character and his whole personality is that he has -- always had -- this almost endless capacity to grow and change. He said to me, one time when he was district attorney and everybody was talking about him for attorney general: "The only way for me to get to be attorney general, if indeed I want to be, is not to think about that, but to be the best district attorney I know how to be." He said exactly the same thing in the same words when he was attorney general and people were talking about him for governor: "If I expect to be attorney general running for governor, I will never be a good attorney general. If I'm the best attorney general I know how

Graves: to be, and if I'm qualified to be governor, then I may be governor."

But what he had the capability to do after he left the office of district attorney -- although I must say it might possibly be true even in that context -- was to fill every cranny of the office he occupied. Every nook and cranny. He would occupy the office that he had, fully and totally, and give it a new dimension as compared with other people. Then, when the time came, he would make his move from that base. Although he kept his political machinery going, it was so far as I know, honestly not in the sense of starting to campaign for a different office.

He had the same feeling as attorney general until Olson pushed him, which was a point where he really started to move openly rather sooner than he thought, but also because Olson became increasingly vulnerable. So, he made the issue of civil defense. He never asked me to involve myself and I didn't, but we talked about the kind of a program and the kind of people and all of that, as we did in some other areas.

When he became governor, we started seeing each other very frequently in terms of state program and activities and people. He asked me to serve in civil defense again, which I did gladly, and with rather more support from my League of Cities people than I had had earlier, even from the Democrats, and there weren't that many of them. In addition, he paid me the compliment of including me as part of a kitchen cabinet that was totally nonpolitical but was very concerned with what he wanted to do as governor.

We changed the civil defense thing around and got rid of hordes of people. He brought in a very outstanding man from Los Angeles who was a leader in the insurance industry in the whole country, a man by the name of Willard Keith. He made him director of civil defense. And a fellow whose name escapes me, but who is very much a part of Hollywood Park, I think, but a very well-born and a somebody kind of a guy, can't think of his hame; he was deputy.

Graves: But, anyway, they didn't understand government, and they ran riot. Boy, they really built up the overhead, and oh my, it was really awful! One day Warren had to deal with it and he asked Willard if he would make it easy for him, and Willard backed off and the governor asked me to take it over. All he wanted me to do was just to sit there for three solid days and call people in and fire them on the spot.

Morris: What a dreadful assignment.

Graves: [Sighs] Including the guy who was number two, and who was a somebody, and that was a very unhappy experience, but I did it, and got the payroll back in bounds.

Japanese Relocation

Morris: Did the civil defense organization have anything to do with the Japanese Relocation?

Graves: No, that was the Ninth Regional Civil Defense Board. The federal civil defense agency created a number of so-called regional civil defense boards, but they created them around the military. The chairman of the civil defense board for this region was the commanding officer of the Ninth Army Region, General DeWitt. Of course, he was the board -- it was war by this time. Warren was a member and I was a member, and there was a considerable number of other people.

So, you're on a board and you're a civilian, and the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor and we are at war. We are the center of the American Japanese population -- California is. There is a problem of dual citizenship. There were reports and perhaps some evidence that at least a part of the Japanese population had some knowledge of what was going to happen.

Montebello was a Japanese center. Louis Burke is a very open-minded unprejudiced man. He told me that on December 7th, no Japanese appeared on the

Graves: streets of Montebello. I don't know whether that's true or not, but Louis Burke believed it to be true.

The Army, represented in the person of General DeWitt, stated to our board that it was impossible to determine the extent of disloyalty, actual or potential, if any, or the potential sabatage, if any, among the California Japanese population, when all the right words about the shock and trespass on civil rights and all the rest, had been said, the decision became a national security matter.

Morris: Who said the things about civil rights and trespass?

Graves: As I recall, we all did. In the end, General DeWitt said that this had to be done. We really weren't being asked. We were told. The Attorney General of the United States, Tom Clarke, gave the order, but the decision was clearly made by the military.

At that meeting, we were just told; we weren't asked. We had no authority to do this thing, it was done by the army and the attorney general. The idea that the civil defense agency of California or even the Ninth Regional Civil Defense Board or the sitting governor had anything to do about making the decision. Supposing we had said no? So what? This is all nonsense. We were told what they were going to do.

Morris: Which was --

Graves: They were going to intern the Japanese for the duration.

Morris: There are a number of sources that say that Warren was seeking this as attorney general of California.

Graves: Not so, I was there.

Morris: Fine, that's why I asked.

Graves: In the first place, no, he didn't seek it. I was in the meeting when it was announced, and I was so close to this thing that, no, I don't believe that. I would have to see documentary evidence, and then I would want to know where the documents came from. I can't say it's not so, I can only say I who was

Graves: directly involved neither saw nor heard evidence of this. He was a man meticulous in his concern for his legal responsibilities and not going beyond them. I do not think he felt responsible for the military security of the United States or the state of California, I don't really think so. His conduct at that meeting would not suggest it. The meeting was called, and the general stood there, all five feet seven of him standing nine feet tall, and told us what was going to happen.

I left the meeting and I went to Louis Burke (we were all in San Francisco at that time), and we concocted a telegram to Attorney General Tom Clark. It said, "We are in no position to question the military judgment or the military necessity, but conceding that, we urge you to appoint immediately a trustee to hold in trust all the properties of the Japanese in this state, and to hold them for the duration of war, lest they be taken over by the wolves."

That telegram came in very handy when I was running for governor against the then mayor of Berkeley, who was also my friend until the day I announced against him -- Laurance Cross.

He had a lot more guts on the gut issues of the day (like who can speak on campus or street corners) than I had ever demonstrated. He had the courage and I was not in a position where I had to find out whether I did or not, but I was by no means convinced I had his moral courage.

As an aside, I was attacked in Berkeley at a meeting of a school for having been on the board that had interned the Japanese.

I said, "Well, there are only two ways I can respond to this. One of them is to tell you that we were never asked, we were told, but that's an excuse. The other is that I sent a telegram that day. My office is only ten blocks away, and I want my secretary to bring that telegram here so I can read it to you. So I ask you for a fifteen minute recess."

I phoned my secretary and told her where to find the telegram, and I got back on the stage. And

Graves: then my secretary walked on the stage with the telegram. Now, if you planned this, you couldn't do it -- my secretary was Japanese.

Morris: Oh, beautiful.

Graves: And I said, "Ladies and gentlemen, I would like you to meet my secretary, Miss Mary Ishi." Then I read them the telegram.

Mayor Cross's supporters really wished they hadn't brought that up. [Laughter] All I can say about that incident, tragic as it was, and it was very, very bad, and still apart from judging the military necessity, and the personal agony of the Japanese involved, what we let happen to their properties was shocking, shocking, just awful!

Morris: You're saying that the trusteeship didn't work out?

Graves: They didn't even create it!

Morris: Did you get a reply to the telegram?

Graves: No.

Morris: This was a telegram back to Tom Clark.

Graves: Yes, sure. No, they not only didn't answer the telegram, they didn't do anything. All the wolves came in and took over their property.

Morris: Were there no state statutes?

Graves: Not as far as I knew, there were no state statutes at all. They were wiped out. If you are interned and also you lose all your properties that you've worked for all your lives, that compounds the felony.

No, I don't think that anything was done at all to protect them -- at least I have no recollection of it. But, all I can say is that, being very close to the situation and being very close to the governor, I have no personal knowledge of him having taken any active part in advocating this. I know he did not advocate it at the board, and I know it was announced as a decision already taken by the federal government.

Morris: That's interesting, because, as I say, in our other interviews we have totally opposite points of view --

Graves: They could even be right. All I'm saying is that I was there.

Morris: That's why I wanted to ask you about it. Were there people in the state who might have been close to Warren who were for internment?

Graves: Oh yes, there were people who were terrified of the Japanese running free, sure there were, indeed there were.

Morris: Man-in-the-street type people or people in positions of power in the government?

Graves: I can't reconstruct it. I do know that insofar as I know or knew, (at that time I made no personal inquiries), that there was not a single evidence of any Japanese disloyalty or sabatoge in Hawaii or California.

Morris: In Hawaii -- much closer to the scene of operation.

Graves: Very much so. I've never found any evidence of any disloyal acts by the Japanese population of Honolulu.

Morris: Or here, in California?

Graves: No, I've never heard of a single instance of any. I know it happened in San Francisco with the Italian population. I know it happened with the German population, but I've never heard of an instance of Japanese, no.

They found some actual traitors among the Italian population, and prosecuted them, but I've never heard of it in connection with the Japanese, no, I haven't.

Morris: Did you and Warren ever talk during the two years they were interned about how they were getting along and what was going to happen once the war was over?

VI SOME ASPECTS OF GOVERNOR WARREN'S ADMINISTRATION

Postwar Economic Planning

Graves: Not in these terms, not in terms of the Japanese population. We talked about what was going to happen in economic terms in employment and things like that. Sam May was very much involved in what to do about jobs and economic development immediately after the war.

Morris: That must have been sort of a golden opportunity for him to talk in terms of planning --

Graves: Prophet without honor, still.

Morris: Was he a part of the Re-employment and Reconstruction Commission?

Graves: I think he was in the beginning. This had to do with a man named Alexander Heron, if my memory is correct. Much ado about nothing, although it had nothing to do with Heron. I mean, this is the kind of thing that the resources of the state can't really have a very great impact on; anyway, there was a lot of conversation.

Sam was involved at the beginning. I think the thing that always happened to him happened again. He was gradually edged out because his ideas and proposals were as usual right and very basic and fundamental and drastic and frightening. [Laughter] Yes, people really want to talk about something that's nice and comfortable. Mainly talk. But, it's my

Graves: recollection that he was very much a part of the whole start of it, and maybe even initiated it, for all I know, for all I remember. In the end, though, I think he was on the sidelines.

Morris: You said something a few minutes ago, that it was something beyond the resources of the state, to deal with.

Graves: Yes. I tend to oversimply very complex things, but it does seem to me that a state government really has very little to contribute to turning around the basic economy of the country. A state can hurt itself in the economic sphere by tax policies or other kinds of punitive or negative, retarding policies, but the economy is not a state matter. The economy tends to be national and subject to national influences.

The companies that are significantly involved in the employment of large numbers of people generally are national companies and respond to national situations. What can a state really do? When you get right down to it, it isn't a hell of a lot. The federal government can say, "We're going to put billions of dollars into this," and move it, somehow. "We're going to do things -- federal tax policy -- we're going to do this and this and this."

The states can do things which encourage industry to come in -- but just take the weight of the federal direct contracts with American enterprise, and the fact that the feds can say, "We're going to give you this contract if you do it in California, or if you do it in Seattle."

Morris: Sort of a footnote here, in reading the economic forecasts in the annual state budgets, there are a number of comments about the number of federal contracts that were granted in California, and then about '47, the comment was that these will probably fall off -- California will not continue to get this high number. But on into '48, '49, '50, and '51, we were still getting a large and possibly disproportionate share of federal contracts.

Graves: We always have, until now.

Morris: I wondered if, again, this resulted not just because of the beautiful climate of California, but from lobbying by the California delegation?

Graves: Plants in being. Companies with know-how in being. Aerospace, which was then airplanes. Ship building capability. Every place which had a shipbuilding capability, which was by no means limited to California, was very busy indeed. But it was the companies with plants in being which could be expanded quickly, that dictated where the contracts went during World War II.

Morris: What I'm talking about how this held up on through until 1950.

Graves: You see, it's held up all the way through because the airplane companies and their related contractors became the aerospace industry. The dilemma, the disaster which confronts us now, is because of the pull-back in aerospace. The near collapse of the economy of Seattle because of Boeing, but there are some other factors, too. We had a war economy where you used what was at hand and it wasn't really that political [laughter]. If you had to produce something you went where it could be produced, whether it was in the President's state or somewhere else.

Morris: But we did an awful lot of plant building in California in the Second World War.

Graves: Yes, but you were building basically around companies that had the know-how to produce. One of the first places that got hit after the war was San Diego.

Morris: That was airplanes, wasn't it?

Graves: Yes. In times of peace, when the pressures of the war economy aren't on, you get an extraordinary number of things done in Texas and the south, especially when you have a President from Texas. You had a great resurgence of activity in the northeast part of the country when Kennedy was President.

Morris: We now have a President from California.

Graves: And, we've had a surprising number of things from Nixon, although he can't sustain the aerospace

Graves: industry, that's too big. That's something else. [Laughter] But, Nixon hasn't done badly for California, within the limits of what he can do, but not long ago I was really watching with some interest what Johnson was doing for Texas and the South.

The point of this was, in the beginning, that while there's been a great deal of talk about activity for postwar development of a state like California, the state doesn't control the name of the game. The economic forces -- and these are in part independent of the government, but they are also very, very much influenced by the federal government in certain areas of the economy -- are not controllable by the states.

Morris: There was one other aspect of it that interested me -- the reemployment planning seemed to be largely in terms of putting people to work in construction -- again, all this postwar construction of courthouses, and hospitals and municipal buildings. I wondered if maybe part of the problem in the planning was that after the Second World War, you couldn't just generally put a lot of people to work in construction --

Graves: No, they don't have the skills.

Morris: They don't have the skills and also they have a different set of expectations now than they may have had in the '30s.

Graves: Well, I don't know if it's that so much, but when you think about the fact that, among the most highly organized of all the forms of economic activity, the building trades are about as tight as anything you can get into. You don't move people into construction for two good reasons. One of them is the union resistance to it and, second, is they don't have the capability or the skills. For years the unions have been having closed doors and very little in the way of apprenticeships; they're getting as bad as the doctors and lawyers in keeping people out of their jobs.

Alright, you can't take people who have learned to weld and make plasterers out of them overnight, there isn't any way. So, all this talk (and I remember it at the time) was nonsense. You know, you can't take

Graves: all these people and train them to do other things when you didn't have any facilities to train them, in the first place. Then the way you learn the building trades in the system we operate under is as an apprentice; and there weren't any offers for apprenticeships [laughter]. So, you know, a lot of conversation.

One of the most dangerous thing in our society is the way that governments, and most particularly the federal government because that's the one that people really watch for this, raise the hopes and expectations of people, then destroy the hopes, and then wonder why they get the backlashes that they get.

Federal Funding

Morris: On this business of the federal government's influence on the national economy, during those years of the '40s federal aid was increasing by leaps and bounds in --

Graves: In what area?

Morris: I'm thinking of the Department of Public Health, starting with the Social Security Act, and money that became available for local services.

Graves: Oh, I never finished the story about my sewers, did I? This has something to do with that.

Morris: I'd like to hear the rest of that, yes.

Graves: Yes, for a long while, like a couple of years after the Christmas Tree Bill, I was persona non grata in the governor's office. Then, there was a meeting in San Francisco. It was called by the governor at the request of the United States Public Health Service, and I was there in one of the front rows. Sitting about two rows in front of me was Helen MacGregor, the governor's secretary, and the governor was presiding. At the early part of the meeting, one of the senior representatives of the United States Public Health Service got up and said, "Governor,

Graves: there's something we don't understand. While the cities of the whole country have been falling dangerously behind in their sewer programs, California has made progress, and we are absolutely at a loss to understand it." And Warren looked me right square in the face, and he said, "Well, ladies and gentlemen, I'm about to do something which is long overdue. I owe my friend, Dick Graves, an apology. The answer to your question is that he took fifty million dollars away from me, over my violent resistance, to spend on sewers." And he said, "Now, Dick, I was right about those counties; but you were right about the cities. I'm sorry about this, and I'd appreciate it if you would come and see me."

And Helen MacGregor turned around and smiled the most angelic smile you ever saw.

Morris: I'll bet she was pleased!

Graves: And she hadn't said a single word to me in two years or so. [Laughter] And I thought that that was the measure of the man, that it wasn't just that he was prepared to say that he was wrong, but he did it in the right time and place.

Morris: I should say so, very handsomely.

National Campaigns

Graves: Then we were again very good friends. Not long after that -- this is on Warren again, because that's very much part of your history -- he called me from somewhere in Ohio during the campaign, Dewey versus Uncle Harry. He said, "Dick, I've never asked you a political question, but I want an honest answer."

This was just a week or ten days, two weeks before the election.

Morris: Right there in the clinch.

Graves: He said, "What do you think?"

Graves: I said, "I think you're dead." I said, "I don't think there's any way to win a political campaign by not campaigning."

He said, "Dick, I've been trying to tell Tom that for four months, that we can't win this one sitting on our hands."

That's the only time that he had ever asked me a political question up till then.

Morris: And you were right.

Graves: And as it turned out, but he knew it. You couldn't fool him. He knew it a long time before I did.

Morris: You said that up till then he hadn't asked you a political question.

Graves: No, after that we talked about politics. When he was then seriously a presidential candidate.

Morris: Let's see, Dewey versus Uncle Harry would have been '48.

Graves: Well, Warren was seriously a candidate in '48, and then in 1952. He did not want to be nominated for vice-president in '48. He didn't want to accept that.

Morris: That's what I understood.

Graves: But he was a candidate, without a following except his own delegation, in '48. Then he was really a candidate in '52. He and Taft and Eisenhower.

Morris: And he and you talked about how to build a following?

Graves: No, not that way. He just told me he was going to make his play and we did talk about it. After it was over, he told me the story of Nixon.

You see, while I had never been active in politics I knew a lot of political people and one of the people that I thought was a great person was Jerry Voorhis, congressman from Whittier. When Nixon came back from the wars, He was assistant city attorney of Whittier, and he was writing letters to our League of Cities office as to what was the law of cities.

Morris: That's interesting.

Graves: You know, talk about meteoric rise! So, his first campaign was against Jerry Voorhis. That was a very bad campaign, that crucified one of the finest men that I ever met in politics.

Morris: You had known Voorhis before he became a congressman?

Graves: I knew him as a congressman, and I knew Helen Gahagan Douglas. I knew her personally, not intimately, but I knew her personally. She was involved in civil defense and when we would go touring around with Mrs. Roosevelt and LaGuardia, Mrs. Douglas was sometimes around. I thought she was a wonderful woman, and indeed she was.

So, my early impressions of Nixon relate to Jerry Voorhis and Helen Gahagan Douglas.

Morris: And Nixon's type of political campaigning.

Graves: Yes. That's right. So, he was on my black list. However, he hung in there on Alger Hiss, and from everything that I read and learned, and think I know, I had to give him a plus for that one. Because, without Nixon that matter would never have been exposed and resolved. But, it's unfortunate that it's all part of the same pattern. His early political strength always came out of something having to do with either accusing somebody of being a communist or fellow traveler as in the case of Voorhis and Helen Douglas, or an actual one in the case of Alger Hiss. I could have wished that it could have some other focus.

Anyway, Warren didn't put him on the delegation that he originally appointed.

Morris: There was a rival Werdel delegation?

Graves: Well, there might have been, but it was unimportant. It was tromped, really smashed. But, when Warren appointed the delegation to the Republican National Convention for that '52 campaign, Nixon was a sitting Senator, and he was not put on the delegation originally.

Morris: Would that be considered a snub in political circles?

Graves: Of the first order of magnitude.

Morris: Why did Warren not appoint him?

Graves: He was a serious candidate for the presidency.

Morris: Nixon was, already?

Graves: No, Warren was.

Morris: Then why not appoint your state's Senator?

Graves: Well, I should think that it would be a sort of indication of a certain lack of confidence in his support.

But, in any case, Nixon assured Warren of his support, so Warren reversed himself and put him on the delegation. Whereupon he jumped the train in Chicago and reported for duty in the Eisenhower headquarters.

Morris: In what terms did he assure Warren of his support?

Graves: I'm with you until you release me -- is that clear enough?

Morris: Yes.

Graves: There was another Senator by the name of Knowland.

Morris: The young Mr. Knowland.

Graves: Yes, and Taft offered him the vice-presidency. He said I am with my governor until he releases me. That's the difference.

Morris: I believe Mr. Nixon has written somewhere that he never gave Warren any assurances of his support, that he always was an Eisenhower man.

Graves: Well, then you have to weigh that against the fact that Warren did not put him on the delegation originally and then did. It seems to me extremely unlikely that a California governor aspiring to the presidential nomination would put an Eisenhower man on his delegation.

Morris: MacIntyre Faries, a judge here in town, was also on that campaign train, and the impression that he gave was that Nixon was actively lobbying amongst the California delegation.*

Graves: On the train?

Morris: On the train.

Graves: I have the same information from an impeccable source.

Morris: Was Warren also on the train?

Graves: I can't answer that, I don't remember. I would be inclined to say yes.

Morris: That must have been a very sticky situation.

Graves: To say the least.

Morris: So at the time when Warren was most serious as a candidate, he was getting undercut from his home state.

Graves: Yes.

Morris: That's an interesting kind of development. Because of other people's competing ambitions, or because of a lack of confidence?

Graves: Another interesting sphere of speculation, and now I have no firsthand information, is to speculate about what was really happening when Goodwin Knight was pulled out of the governor's office to run for Senator. Remember that?

Morris: In 1958.

Graves: Goody Knight succeeded Warren, then he beat me, and then when he was about to run again, they persuaded him to run for Senator and Knowland ran for governor. And it destroyed Knowland as a political figure in California, and left Nixon unchallenged. Now, that's

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*See interview with Judge Faries in this series.

Graves: interesting, is it not?

Morris: That really is, when for so long the Knowlands were a major power and kingmakers.

Graves: Let me go way back to something else for a minute and then let's call it an evening, OK?

VII REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Professional Municipal Management

Graves: While I was an executive of the League of Cities, I was invited to become, what would you call it, chairman or some such thing of the graduate seminar in municipal management.

Morris: Back at Berkeley?

Graves: At Berkeley, which I did for a number of years and which was one of the most rewarding things I've ever done except for a somewhat comparable experience in Philadelphia which we'll get to one of these times. By then I had established myself en rapport with city planners and with all of these professional divisions within the league -- the engineers, and the health officers and all the rest of these people I was representing -- more or less professional groups that work for cities as well as the elected officials.

Morris: That's interesting.

Graves: The League of Cities is organized into geographical regions which have their own regional meetings on some regular schedule and talk about the problems of their own regions, and the league staff tends to participate and not to dominate that.

And then they have departments of the league, like mayors and councilmen, city managers, city clerks and finance officers, and fire chiefs and police chiefs and city engineers, and city attorneys and city planners, and so forth. At the time of the

Graves: annual meetings they meet quite separately most of the time and discuss their own professional business. They then assemble in general session several times there in the course of the three-day meeting.

They're all represented on the board of directors of the league by one of their own chosen people. So, that as this thing evolved, our central staff was very close to the leaders of these professional groups. I had a particular affinity for the city planners as well as the city managers. One of my crusades (not so well received at the time) was that because city planning was a separate activity of city government divorced from the city manager's office, with an intervening city planning commission, it isolated itself from the implementation of its own plans and programs. While I had no objection to an advisory city planning commission, I believed the planner should be a member of the staff of the city manager, because most of the manager's programs and budget related to some form of planning, not just land-use planning, but facilities planning, the whole bit. It's all interrelated.

So, I had some classic arguments with these people. I ennunciated this heresy at national meetings of the Association of Planners, and in our regional and annual League of Cities meetings. Jack Kent and I conducted this debate at least once a year for the seminar [laughter]. One of the things I did with some small success was to attract to that seminar the other academic disciplines, some considerable number of the students of which were likely to end up working for government. So I undertook to persuade their counselors to send some of them, at least, to my seminar so I could get this crossfertilization among the disciplines, and not just have a bund of students in political science.

Morris: Which would be the other disciplines? Engineering and --

Graves: Well, ever hear of Bill Finley? The greatest public employment agency that has ever been generated was my seminar. If you had any brains, you went out of that seminar to a municipal job, because the city employing people paid our league staff the compliment of asking us to send people to them, and that included city managers and everything else.

Graves: When somebody showed some real talent in my seminar, if he wanted to go to work in a city, he had it made. I had a lot of fun. The now senior city managers in the state were my students then.

Morris: Would you run down a list of them?

Graves: Tom Fletcher is an outstanding example. He loves to tell about being in my seminar and having me keep him after the seminar had adjourned and telling him that he had more political understanding of the role of a city manager than anyone I'd ever met in the seminar, and that I wanted to keep in touch with him and spend some time with him personally. I got him his first job and he loves to tell all that about his beginnings.

There have been many of them, but I can't quickly recall them all.

Some number of distinguished city planners were in that seminar. Notable among those was Bill Finley, who was an extraordinarily arrogant young man intellectually. Very bright and impatient of people who were less able than he. I brought a great big roll of newspapers fastened with elastic bands, like a bludgeon, put it down on my desk and said, "The next time you insult a member of this seminar, I'm going to whap you over the head with this."

The seminar made a significant contribution, I think, to Bill's maturity. I got him a job in Richmond that was just suited for him at the time, because he was an assistant to a city engineer who had none of this brilliance, so he had to learn to adapt. Also Wayne Thompson was the city manager, and that made a difference, you see. So Bill ended up with his own city planning department in Richmond. He later became director of the National Capital Planning Commission, and is now doing awfully well as an officer of the Rouse Company in Baltimore where he has played a leading role in the planning and development of the new town, Columbia, Maryland.

This seminar was an opportunity once a week to find myself on the defensive against a lot of very bright young people, trying to interpret to them what it

Graves: really means to have to work within the framework of government, and to have them recognize that you do have to work within the framework and you have to be very sensitive to the political problems of the city council. You just can't expect the city council to go out and bleed and die politically for you all the time. How do you make your plans and programs politically acceptable, that is what we spent a lot of time talking about.

Morris: How does one do this as a professional?

Graves: Yes, how do you as a professional in a city hall having a personal goal which raises some real political problems, how do you manage to make it somehow politically acceptable so that the city council could possibly support you and survive?

Part of it is semantics and part of it is (and it is, a lot of it is semantics) saying to yourself, "Well, this is a very radical step and I can't accomplish this all at one time, I can't ask anyone to do all this at one time, so this is step one, and then we can get to step two and in step three we're there, but if I try to go to step three coming in, I'm dead."

This is very hard for them to understand. I think we made some progress with some of them, anyway. It was a lot of fun. I enjoyed it and I think it was a good thing.

Morris: Did you feel that as a group these graduate students were more responsive than that group of which you were a part in that first lecture you got from Sam May?

Graves: Oh yes, because these people were already committed to some course of action with their lives. They were interested -- these were graduate students, and they had already made some commitments as to what they wanted to do. This was a training course. We went through all the routines of the courses, you know, mostly ICMA courses, basic management principles, and all that. But, always I tried to get them to understand what it really means to operate within a political framework. Sometimes you have a notion --

Role of City Managers

Graves: I was preaching heresies again at meetings of the International City Managers Association, to which they later elected me an honorary life member, telling them I felt that the basic defect of the city manager system was that it made no provision for political leadership of the community, in fact it prevented it. It prevents it, and I'm not sure anymore whether the absolute choice that I presented to them would have been better, I don't really know, but I did tell them that I thought the city manager had far too much authority and no political responsibility, and that they had really carved themselves out a nice little niche. Their code of ethics and their whole posture was that "Oh, we don't make policy, the council makes it."

Morris: And this you said in the council of city managers?

Graves: Oh yes, at the ICMA annual meetings.

Morris: Not your graduate students?

Graves: No, this was the managers. "You've really got a neat trick, you would have the people believe that you don't make policy in order that you not be held politically accountable for what you have persuaded the city council to do. And yet you and I know, because I know you, that when you're going to make a major recommendation to the city council, you have already talked to everybody on that council and you know whether you've got the votes. But, you confront the public and say "Who, me?'"

And I said, "And so there is no political leader, there is no one, and you have created a eunuch, politically."

Morris: Of the council?

Graves: Of the community. It has no political leader. It has a council which is purely legislative and it has a manager who says he doesn't have anything to do with policy. So, who do the people look to?

Oh, we really had some fun with this. We really did. And oh, they almost read me out of the party.

Graves: But, they're still debating that question and they're much different than they were, much different.

Morris: In becoming more political?

Graves: Much more in the forefront of open advocacy of the policies which they think are necessary.

Morris: As an association?

Graves: Individual managers, and their association reflects it. And here are these fellows who were hiding behind all this comouflage, and now they're out in front dealing with the problems of the blacks in social terms and all kinds of things that would have been incredible, unbelievable, in my day.

It is still true in the pure council-manager form that there is no single elected political leader. You can't have a seven-man council that is a political leader, you know.

So, I was saying to them that I thought they should be purely administrative, there should be an elected mayor who should be the political leader of that city, and that if they want some protection, fine. The mayor appoints them with the approval of the council and the mayor fires them with the approval of the council, or whatever. However, if a strong mayor wants you fired, you're going to quit anyway.

Face it, you know, your job tenure now is only five and a half years, so why worry about it. Oh, we had some fun with that. I still don't know the answer to that. I still don't.

I don't know what the result would have been of what I was advocating. But, I guess what I was trying to tell them (and I still think) is that, how could you say it -- a program with no real content, perfectly administered, is much worse than a municipal program conceived in trying to meet the needs of the community, responding, but not so well administered. If I had to take my choice, I'll take programs not so well administered in preference to a vacuum perfectly administered.

When I was talking, these men thought their major function was to figure out all the techniques

Graves: of how to prepare a budget.

Morris: How to run a tidy ship.

Graves: It was all technique. Why, it was going to be the most marvelous thing in the world. We got performance budgeting. We would know how to put a unit cost on the fire department. We may not have a good fire department, but we know how much it costs. So we budget on unit costs. Thus was a tremendous step forward. This is nonsense!

I guess I was talking to them about what they themselves would come to realize. We haven't changed the format much yet, but the substance has changed a lot. Managers are no longer, as a group, all wrapped up in technique. They are very much involved in program. And this is a major change. I would guess that the city manager form versus the strong mayor form is still in some evolutionary stage. I don't know where it's going to come out. There's a great deal to be salvaged from both, but the pure city manager form as it was stated and emphasized and hung onto in the '40s and early '50s, which was my period -- it's not like that anymore. It has changed.

Morris: Has the training for people to become city managers changed at all? I would think that if you'd been heavily oriented in cost-accounting techniques and efficiency, you'd have a very hard time being comfortable with the new "let it all hang out" school of civic enterprise.

Graves: I have no exposure now except as an honorary member of ICMA -- I'm on their mailing list. I get their published material, and I don't have time to analyze it except when something attracts my interest. But, just scanning, I'd say the answer has to be yes. I would guess that not more than thirty percent of their material, maximum, has to do with this nit-picky technique stuff that they used to be totally absorbed in. Most of it is really confronting the hard issues, and it's manager stuff.

Morris: People stuff?

Graves: Oh boy, and how! Yes! And all the hard issues. People issues are dominant in the material I get

Graves: from them now, and very, very much reaching for all of the highly professional skills they need as tools. I could build a library on their efforts to find a way to use the computer sciences to try to find out what their community is really all about.

Morris: In terms of human needs.

Graves: Oh, absolutely.

Morris: Health and recreation and schools?

Graves: Oh, yes. It's not computers in order to find out how much the fire department is costing, no, it's people-oriented. As usual, people make these changes, and there is a new leader in ICMA, Mark Keane. The revolution starts from the day that he went there. His predecessor -- a fine man -- trained in the school at the University of Chicago, 1313 Brownlow, et al. They created the myth of the apolitical city manager, and they were not happy when as a very young man, as early as 1941, I got myself elected president of the American Municipal Association.

This did not please them because I was a rebel. They had cast this thing in a mold which was a reflection of their own thinking, but no more. Pat Healy was a contemporary of mine as a League of Cities director. He came out of Utah. He's now director of the National League of Cities, and has been for a long while. He completely remade their whole approach -- totally different. It's entirely compatible with what the leader of ICMA is doing. But then he had a whole generation of young mustangs who are now running cities. No, it's not the same. It's very encouraging.

The thing that strikes me the most is that in the National League of Cities and in the League of California Cities, the most radical expressions of a new point of view that is people-oriented and way out is coming from the mayors.

Morris: In other words, mayors, though elected, are becoming more conscious of --

Graves: Very much, way out there, facing up to the realities. Yes. Very significant and to me very new. Didn't exist at all. I would find some allies among the

Graves: mayors in my period when the issues were certainly very much different and much simpler to deal with than now, but even the ones who supported me, they didn't go home and talk about it in their cities. But these men are, oh yes, they are. Very interesting, very significant. It's strange, too, at a time when in our own state the cities are reaching out and being bolder and more realistic and trying to deal with things, that we suddenly create a state government which is going in the opposite direction.

Political Pressures: 1971

Morris: Is this again because of individuals? People?

Graves: No, I can't say that anymore because Reagan got reelected. Admittedly Unruh was not the best of all possible candidates -- he might have been the best of all possible candidates available at the time.

But no, I don't know how they got this dichotomy. After all, a governor has to be elected in the end by the same people who elected the mayors. Reagan essentially, it seems to me, represents a very effective opposition. He is a very articulate spokesman and a very courageous one in a manner of speaking. Although, if you get elected, you weren't courageous, you were smart.

Of all the things that people are unhappy about, upset about, and are against, wouldn't it be fair to say that the Reagan administration represents a negative rather than a positive thing? And that the people who are unhappy about what's happened on campus; unhappy about the young, the hippies, and the protests; and unhappy about the blacks and the browns are basically the people who elected Reagan. They elected Yorty, too.

Morris: I gather he's thinking he might run for governor.

Graves: Of course, he's talking about going to New Hampshire and running for President [laughter], but remember, Yorty was the candidate for Senator when I ran for governor.

Morris: He seems to be one of those people you mentioned

Morris: earlier who likes politics.

Graves: Oh, he loves it. He has enormous survival powers.

Morris: Is it possible that the California voter is sufficiently an ambivalent creature that at the same time he could vote more progressive city leadership and --

Graves: I don't know. This state, if you look at its history over a long period of time, name the Democratic governors.

Morris: Brown and Olson.

Graves: Brown and Olson.

Morris: And Olson was the first Democratic governor in many years.

Graves: A zillion years, and he was a one term governor. Brown had it twice. Otherwise, solidly Republican.

Morris: But many different varieties of Republicans.

Graves: Oh, admittedly. I think part of it is the influx of people and where they come from, what their political traditions are. We can't really count the disenfranchised blacks for so many years. So many people here from the Midwest, which is basically Republican country. I think that the growth of the suburbs has created a desire to identify with the establishment people, basically Republican, so that a good many blue-collar hardhats when they move to the suburbs become good staid Republicans. The political direction of the state in the absence of a really shocking economic recession or worse which we are getting real close to around here --

Morris: It seems to be getting possible again.

Graves: That it does. We can talk about all the built-in safeguards, but I think Nixon is going to start finding out it isn't going to work, because he's not going to take it anymore, he's going to start to make a move, he's going to let somebody else worry about inflation. He isn't going to take any more of this.

I would say that the direction of this state,

Graves: In the absence of an economic crisis, is definitely conservative. And the direction of the country is. It's a response interestingly enough, I think, to the social stresses that exist, disaffected youth on the one hand and the push from blacks and browns, and stuff like that, so that everyone's scared, and so they vote against it -- whatever it is.

I wish it weren't so, because it's going to create added strains and what the black people and the brown people are demanding is their birthright, and they aren't going to quit.

Morris: Then it's no more than what was being called for in all the recommendations coming out of all of Governor Warren's commissions and committees.

Graves: Yes.

Morris: You read the Department of Mental Hygiene and the Youth Authority and the Department of Education recommendations from the '40s and we're still saying the same thing.

Minority Group Issues

Graves: That's right. These are conversation pieces designed to get rid of the problem by talking about it. [Laughter] You really don't until you're prepared to allocate enormous public resources for a very long period of time, to prepare people and equip people to work productively at some level of skill.

There were many answers. Mrs. Roosevelt, one time in a public meeting said (a woman of great wisdom and great courage), this was at a real good liberal meeting, "I have no interest in the integration of schools. All I want to do is integrate neighborhoods. If I can integrate neighborhoods, I have already integrated schools. But, if I don't integrate neighborhoods, what's the good of integrating schools?"

She just hit this busing thing before it ever

Graves: came up. There isn't any point. It's like some of the experiences I had in Philadelphia. You wouldn't like to stay here for two weeks and talk, would you? [Laughter]

Morris: I'd be delighted!

Graves: There is a whole generation of adult blacks -- I think it's already too late to educate them up to any level of skills that are significant, and that the only thing that really works is to say "this is the last generation that's going to lack this, and we're going to start now with what we can salvage out of the present generation of young men, and from here on, no more." But boy, I tried to run a program once for the adult black. Whew! In Philadelphia I had a training program for service station attendants set up. I got backing from Gulf Oil, Atlantic Richfield -- the whole bit; we had the best trainers from these companies. They were Basic English people who never used a two syllable word where one would do, and we had a whole room full of people largely black. We were trying to train them to be service station attendants. No way.

Morris: Were these men fresh out of the South?

Graves: No, they were Philadelphians. But remember, they lived in black neighborhoods where nobody speaks English, nobody even speaks Basic English.

So we backed off and we said, "We have to take our trainers and train black teachers who understand it. And, that's the nature of the problem.

When you say to me that you're going to take a black child out of a black ghetto neighborhood and send him to a white school and he's going to be there four or five hours a day and is going to go right back into the ghetto and stop talking English, and start talking this dialect, it doesn't make any sense to me. That's not the answer, it just isn't.

Morris: Part of the problem on integrating neighborhoods is that there are restrictive covenants in many areas that have been very hard to break.

Graves: I think that any covenant entered into which is

Graves: contrary to the law is void. As far as deed restrictions are concerned, I'm not impressed. That is on the face of it held to be illegal. I was accused of having signed one because I lived in that kind of a neighborhood when I was running for office. I was accused of having signed a deed restriction in my neighborhood in Berkeley. Back in 1936, I had a young struggling architect who was starving to death, by the name of William Wilson Wurster, design me a house.

Morris: I've heard of him!

Graves: Slightly. And, I had a young struggling landscape architect by the name of H. Leland Vaughan. Boy, I really picked them. Everybody I picked became a dean! [Laughter] So I got this accusation and I said, "I'll tell you what I'll do." I'll make a public commitment that if you can find a deed restriction with my name on it, I will withdraw in favor of Mayor Cross."

So they went and looked. But I had refused to sign it.

Morris: There was such a deed restriction?

Graves: It didn't apply to my property. I wouldn't sign it. Sometimes you're born with a certain -- or maybe something happens to you along the line -- maybe it was my football team -- it might have been, you see, I don't know. No man really knows why he feels and does believe the things he does.

I was accused of this in a meeting in a church in Los Angeles, Negro church. The coincidences that happen sometimes you could never arrange. I had a student in my seminar by the name of Sherrill Luke.

Luke is a black man and so handsome he just knocks your eyes out, and he writes beautifully. And he's very bright. He came into my seminar. And, he was so good I called up Wayne Thompson and I said, "Wayne, I have a new assistant city manager for you. He's black. And I won't send him to you unless you make me a solemn promise that you will never use Luke on anything that directly affects the black community.

Graves: He said, "Well, I'll talk to him." And he hired him. The first black assistant city manager in the whole United States. He's the first black man that ever joined the Rotary Club of Richmond, I can tell you that! He was legislative secretary to Governor Brown. He is in charge of the urban affairs program for Aetna Life Insurance Company at their home office, where he allocates Aetna's share of all that money that the companies all committed, five million or six million dollars --

Well, he was assistant city manager of Richmond when I was a candidate, and I'm in a black community in a black church in Los Angeles. Somebody stood up -- Goody covered all the bases, he'd been running for a long time.

"What have you ever done for the black people?"

I said, "If I really had to answer that question, I would disqualify myself."

A great big woman stood up in the back, she said, "Mr. Graves, you don't have to answer that question. I'm Sherrill Luke's mother." And she said, "Now, if you want to listen to me I'll tell you what this man did for one black man, my son."

Morris: [Laughter] Oh, isn't that beautiful!"

Graves: Yes. There are strange things that happen to make it interesting. But, I did the same thing -- you know there aren't many Jewish people who are city managers. And I created the first Jewish city manager in California -- deliberately, very deliberately, just to prove it could be done.

Morris: Did that one young man have any idea as to why more Jews didn't go into city management?

Graves: Oh, I think he knew that. Jews are born knowing that. You know, when I was a teaching fellow and I was reading political science blue books, if I wanted to know what an "A" was, I picked out three Jewish blue books, and I read them, because I knew that was an "A" and that was the standard against which I'd judge everybody else. Why? Because they know they have to work harder. They know they have

Graves: to be smarter. They're born knowing that, and that's why they get where they get. That's why they're able to do the things they do.

Morris: But why don't they go into city management?

Graves: Oh, there are lots of Jewish people in city management now. The world has changed a lot, but there are some things that don't change. You heard me get a phone call today and I asked if that man was a Jew or a Gentile. Even now, I would not send a Jew as a construction vice president to a Gentile developer. You see, we haven't gotten that far, yet. Look at the field in which I work now, which has to do with development, mostly. The companies are Gentile or they're Jewish. They're not both. In big companies like Tishman, of which I was vice president, the tops are all Jewish, there are a lot of Gentiles in there, but the tops are all Jewish.

But, I must say that in the whole overall community, there has been tremendous progress made in the last ten or fifteen years, but we're not there yet.

In San Francisco, as I might have said to you earlier, the top is a very fluid society, very open. Not here. If you bring a Jew there they know who it is, because if he comes there he's somebody that's important [laughter]. It's shocking, you see.

I'm reminded of the Union League Club in Philadelphia, which is the heartbeat of the Republican party. I used to go there for lunch with different people, members. I loved to get a very quiet (one of those moments, you know, when a room goes quiet?) moment, and then say to my host, "Now, as a Democrat --" [Laughter] When you go before the membership committee of that club, I'm not kidding, you don't even get there if you're a registered Democrat. No way. But, if you go there and you're a registered Republican, they ask you if you ever have been a registered Democrat!

Morris: We've come to the end of this tape. Let's call it a night!

[Recorded: Afternoon, 14 April 1971]

Pollution Control

Morris: We mentioned environmental pollution earlier. Could we talk a bit more about Frank Stead on this?

Graves: He was in the field of environmental sanitation, and a great leader in the field at a time when only other leaders in the field were very much interested. He was a problem to his department and to the politicians, because he was advanced in his thinking and so aware of what the implications were going to be of the things we were permitting to happen to pollute the environment that he had a hard time. He alienated all kinds of people because he was preaching the gospel of what is now the biggest, broadest issue in the country.

I can remember his using all these words that are now commonplace, and I didn't even know what he was talking about. [Laughter]

Morris: Those were the words about pollution and so on?

Graves: Yes, you see Frank was always involved in environmental sanitation. That was the name of the division of the Department of Public Health. Now perhaps they call it "environmental pollution control."

But all things ecological, which I still can't define, I can remember Frank talking about earnestly and what should have been very persuasively -- and nobody really cared, not really. He was always involved in terrific legislative wars either trying to advance the public health controls of environmental pollution -- water, air and everything else. The disturbing of natural terrain, hillside, watershed, trees, shrubs with bulldozers. The last thing Frank and I did together was the bi-state study of Lake Tahoe, and the pollution of Lake Tahoe. I was chairman of the bi-state committee.

Morris: I knew Frank Stead was a member. And you were chairman of it?

Graves: Yes. That was a very interesting assignment. This was just an extension of the relationship Frank and I had had all during the legislative years. Not that we were always on the same side, because I was an advocate then, and so I was not only inclined, but I was committed, not to give up lightly local controls of things which we viewed as local and which in the light of history and experience were not.

I was on the wrong side of a lot of wars, you know, because of the home rule concept that the cities have a right to govern themselves. So, I was at times at odds with Frank and the department when it was purely (or almost entirely) a question of whether the power of the state was to be used and take over from the cities. The cities were my clients.

But, in the larger issues, when it was really the public health interest versus private interests, Frank and I were almost always together.

Morris: How did you justify working for that 1949 water pollution control bill? That was something that Frank originated, rather than the cities.

Graves: Yes, it was. Largely, I think because the city people who were professional administrators having to do with water were knowledgeable enough to know that they not only couldn't do it themselves, but that the sources of water pollution were not in their city, rather it was upstream somewhere. It was the logic of that and the fact that instead of opposition from the city administrators who were directly concerned, we had their support in what we were doing, and they were without any great difficulty able to command the support of the mayors and councilmen or their city manager.

Then, I guess, it is also true that there are no plusses for a public official involved in controlling the purity of water -- water quality. He can't make any points. He can only lose. If he does what he should do, he must impose very onerous controls on industry; then the backfire is very bad politically. If he does what is necessary, he pays the penalty. If he doesn't, really, the political penalty is also there, because at that point in time, there was no organized public interest in water

Graves: pollution. Think about it -- how could it have gotten to the stage where it is now if the public was the least bit interested in the quality of water? There was indifference.

If he did the thing he paid the price of opposition and attack from people who were being controlled, but he didn't get any plus. And so that was the difficulty.

The Right to Police

Graves: It's only when you get into the areas which are very sensitive -- the loss of the right to police your town, your neighborhood, is such a sensitive area, and the people are interested. The whole idea of turning over the control of your neighborhood (or community) police department to a higher level of authority that's removed from you. Take a nice community like the city of Piedmont where I used to live -- if there were any idea of that community not controlling its own police, there was no logic that could persuade them to give it up, nothing. They did not want the Oakland Police Department running the police department in Piedmont.

There were two reasons, I'm sure. One of them is they had reason to be concerned about whether they would get the same high order of police protection against robbery, murder and all that, because they were willing to pay for a police department where if a citizen and resident of the city went out for a walk, he knew he was going to be stopped by a police car, because in Piedmont you are supposed to be able to say who you are and where you live. The people relish it, you see, because it's the measure of the protection that they have. So I always knew when I went out for a walk in the evenings that I would be stopped, and they would say, "I beg your pardon, (very courteous), but I would appreciate it if you would identify yourself." Now, you can't get that when you have a big police department.

The other thing is if you were a very powerful resident in Piedmont and your kid got caught drunk-

Graves: driving, he was never booked, they brought him home and put him to bed. That was the other advantage.

Morris: That's now a matter of discussion in this whole area of juvenile justice, that should be the way things are handled.

Graves: You think I was kidding about that. I'm not. You don't think that a juvenile delinquent in Piedmont is given the same treatment at the hands of police that he would be in some other areas of the city?

Morris: No.

Regional Functions

Graves: That's right, you know. This, too, is a reflection of the kind of concern that the city governments have when they are asked to surrender something, you see. Now, there are a great many things they have surrendered, water is one of them. Sewage is not a political plus. Who wants to fight to be able to maintain the sewer system? Only in one respect, and that is if you want to be able to grant or deny sewers to a subdivision.

So the cities have compromised in such areas as the regional administration of water. The right to the subdivision after all is still in the city hall, so the fact that you have a removed administration of the water system doesn't give that regional agency the right to come in and provide water in a subdivision without the city having approved the whole thing, so they haven't given up that much.

Another example would be regional parks. By their very nature, they're larger than city parks. You get a regional park program and pretty soon they begin to put other things in and the agency tends to grow, but it's still not comprehensive like water, sewers, or some of the other things.

Morris: In other words, it's changed sort of piece-meal not as a part of any regional kind of thinking?

Graves: It's always been functional, yes. Well, there isn't going to be (this is a dogmatic statement, I know) in the absence of a complete radical change in the government of the United States -- there aren't going to be all-purpose regional governments. There will be some multi-purpose regional administrations and there will be more if we can resolve endless argument as to whether the governing body should all be delegates from existing political sub-divisions like already mayors, already councilmen, already supervisors, or whether the board should be independently elected, or both.

But, an all-purpose regional government? No. It would be a bad thing. For one thing, it wouldn't even be efficient. [Laughter] I made an interesting study for the San Francisco Examiner once when I was a graduate student. It had the curious effect of proving the wrong thing to the editor. He was off on a kick that if we would have -- how many counties do we have in the state?

Morris: Fifty-eight.

Graves: Fifty-eight. If we had thirteen counties, that would save an enormous amount of money. So, I undertook this study and it proved conclusively that the larger the county, the higher the costs by any standard of measurement: per capita, per anything. County government gets more costly when it gets bigger, city government doesn't work the same way per capita or by the other standards of measurement. (I'm not prepared to say if that's true of some cities like Los Angeles. I really don't know.)

As a general principle, I proved to the editor of the San Francisco Examiner that if he were successful in what he was undertaking to do, it would have the opposite effect. That's not really the point. I don't think it makes any sense to try to do housekeeping functions on a very large geographic basis.

The whole administration of welfare programs makes no sense; it makes no sense to have it on political boundary lines or counties. But sweeping the streets is not the same thing at all; we've compromised methods of getting these things done

Graves: rather well. For example, there was a point in time when Beverly Hills had only one building requiring a really large ladder truck for fighting fire, only one. They were actually going to go out and buy a ladder truck for one building, and we suggested to them that they might make a contract with Los Angeles which happened to have such a truck within four blocks. [Laughter]

There are many compromises. The health services: cities aren't generally in the health business anymore. It's done by the county for the entire county, and that doesn't prove the county is always the right level of administration.

Frank Stead was working in an area where the governmental resistance was not so great. The logic was irresistable. How can you possibly have a city-by-city administration of air pollution control? No one could seriously argue for that. The counties are also too small a geographic unit, demonstrably.

Morris: On air pollution control he did have this problem: that it was considered to be a local problem.

Graves: No, no, that's not really true. But, if you were a polluting industry, you really couldn't go to the legislature and bold-facedly say, "I have a right to pollute the atmosphere" could you? So you would go and you would have other people saying that this was a local matter and it was none of the state's business.

Morris: I see, that makes it more understandable.

Graves: That is actually a great deal of what happened, about a lot of things. Apparent issues are not the real issues at all, and this was no different. Frank might have encountered some opposition from some political jurisdiction, but that was not the real basis for the object of polluting industries -- not the least of which then and still is the petroleum industry and the automobile.

The air pollution in this area, in this basin, is eighty something percent, the result of the refining, distribution, and consumption of petroleum products. That was true twenty years ago and it's

Graves: still true. If you got rid of the gasoline-combustion engine, if you got rid of gasoline as a source of energy, the smog would suddenly disapear. You'd have a residual of fifteen percent, it wouldn't be like it is now.

Getting back to Frank Stead, it seems to me it's kind of a tragedy that Frank isn't twenty years younger, ultimately to enjoy the fruits of his early, pioneering efforts and so that he could have the full opportunity for the exercise of his great talents in this field.

Morris: Well, he, too, has a role in training this generation.

Graves: Oh, he has had and has a role, don't misunderstand me, but the man is qualified to be the national professional leader in his field.

We had a lovely time together on the bi-state study, and it affords me some very wry amusement whenever Ronald Reagan talks now about his interest in the environment, since he was (A), opposed to the study; (B), opposed to the report; (C), opposed to all the recommendations; and (D), opposed to giving the result any money. It was absolutely unbelievable, his total indifference to what we were trying to do. Hard to understand.

Morris: Could we go back a little ways to some earlier questions that --

Graves: Yes, I think we better follow that format now, too.

People in Politics

Morris: You had said that Mr. Katcher misplaced you in events, particularly in referring to the California Republican Assembly in 1934. But, I wondered if you did in those days, know Ed Shattuck and Bernard Brennan.

Graves: Well, Bernie Brennan was city attorney in Glendale, so of course I knew him. Ed Shattuck turned up in my League of Cities life somewhere, but not in connection with politics. It was in some other way that I met him.

Graves: I knew Boo Kenny very well, and I knew Pat Brown as district attorney of San Francisco. But never in any connection with any California Republican Assembly. I knew all the people.

Morris: Murray Chotiner, too?

Graves: No, I have never had the pleasure.

Morris: It's interesting, that they appear together in Katcher's book; it puts in one activity a very interesting collection of people whose later careers headed in somewhat different directions.

Graves: Of course at the time you were speaking of, Pat Brown was a registered Republican of what we would now call the Warren type -- more identified, I suppose, with Hiram Johnson, but liberal Republican, San Francisco Republican, civil rights Republican. Pat is a political animal in the context in which we were talking about this yesterday. Not that he isn't interested in the problems, he is. He's enormously sensitive to them, but Pat's interests as I tried to distinguish them (perhaps artificially, I don't really know what was purely political and what was the desire to govern to accomplish certain ends, administration) -- Pat would be on the political side. I don't think that anyone would say that Pat was the kind of an administrator that Warren is --

So, Pat evolved into a Democrat, not in the philosophical sense, I doubt that he had to change at all in order to achieve that -- it was in terms of political tactics, I would think.

Morris: And Kenny, had he always been a Democrat?

Graves: Well, Kenny has always been what he is. I don't know what his registration was. He's a very brilliant man, and probably, among the people we're discussing, the greatest intellect. Never took politics seriously -- he ridiculed even himself as a politican, and all the fuss and feathers of politics. He ridiculed the whole thing -- made fun of it. He was full of fun, anyway.

Morris: Would this explain why he went off to Germany to

Morris: observe the trials at Nuremberg during the primary campaign when he ran for governor in 1946?

Graves: No, that would be the intellect at work. The serious concern of a very brilliant lawyer and a fine jurist. No, that would have been as a public man being concerned and interested in what was going to occur, I would think. And also because it was pioneering in a field of law that was going to set precedents, you know, and has and will. But I don't know, and I'm certainly not prepared to say that was it, but in thinking about it and thinking about Kenny, this would be a great turning point in the history of world law, and besides, I think he would --

Morris: It was the timing of it I was referring to. It was during the primary campaign when he was the Democratic candidate.

Graves: Yes, he was the Democratic candidate. He wasn't nominated, he was a candidate. Well, that was inexplicable. There's no way to explain that.

Morris: Other than that he didn't really feel that he could challenge Warren? This was the election that Warren won in the primary.

Graves: But he didn't really set out to challenge Warren. You see, there was a real rapport between Warren and Kenny, and it was always hard to figure out whether they were in different parties when Kenny was attorney general and Warren was governor. That was a really close relationship.

Isn't it interesting that Warren and Pat Brown enjoyed the same relationship when Warren was governor and Pat was attorney general? It was inconceiveable that Brown at any time would ever have run against Earl Warren as an opposing candidate, yet Bob Kenny did.

I'm not sure why he did. He became a candidate and then he went away. It's hard to figure out. I can't answer that one. It's inexplicable. You'd have to ask his analyst that, I think. I really mean that. I think it was psychological, and that an analyst would have to find the true answer to that question.

Morris: I'm not sure that our interviewers have asked him that question.

Graves: It seems to me that it's a question that should have been asked and should still be asked. Might be revealing.

Morris: One rumor at the time was that there was possible coercion from the more radical elements in the Democratic party, that he ought to run.

Graves: I would be surprised. I don't really know. At one time, in one twenty-four hour period, on different issues, Bob Kenny could honestly be identified with the far left and all the way through to the conservative right (not far right, now that's something else). He's a very complex man, and I don't know how to -- I really can't answer it except to say that I always have enjoyed him and I think he's a brilliant man, and he's all kinds of fun. I never try to understand how his mind works. I count him a friend.

Morris: Mr. Shattuck apparently twice very much wanted to be appointed U.S. Senator and was passed over, as it were --

Graves: I'm not that well acquainted with it as a political matter. As I told you, I had absolutely nothing to do with it. Not in the least.

Price Administration: World War II

Morris: One item that we haven't mentioned yet from your resume is that, in addition to taking on civil defense during the second world war, you were also OPA regional director.

Graves: Yes, I was regional consumer director for OPA.

Morris: This was price administration?

Graves: Well, the Office of Price Administration had many facets and divisions. I was the head of the so-called

Graves: consumer division, the function of which was to protect the interests of the consumer in that artificial economy that was created by price controls.

It was a part of the same feeling I told you about in my lack of direct involvement in the war and not being in the military services, and the hair shirt I was wearing all the time -- in the civil defense activity, getting as close as I could to the Fourth Air Force and the Fourth Fighter Command which were much a part of the overall civil defense system and military. I was terribly sensitive to this. There were men older than I who were not of the regular army who were down in Riverside making a lot of sacrifices and I wasn't. It bothered me, it really did.

Going into OPA was a foolish thing to do, I made no real contribution to the war effort, but I went in because of a very, very interesting man -- Harry Camp. He was the head of a national hat manufacturing firm located somewhere around San Francisco. He was a very delightful man and I ran into him in some way, I don't really remember now, but at one of these war-related activities, and he started twisting my arm to come over to OPA. Then the national director of the consumer division came out to San Francisco, and Harry sicced him on me. He was something else! He was the greatest salesman in the world. This fellow was the president of the company that brought out Metrecal -- that was his deal. Bob (I've seen him lately, so that's why I forgot his name) [laughter] -- Sessions, he was just the world's greatest salesman.

I got a leave of absence from the League and I went to work in OPA. I accomplished, as might have been expected, absolutely nothing. There was no real consumer program, and nobody really wanted one. [Laughter] I didn't accomplish anything there, so I didn't overstay my leave. Having gone in there trying to make some kind of a contribution, then seeing it was apparent I wasn't going to be able to do it, I didn't stay too long.

VIII FURTHER ASPECTS OF WARREN'S GOVERNORSHIP

Effectiveness of Civil Defense

Morris: By this time Warren was already governor?

Graves: Yes, he was. It was in the interregnum between the time when I was simply serving as a member of the civil defense council and the time that Warren then asked me to come back and take over the direction of it. Then, he asked me if I would move to Sacramento, that the civil defense director would not be in Contra Costa County if something serious happened here. Well, he wanted me in Sacramento, so I moved to Sacramento for the remaining years of the war. The nearest thing that happened was when Port Chicago blew up.

Morris: Which was back in Contra Costa County!

Graves: Yes. I think that I can summarize the entire status of the civil defense effort in the United States then and now by saying to you that as state civil defense director having an authority at that point in time only second to the governor and the ability to walk in and supercede a sheriff (put him out of office, just boot him out), I couldn't get past the deputy sheriff who was stationed to keep people away from the disaster area of Port Chicago, and I never did get by.

Morris: So you were never on the spot?

Graves: No one let me. [Laughter] That's the way civil defense would work. I tried to tell them all. I tried and tried and tried. I made a speech one time when I was in Washington, that brought down on my

Graves: head everything, the FBI and the whole bit, because I said that civil defense should be turned over to a special branch of the military. That, in case of an actual attack, any reasonable man would know that the military would immediately move in and take over all civil authority, and that it was the only authority that would be respected, and it was the only authority that could give orders to the existing law enforcement and other types of agencies that would have to function, that would be respected and obeyed. And ho, ho, ho! My! Did I get called on the carpet by the feds! It's probably somewhere in my dossier.

Morris: This was one area they did not wish to --

Graves: Oh, it wasn't the military. The others didn't want the military to have anything to do with civil defense because it would be the beginning of military control over the government of the United States. Well, that's nonsense, sheer nonsense. Everytime anything happened, the military moved just like that, and they always would. Absolute absurdity, but the great fear in Washington was that if we gave this to the military we'd never get it back. [Laughter]

Morris: Did this mean that you then had more time to be available to Governor Warren as he was setting up his administration?

Graves: Oh yes, much more so.

Morris: What were the major issues that he saw as he took over the governor's job?

Graves: To try to name them in anything like a difinitive list, I wouldn't want to even try, because years run into years --

I would have to state it at the beginning, I think, and then not try to carry it forward. Let's just say, "Now Warren is governor."

Public Housing

Graves: For example, the issue of public housing was before the legislature, and I think that the governor had invited me to lunch at Frank Fat's, which was one of his favorite places.

Morris: Is that a Chinese restaurant?

Graves: Yes, Frank Fat is a Chinese. That's a very well-known restaurant and very well-patronized by political people in Sacramento.

He said, "What in the world am I going to do about public housing? I cannot embrace public housing. My reason for it is that I don't think we should do that to the American people -- institutionalize them, put them in barracks. I just don't believe in that." I said, "I understand that. What are you for? If you can't be for public housing, you can't be for slums. What are you for?"

"Well," he says, "What is there to be for?"

Morris: What are the alternatives?

Graves: Yes, "what alternatives have I got?"

I said, "Urban renewal."

He said, "Tell me about that."

And so we talked about that and that seemed to him to be a happy union of public authority and private enterprise. It showed some promise at the time that it hasn't by any means lived up to.

Anyway, he said, "What do you think would be a sensible thing to do?"

I said, "Well, we have the community urban renewal statute, but we don't have any money. There is no state agency, there is no nothing, there is no state participation, there's just nothing. You adopted a state statute but because of federal funding, the line of control runs right from Washington to the cities."

Graves: So, anyway, you'll find that he put in a budget request for five million dollars for urban renewal. Well, he didn't fight for it, it was not a part of his real thrust, and it didn't finally go through. But it has its own significance, that of being unable to embrace public housing (which, incidentally, I don't either, and never did) in the form in which it was concieved and undertaken -- it was a monstrous thing, really terrible. Even people who used to be the greatest advocates of it finally changed their policy and their posture. In any case here was a man who had just become governor, who had changed and grown and broadened as attorney general as compared with being a district attorney, which is the essence of the man -- to change, to meet new obligations.

Appointments

Graves: The governor also would discuss some appointments with me, when the function was in some way related to the forms of public service and people I should know in my own work.

It was to be terribly significant that with his political background, coming out of the conservative elements of the Republican party -- admittedly after the liberalizing influence of being attorney general and being (as he told me once) for the first time being exposed to the larger problems of the people of this state as against prosecuting somebody for breaking the law -- that his concern was he must find people to appoint to positions who would be fair in their treatment of business, but in no way subject to its influence and control. The committment must be to the public interest.

In this connection I really stubbed my toe in recommending a public utilities commisioner. There was a fellow in Palo Alto who was director of utilities for Palo Alto. You know it is curious anomaly that some of the most politically conservative cities in the state at that time were also the cities in which you had public ownership of utilities.

Morris: Did Palo Alto have that already?

Graves: Oh, yes. Just like San Marino in another context, where nothing was too good for the people of San Marino and their children, libraries, schools, whatever. When they come downtown where they made their living, they were wearing a different hat, you know.

So, I recommended to him Pete Anderson, director of public utilities, Palo Alto. So the governor asked me if I would find out if Anderson would be enough interested to discuss it with him. I called Pete about becoming a member of the Public Utilities Commission. I called him and he said, "Yes, I'd be delighted to talk to him about it."

Anyway, he's become a member of the Public Utilities Commission, and I think he was there about nine or ten months and assigned to become one of the senior executives of PG&E.

Morris: [Laughter] Oh, my goodness!

Graves: And the governor called me up and he said "You really picked one that time!" He said, "I'll give you one more chance."

So I said, "Harold Hals, city attorney of Pasadena." He appointed him; that was a good one.

I was just never so embarrased. Here, I'm the guy who picked a commissioner who went to work for the PG&E. [Laughter] It was embarrassing. It was also funny.

Health Insurance

Graves: Then came compulsory health insurance. This was the great turning point in Warren's political future.

I mentioned to you Willard Keith who was a senior insurance executive. He took over for a time the direction of the civil defense council, from

Graves: Los Angeles. First these friends (and they'd been political friends and supporters of his for a long while) really didn't believe he was serious, and when they found out he really meant it and was prepared to fight for it right down to the wire, they tried to get him to come down to L.A. to meet with this whole group that he'd always met with in Los Angeles, and let them try to talk some sense to him. You know, "What the hell is this?"

Morris: Would this be doctors' groups?

Graves: No, this was not, this was -- remember that Asa Call and Willard Keith, and all the rest who became his bitterest enemies, were once his closest friends. So he just wouldn't accept the invitation and finally I got a call from Willard Keith.

He said, "Dick, we just don't know what to do. This is our governor, and he won't even come down and talk to us." Then he said, "Would you ask him? Would you talk to him?"

I said, "You're way out of my league. I don't have this kind of relationship with the governor."

He said, "Just talk to him."

I went to the governor and I said, "I got this call from Willard Keith and it's ridiculous -- calling me up to try to persuade you -- "

He laughed and said, "No, Dick, I'm not going, because I have no way to persuade them, and they have no way to change me. So, what's the point of it?" He said, "I've told them exactly that on the telephone: that I know that I cannot persuade them to my point of view on this issue and they cannot change me on this issue one iota, so there's no point in it."

I said, "Well, there are other issues --"

He said, "No, this is the end of the line with that group. It only takes one issue." And he said, "This is the one. I must survive without them."

So, I called back and I said, "What the

Graves: governor's told you is what he really meant, and that is he knows that he can't persuade you and you're not going to persuade him to change, so he says, 'what's the point of it.'"

I was in Los Angeles very shortly after that talking to Neil Petrie, president then of Barker Brothers and very much one of the civic leaders of this community, and always out in front on anything that had to do with what was considered by the business community to be good for Los Angeles.

So I went into Neil's office and he said, "I have one call I have to make, but don't move. Here, just take a look at the report of our company to our employees." He said, "We don't just report to shareholders, we report to our employees."

I said, "That's interesting." So I sat there thumbing through this report and I came across a section dealing with the company health insurance program.

First paragraph: it is unfortunate and a source of great concern to our officers that the employees who need health insurance the most are the very ones who do not subscribe to the health insurance program.

So he got off the phone and I said, "Neil, that's a very interesting thing. Is that a fact?"

He said, "Yes, it's just a terrible, terrible thing. The people who need it the least are the ones who are in the system, and the ones who need it the most are the very ones who aren't in it.

And I said, "Well, why don't you make it mandatory, like mandatory health insurance?"

And he said, "Why you no-good --"

So, compulsory health insurance became a political turning point, and the result for the governor was Whitaker and Baxter, employed by the American Medical Association to deprive Earl Warren of the nomination for President.

Presidential Politics

Morris: Yes, there does seem to be a --

Graves: Oh, there's a direct connection, just like that! And more or less at the same time, the governor took on the oil companies. There was the highway program, increased gas taxes, all of it. He won that one. But that earned him the undying enmity and opposition of the national petroleum companies, and they were the other half of the team to deprive Earl Warren of the nomination.

Morris: How did that work?

Graves: I'm talking about the literal transplant of Clem Whitaker to the Middle West in preparation for the Republican national convention -- full time, with unlimited funds to spend for one purpose.

Morris: What year was this?

Graves: Well, let's consider when it could have been. My feeling is that it occurred in '48, because I have no such recollection of '52.

Morris: In November, 1951, Whitaker and Baxter sent out a bulletin which said: We believe you should be advised that Governor Earl Warren of California has renewed his advocacy of compulsory health insurance in two recent speeches. We will keep you advised of any further development in Governor Warren's apparent plan to agitate for socialized medicine in his race for President."

Graves: OK, '52. I would guess that's when it must have been because that was the serious drive for the presidency -- the nomination. So, it would have been a carry-over.

It's a kind of curious thing. If the governor had not advocated the causes and done the things he did as governor which commanded such a broad base of support among the people as a whole that it washed out party lines, he would not have attained the stature to become a serious candidate for the presidency, if you see what I'm saying. But, the fact that he did those things, then, notwithstanding

Graves: the broad base of popular support, the machinery of practical politics cost him the nomination.

Morris: What prevented him from picking up the support of the people who presumably would have benefitted?

Graves: Well, they aren't represented at a convention. You must always distinguish the mechanics of politics from the public will. The only time an organized public ever stampeded the machinery of politics was Wendell Willkie.

Morris: Why did Warren choose health insurance as the issue to make a stand on?

Graves: I don't know except to mention the name of Wilton Halverson.

Dr. Wilton Halverson, whom I remember first as health officer for the City of Pasadena, and a great national name even then among the public health people, not only in this country, but also having an international reputation. I guess the way I remember everyone in retrospect that I admired at the time has me saying the same thing, but he was absolutely the greatest guy every [laughter] -- just superb!

Morris: This is what everybody says, he was marvelous.

Graves: Oh, he was wonderfully handsome, he was the nicest mannered man you ever saw. He was so bright and so brilliant in his field. Why did he have to crack his head open falling down in a lousy bathtub.

Morris: Oh, my lord!

Graves: I don't know that he ever did recover -- I'm not sure. I don't even want to know. I know for a while he was just a vegetable. I don't think he ever did recover the kind of drive and competence he had had. It was a disaster.

He was a great power in the Warren administration.

Morris: Over and beyond public health -- ?

Graves: I would say that he would not have attempted to go beyond the public health, but there was between him and the governor an intimacy that Warren does not give

Graves: to many people, if you know that about him.

He's everybody's friend, but nobody's intimate.

There was what I would call a real intimacy between Warren and Halverson -- a real tie. This is sheer speculation, but it's inconceivable that Warren would have undertaken to drive for compulsory health insurance unless Halverson was committed to it, also.

Morris: This is interesting in view of the fact that several people have also said that Halverson cleared all major policy matters with the medical association executive council as a matter of course.

Graves: Well, he didn't clear this one! I don't know, but I would wonder (and I'm not for one minute suggesting that there's one grain of truth in this, but it would be an interesting area to explore) -- it would have been totally like Warren to say to a Doctor Wilton Halverson, "What is the most important single thing that we can undertake to do which affects the public health?"

Because that's what he did all the time about everything else!

Morris: And the need for health insurance was well documented. Ray Lyman Wilbur back in the thirties and people at the University social welfare department had been suggesting health insurance for --

Graves: Well, I can't answer the question, I don't know except that as a major issue of public health, I would find it hard to believe that Warren would take the advice of the social welfare director and not the advice of Wilton Halverson. I would be surprised.

Morris: And then carry it politically without involving Halverson in the legislative effort?

Graves: Very likely. I don't know, but this is all speculation, and I have no basis for it.

State Finance

Morris: Could we talk a bit about the budget and state finance? The office of legislative analyst was created shortly before Warren became governor. Did he support this idea?

Graves: Oh no, no. Because you see the legislative analyst was and still is contra the director of finance. His adversary. No, it wouldn't have been that. It certainly wouldn't have been Warren, no. I can't imagine the governor as a born and bred executive type, undertaking to strengthen the resources of the legislature to fight him, no, that wouldn't have been likely.

I don't remember how that came about. Of course, if this was the point in time when the office of director of finance began to gather the instruments of power and control, it may have been the legislative reaction to the fact that the only man who appeared before them to explain the budget was the director of finance and his staff, and they had nobody of their own to analyze for them. I would think that would be the motivating force, but can't place it in time. But, it was deliberately conceived to help the legislature and particularly of course, at that time, the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, to break the budget down in their own terms, and to get an independent view of it. But it wouldn't have been Warren.

Morris: Jim Dean who was director of finance seems to have been an outstandingly able person and Alan Post who was legislative analyst, as you say contra the department of finance, again a very able man. I guess what I was asking was what you recall of how the Department of Finance developed the instruments of power.

Graves: Well, again, I can only give you my sense of it and not an answer in facts on any real basis. Jimmy Dean was the first professional public manager who sat in that chair.

One previous director of finance I remember well was Rolland Vandegrift, appointed by Governor Merriam. He had been involved in state budget matters for some years as executive of the

Graves: California Taxpayers Association. In a sense, he furnished the legislature a critique of state budgets which, although differently motivated, accomplished some of the results now achieved through the legislative auditor. I remember him as an effective director of finance. However, the prestige and authority of the Department of Finance declined under Governor Olson because of irreconcilable differences between the governor and the legislature, particularly the state senate. I don't remember when the Office of Legislative Auditor was created, but it might have been related to this. It could also have been the legislature's response to the added budgetary control of governors through the Department of Finance.

In any case, the Department of Finance and its authority was greatly strengthened under Dean because of Warren's feel for administration and Jimmy Dean's knowledge of how to go about it.

Morris: This was also the time (1948) when they changed from the two year budget to an annual budget. In talking to Verne Scoggins, his comment was that there was a recurrent problem of inconsistencies in budget procedures from one legislative session to another.

Graves: My guess is that the change from the two year budget to a one year budget would have weakened the Department of Finance rather than strengthened it. So it had to be something else. After all, when you budget two years downstream and you control the administration of the budget under a director of finance, the administration has a lot more latitude than if the legislature is on its back every year.

It would be relevant to know when the federal Bureau of the Budget was established. That again is a shot in the dark, but I have the feeling that the concept of central budget management appeared most strongly in the federal Bureau of the Budget.

It went kind of like this. My feeling is that at the point in time when the federal Bureau of the Budget was first set up as an extension of the executive authority of the president, there was far more control vested in the Bureau of the Budget than had ever been vested in any department of finance.

Morris: My thinking was going along these lines, too, as to whether or not the fairly complex cost control methods developed in the Department of Defense during the war began to be applied to what was by then a large state budget in California.

Graves: I really hope not, because the states can't afford the Department of Defense's cost over-runs. [Laughter]

Morris: Well, Mr. MacNamara didn't plan it that way, I gather, but before he got into those difficulties he was supposed to be a bright fiscal manager from California.

Graves: I can't answer that question at all. I don't really know. I would say that there were cost control efforts being made in the cities and the state which would precede that point in time. You're referring to World War II -- there was an already considerable body of literature on the application of unit cost accounting to governmental process, which was very different because of the defense department's cost accounting deals in commodities, in hardware. I don't think they did much in cost accounting on administrative services, and the states and the cities don't deal in hardware, they deal in costs of services. What is the unit cost of putting out a fire; you know that's a very complex question.

Morris: I'm looking for leads, because I'm going to be talking with finance people.

Graves: I think you should explore the possible relationships between the techniques of budgetary management which were developed in the Bureau of the Budget and what effect they might have had on broadening and changing the powers of the state finance directors.

Morris: It was somewhere in the early '50s, apparently, that the finance department reached a point where they had their own survey teams who would review administrative departments.

Graves: Well, this would be a pick-up from the Bureau of the Budget. That may be part of the key to that one. I don't really know.

I did one thing (I tried to do one thing with no notable success, I don't know what has ever

Graves: happened to it) -- but one of the things the state has never done is to have an effective statewide planning department. All the futile efforts that have gone in that direction (so long as I was watching it, I wouldn't want to comment on it after 1953) --

I once wrote a memorandum to Governor Warren, I don't have a copy of it but I wish I did, I wish I had kept it. I don't remember the date on it, but it would have been in the very late '40's or possibly in the early -- very early -- '50's, a span of three or four years in there. I wrote a brief for the governor to recreate his closest administrative staffs into the executive office of the governor. You see, one of the problems that exists in a staff operation is that the director of finance, for example, is one among alleged equals. All other directors of departments have equal status.

Morris: As members of the governor's cabinet.

Graves: As a director of a department. So this director of finance is a head of department. The fact that it happens to have fiscal management is no different than "I've got highways. So don't you come around looking in my department. I'll take care of my department, you go back and take care of the Department of Finance."

Morris: And finance, by its nature, has a relationship with all the other departments.

Graves: Of course! "You prepare your budget and send it to me, I'm going to look at it." "What do you mean looking at my budget? Telling me what I'm going to be able to do?"

So, I was trying to sell the governor the idea that the sounder thing was to create the executive office of the governor so that the director of finance became the chief budget officer and the voice that he spoke with was the voice of the governor. "I am the governor, don't tell me I'm not the governor. I speak with the governor's voice."

And I set up a whole proposal for this and

Graves: included in it planning, for exactly the same reasons that I had been arguing with the planners that they should be an assistant city manager in charge of planning, speaking with the voice of the manager. Nothing came of it.

Morris: Are there any other things you would like to comment on about Warren as governor before we get into your own avowed political enterprise?

Graves: Yes. I think I gave this to Leo [Katcher] but I don't know if he used it or not. But, you know, one of the things the governor taught me was never to drink after dinner. This isn't the point of my story, but it has to do with it.

Warren liked his drinks before dinner. At this point in time I was in the civil defense office and I was travelling with him frequently from Sacramento to San Francisco. We were at the Bohemian Club. So, we had dinner and we got in the car and started back to Sacramento. I consider this a forerunner of the one-man-one-vote decision.* I also consider it the key to what became his entire posture on the Supreme Court.

A Government of Law

He used the phrase "a government of law" in our little discussion, and it occured to me to say, "Governor, I would appreciate it if you would define that for me as you speak it. What do you mean?"

Now, to me this was a most revealing answer, indicating the direction of the man's thinking, at that early point in time.

He said, "Well, the way I see it is that there are two hundred million people in the country and all but one of them is one side and that one man is on the other. But the law is with the one man. And the one man prevails." And he said, "There is no

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*Gray v. Sanders, March, 1963.

Graves: other possible definition of a government of laws, and if you don't like the results you change the law.

"But," he said, "it is the protection of the rights of the individual -- the single person -- that is the essence of a society that lives under the rule of law."

"But," he said, "it is the protection of the rights of the individual -- the single person -- that is the essence of a society that lives under the rule of law."

And then we got to talking about how far away we were from that, and how many people were really deprived of their rights under the law because they were inarticulate minorities. His whole discussion was saying in all kinds of ways what became the school desegregation decision: Civil rights; it became one-man, one-vote; it explains completely the things for which he was most admired and most vilified as Chief Justice, and that was his defense of the rights of communists, criminals or whatever, no matter how unpopular the cause. Where was the rule of law? This was such a far cry, such a complete change from Earl Warren, district attorney --

Morris: It's interesting that this should come about in the process of getting further removed, one would think, from the contact with individual critizens he had as district attorney.

Graves: I think it's the reverse, Mrs. Morris, I think it's entirely the reverse. The district attorney has no legal obligation to be officially concerned about the poor or the sick. He only has to bring to book those who violate the law.

Morris: As someone else has passed the law and recorded it.

Graves: Somebody breaks the law, the district attorney arrests him and prosecutes him. That is the end of obligation. You do it efficiently, fairly, and you do it without being corrupt, and that's it.

But the district attorney (and particularly about forty years ago) was not about to bring an action to prevent someone from discrimination in

Graves: housing [laughter].

There were lots of real signals about the way he was changing. Walt Gordon, a black man on the Adult Authority, passing judgment on white men in prison. All kinds of early signs that his way of thinking was changing.

Morris: Buried in the record (because it never passed, I assume) are reports that several times FEPC legislation was introduced before the California legislature in the late '40s. Would this have been Warren, or would this have been --

Graves: I would be surprised if it was, but on the other hand I don't know that I'd be that surprised, but I'm not sure. I can't answer that. I don't know.

Warren's Relaxation

Morris: What did this have to do with not drinking after dinner?

Graves: Oh, he told me one time -- he would come to conventions, and always be a part of the before-dinner cocktail hour and have a great time with people and then go to dinner, and do what was necessary there, and then, boom!!, gone. No sitting around with the boys.

Morris: After dinner?

Graves: Yes. So, I asked him about it one time. And he said, "Well, you remember I was a law enforcement officer for a long time. You could take a few drinks before dinner and if you had dinner at a reasonable time you were never going to get in trouble. But, you drink after dinner and you get in trouble. And as a law enforcement officer, I can't afford to be seen drinking after dinner and getting into trouble."

And so I quit drinking after dinner. I very rarely drink after dinner. Once in a while, I'll have a brandy or something, but in terms of going and spending half the night in a night club and

Graves: drinking, I haven't done that in such a long time.

Morris: In terms of the things one wishes to get done and one's physical limitations, it sounds like a very sound rule.

Graves: It is. So, with Warren's comment in my mind, I haven't done it. But I've watched other men, and it has proved to me time after time that men do foolish things because of drinking after dinner. That's the best personal advice Warren ever gave me.

The other story was about Jim Beam. He was on a train going from Chicago to Washington, or somewhere like that. Before dinner he went into the bar car to have a couple of drinks, and he sat down next to a very attractive, good-looking man.

This man kept looking at him when he first sat down, and he said, "I beg your pardon, I ought to know who you are, but I just can't think of it."

And he said, "Well, I'm Earl Warren, governor of California."

"Oh," he said, "I don't live there, I live in Kentucky, but I knew your face and I'm delighted to have a chance to chat with you. Won't you join me for a drink?"

The governor said, "I'd be pleased to if I can buy the second one."

So the man said, "What do you drink?"

He said, "I drink Jim Beam and a little water."

"Well," the man said, "That's interesting, so do I."

So they had a few drinks and went in and had dinner together, after which the governor said, "Goodnight" and went to his room and to bed. When he got back to Sacramento, there were two cases of Jim Beam whiskey at the mansion, because the man he was sitting with was the president of Jim Beam! [Laughter]

Morris: Oh, my goodness! Couldn't have happened to a nicer

Morris: fellow!

Graves: No!

Morris: Did you and the governor have any chance for just relaxation between planning what was best for the state?

Graves: No. The governor did have friends with whom he did this kind of thing. The governor liked to hunt and fish and this has never been a part of my recreation. So that I associate this with, of course, lot's of people, but primarily with Ed Carty who was mayor of Oxnard.

They used to go hunting over on the Channel Islands where there was some wild game. The governor's a great hunter and fisherman. Most of his relaxation, I think, was to get out and get up into the hills.

No, I was never involved with him in anything you would really call purely personal, recreational type things. No.

The Matter of Patronage

Morris: Mr. Carty was appointed to the Fish and Game Commission. This leads to a question I've had. How did Warren solve the matter of patronage as governor? He made a lot of appointments. He seems to have come to people like you for recommendations of who was technically, professionally competent for a job; how did he cope with the traditional business of patronage on boards and commissions?

Graves: He didn't try. I think you must make some distinctions here. In making appointments to boards and commissions, judges and the like, while you look for men with qualifications, the choices are so great, that you can find a qualified person who is also a friend. I think it's reasonable in politics (as I mentioned the other day) that you don't appoint your enemies. [Laughter] You try to find a qualified friend. Now he's going to appoint one

Graves: man as director of public works. No patronage. No friends. No interest in that. None. "Find me a man who knows how to do that job."

Morris: Were there pressures on him to appoint somebody's friend?

Graves: Oh, there's always pressures. He didn't worry about pressures. Truly. He knew where his political base was; it was rooted in the people. He didn't need things like that; he paid no attention to it because he was bigger than the Republican party. He didn't have to worry about that. You know that's true. He didn't depend on the Republican party. The Republican party depended on Earl Warren.

Morris: What might have been done to achieve the nomination in '52?

Graves: That wouldn't have helped him with the nomination. The forces that -- after all, he appointed the California delegation. And so whether he was yielding to political patronage pressures wouldn't have any bearing on it. He handpicked the California delegation. That had nothing to do with it. No. The forces at work in national politics, the national political scene, are so diverse and powerful they reach into the very roots and nerve centers of the whole country. They're different in the Republican party and in the Democratic party, but only in kind.

When you really look at where the Republican power is, organized, financed power -- you're talking about an agglomeration of economic interests that control hundreds of billions of dollars. You're talking about the wealth of the country -- and when you think about that you must think about how it influences all kinds of things. Such great power that whether you appoint somebody to a job or not has nothing to do with it, not at that level of politics. The wisest politicians I have ever met know perfectly well that the worst thing you can do is make your first patronage appointments.

Morris: Because then you have to continue making them.

Graves: Well, you just disappointed twenty-five other people who have an equal claim on you. And there's only

Graves: one answer, and I sold this to the cities, believe me, I really did, and that is that there were so few patronage appointments. If you don't make any, nobody can be mad at you. I didn't have to tell Mr. Warren that. He knew that instinctively. When you're talking things that really did not matter -- honorary or something like that -- surely he might appoint a friend. For state boards and commissions he would find qualified friends. After all, the civil service in the administrative departments controls everything but the director, deputy director, and a secretary, as a practical matter.

You look at Mr. Warren's appointments of department heads and you'll find they were picked because he was convinced that this was the best qualified man available for that job at that time. When he was asking people like me he sure was not playing politics, or patronage, as to who might be good for this job. If he was asking me, he was asking a lot of other people just like me. He asked me when he thought I had some reason to know something. He didn't ask me about something that I didn't know about.

Morris: Sound business management.

Graves: Yes, but that's again evidence of an understanding of administration. So, I would say that his appointments were highly non-political.

IX ADVENTURE IN ELECTIVE POLITICS: 1954

Deciding to Run for Governor

Morris: Now, what made you decide to run for elective office?

Graves: I've just finished reading Irving Stone's book about Sigmund Freud, The Passions of the Mind, and I'm no longer sure of when the conscious mind is in control or when the unconscious mind is hard at work. So I would have to qualify my answer somewhat differently than I might have some while back. Let me tell you what I think I was doing and then it will be apparent that the unconscious wish might have been there.

I'm not going to elaborate on certain aspects of the proper answer to that question, but let me say this: I've already told you that I was very bored -- infinitely bored -- with my work in the League of Cities. Twenty years was just too long! At the same time I was the highest paid person involved in municipal government, and I was one of the highest paid people involved in government at all in the state of California when I left the League of Cities.

I had spent my whole life up until then in and around government. There were no government jobs that would have attracted my interest, and I had no background of experience that would qualify me for anything like a comparable job in private business. When you want to make a change and you discover that there isn't anywhere to go in government, and you're not qualified to take a position in business at the executive level which my then income would have

Graves: required (and I wasn't about to take a major cut in income) [laughter], what do you do?

Well, this was on my mind. In one sentence, my personal life at home was very unhappy, and that was on my mind.

Now then, consider that Goodwin Knight had been Warren's real enemy, the real knife-in-the-back kind --

Morris: As lieutenant governor?

Graves: As lieutenant governor. And being as aware as you are now of my affection for the governor and my devotion to him, I was not fond of Goodwin Knight. Nor had I any reason to believe in the period of time that he was serving as governor, having succeeded Earl Warren for the remaining term -- as a matter of fact, I had a good many reasons to believe that he would not be a good governor for the cities and for the League of Cities and purposes that we were trying to accomplish.

This was confirmed in many of the very minor contacts I had with him as the director of the League of Cities dealing with the governor. Then again, he was already in a hassle with my university. He was already attacking certain areas of state services which I thought were important. So, not for the first two reasons now, but for the second two (my feeling for Warren and therefore my dislike of Knight, and my concern about him as a governor elected in his own right), I was really concerned about him. I really was. I started (gratuitously) talking to every leading Republican figure who was so identified (or had been) with Warren that I thought there might be some hope of persuading someone to challenge Knight for the Republican nomination.

Morris: Was this after Warren had gone to Washington?

Graves: Oh yes, this was in anticipation of the 1954 election. I was talking to people about running against Goodwin Knight in September of '53. After I'd run out of Republican possibilities I talked to Democrats in late September of '53.

Morris: And the Republicans did not wish to challenge Goody?

Graves: No, they wouldn't or couldn't for whatever reason. And I met with everybody. I talked to everybody. [Laughter] They were all my friends.

So then I went to see Pat Brown [laughter], and we sat in a little restaurant up at Lake Tahoe because this was a meeting of the County Supervisors' Association. And, I tried to persuade him to run. And he said, "It's too soon," and I said, "No, it isn't, he can be beaten now!"

"No, it's too soon."

So I went to George Miller, and I said, "George, who in the world can run as a Democrat with a chance of beating Goodwin Knight?"

So he told me, "Well, if it would be anybody it would be one, two, three." He named three names.

So, I said, "What about you?"

Morris: Who were the "one-two-three?"

Graves: I don't remember. I can't remember their names. [Laughter] They were not in office. So I talked to them. Nobody, just nobody. So I thought, well, that's that.

So I went back to my little old League of Cities office in the Claremont Hotel in Berkeley, and one day in walked George Miller and Don Bradley. And they said, "Come with us, we're going upstairs and have an interesting lunch."

So we sat down to lunch and dear George says, "You run. You're so anxious to have someone run against Goodwin Knight, you run."

Morris: That's what happens when you raise the issue.

Graves: And I said, "Look here, now, I'm a registered Republican."

"Well," they said. "So you change your

Graves: registration, so what's the big problem?"

I said, "Why that's impossible."

"No, it's not."

I said, "George, look, for heaven's sake. [Laughter]

How can I do a thing like this? I run and I lose and I'm starving to death?"

Now, this is where Freud comes in. I'm not so sure from here on. I think it's at least possible that if I had run as a Republican, I would have been elected, but I'll come back to that.

Morris: Fascinating!

Graves: Yes. Having said that I should also tell you that the best thing I did at that point in my life was to run for governor, and the next best thing was to lose respectably. [Laughter]

Morris: Why did you think it was a good thing to lose?

Graves: Well, this has something to do with the first two things I said. We can come back to that. And then George and Don arranged for me to meet Ed and Ellie Heller in San Francisco on their house on Pacific Street. We had a little candlelight dinner, and we talked a long while.

Ellie Heller can ask hard questions, you know, and expects straight answers. We had an interesting evening, and when we were ready to leave, Ellie said, "Ed, I say go." And he says, "Let's go!" So they said, "Dick, if you decide to go we'll support you -- financially and otherwise."

Well, that was interesting, so then Don Bradley and I came flying down to Los Angeles and I see Paul Ziffren and dear Mickey, and we had a long evening together, and when we were through, Paul said, "Well, let's go!"

Laurence Cross and Edmund G. Brown

Graves: But I think it should be clear, too, that from a standpoint of these people and a good many more, the choice was not between me, a political unknown (not a governmental unknown, a political unknown) and an acceptable candidate who was politically known, the choice was between me and Laurence Cross.

Morris: This is interesting. How did he come to be a possible candidate?

Graves: He made himself a candidate and he campaigned long and hard for a very long time.

Morris: In other words, he wanted to be governor?

Graves: Oh, he was all over the state making speeches.

Morris: Before '53.

Graves: Oh, yes. He talked to me the year before, when I was still in the League of Cities telling me what his intentions were, when it was the last thing in the world that I would ever confront him. But you must bear in mind that what seems like an incredible political chain of events (a Republican in December and a Democratic candidate in January), and all the rest of it, realistically, was in the nature of the choice that had to be made. I paid my respects to Laurence Cross on the tape yesterday, that I had no way to qualify as the kind of a really fine liberal Democrat he was. I didn't agree with everything, but that's not the point. He had the courage, and he was out there fighting some good hard fights..

But in any case, that was the choice.

Morris: Why was Cross considered unsuitable?

Graves: Well, it was said that he was subject to attack as a left-winger, in the sense of having arranged for communists to speak in Berkeley off campus (when they couldn't get on campus, sponsoring them to speak) purely in the terms that you have the right to speak, not that he had any interest in communists. But we were at that point in time not that far

Graves: away from the McCarthy era. And the bludgeon that was used to destroy him was that he was subject to a smear campaign.

Morris: This was the decision of the same people who said to you, "Let's go."

Graves: Yes, so that the fact that I was able to command this kind of support has to be kept in the right perspective. It was a choice of the two then known alternatives.

And I will never really know, and I don't think I really want to know, whether or not I was selected as a proper choice for a holding action for Pat Brown to run four years later. I don't mean that to sound as ugly as it sounds, but nevertheless, politics is a kind of business where you do strange, sometimes not very nice, things, and I don't really know. But, I have a suspicion that at least in the minds of some of the people who were responsible for enlisting my candidacy, that it would mean there would be no blood bath in the Democratic party, nor would there be an attack on the Democratic candidate in any way that would later embarrass Pat Brown.

Morris: What about the fact that you had been, up until the filing date, a Republican?

Graves: Well, I heard a little about that at the beginning, but it didn't really matter. It was the best weapon that Larry Cross's supporters could use against me, and they used it; but, it was also true that the only difference between me and Pat Brown was that he changed his registration sometime earlier [laughter] in order to run as a Democrat.

And then when you started going down the list of Democrats in office, you would have disqualified two-thirds of the sitting Democrats who had all been Republicans at one time or another, so that this didn't have any bearing on it. It was perfectly obvious that I'd been a kind of a non-political Warren Republican.

In any case, then I had to make a decision. When you can't change jobs, why not set off the rockets and blow up the ship and all that. Why not run for governor?

Morris: Yes, and see what happens.

Graves: It can't hurt you, and it might change things. And it might even change the nature of your private life, win or lose.

What I meant when I said "the best thing I ever did was to run and the next best thing was to get beat" was, it changed my life -- from a business standpoint, very much for the better, and from a personal standpoint, what evolved out of it was something better than I had any reason to hope for. So, that I gained the two things that I was desperate about, by running and by losing. I would not have done that if I had won.

Morris: Why not?

Graves: Well, my private life wouldn't have changed at all, and my business life would have been in jeopardy the minute I was defeated or didn't run again. It worked out, although it wasn't my purpose, it wasn't my intent to lose, but I didn't suffer any personal feelings of "Oh my God, --

Morris: The world has come to an end?

Campus Communists Issue

Graves: No. So anyway, I made the decision to go, and then I resigned from the League of Cities. I started on the campaign trail in January and I never got off of it until November. And I had a lot of interesting experiences. Too many of them, I guess, to remember all, but some of them are interesting.

For some reason, which is far too great a compliment to pay myself, the people who supported Stevenson flocked to me. And the fact of the matter is that Mr. Stevenson came to California three times to campaign primarily for me, not for the full slate.

When I said earlier something about the part Jewish people have played in my life, this readily and very quickly became apparent in my campaign.

Graves: I had a total of $185,000 to spend on the entire campaign.

Morris: Not enough?

Graves: Goody Knight once told me he spent two million to beat me.

Morris: This is fifteen years ago in the governor's race in California?

Graves: Yes. We had no money at all. We were never on television unless it was a gift from somebody. They were little spots and they always came out badly (I used to think that somebody framed it with the cameraman). I would get spots with shots of me from here up or here down, or something [laughter]. It was an incredibly amateurish performance, particularly since Don Bradley was an old pro, and Pierre Salinger was my press secretary. We had a great time, the three of us, we had a marvelous time.

Morris: Did Don Bradley manage the campaign?

Graves: Oh yes, and nobody ever gave anyone more dedicated service and got less for it. Pierre broke his back with effort. Gene Lee, starving to death, worked for me in my campaign offices. Oh, there's a long list.

Things that I remember that have any bearing on this tape -- out in Beverly Hills, in a home of a very rich widow (young and enormously fat) and a great many very nice people there, it was supposed to be kind of a money-oriented meeting, as most of them were. So we got into questions and answers, and I'm on trial. I'm a converted Republican and I'm unknown: "how do you feel about some of the really important issues?" I got hard questions, and gave them honest answers whether they liked them or not. I hoped they did, but I gave them my best answers anyway.

Morris: What kinds of questions were people asking?

Graves: Oh, the whole range of issues of the time, and on this particular occasion, I got the question: where would I stand on the question of the right of communists, avowed communists, to teach in the University of California?

Morris: This was loyalty oath time?

Graves: Well no. I got involved in the fight on the oath with Malcolm Davisson and Frank Kidner. I sat up in the Berkeley hills one night with those fellows trying to talk through the right position. They were generally representing the faculty in the controversy. They were talking to me about the politics of it. The hours I spent trying to help them find a key to resolve that one. But, no, this was of course a part of the question, but it was not the original fight on the oath. This really turned on the same point, but it was squarely presented in a couple of instances during my campaign as the question of the right of a communist to teach. As I remember it at the time, to me surprisingly, Robert Taft as a trustee of Yale University (if that's the right one) had taken the position that so long as this person was qualified to teach, that being a communist should not bar him from being a professor. And I took exactly the opposite position, and that night in Beverly Hills, said, "No, not in any college if I can prevent it." Whew! This woman started to shake like a bowl of jelly. The rest of the people there did not get themselves involved. There wasn't any back-and-forth thing. It was between me and that woman, and everybody else was waiting.

And she said, "Well, I would like to have fifteen minutes. I want to bring someone here who is better qualified to discuss this with you than I am."

So I said, "It's all right with me if it's all right with everybody else."

We talked about other things, and some fifteen or twenty minutes later, a very handsome, very smooth, beautifully dressed professor from the University of California at Los Angeles appeared. He was very articulate -- a very bright guy, but we just weren't on the same wave-length. He asked me the same question and I gave him the same answer, and then he made himself quite a speech, with all the usual rebuttals and I said, "You don't understand me at all.

I said, "I'm not talking about whether they can

Graves: corrupt young people at tea or other off-campus or even on-campus, more personal situations; that's not my point at all." I said, "You haven't asked me why, but I'm going to tell you." I said, "To me a teacher is absolutely committed to teach the truth as he understands it. In all areas of the mind where the question of intellectual integrity arises, he maintains integrity, total.

"An avowed communist is an intellectual whore. He may not change what he teaches in physics (although he can if the party line changes in physics or biology), but if he's an avowed communist he will follow the party line regardless of his own intellectual convictions. He has sacrificed his intellectual integrity. He has disqualified himself to be a teacher, that's all. And, I don't think I need a better reason than that."

I lost the woman, but I won the audience. [Laughter] So that was an interesting evening.

I think, perhaps, the most interesting thing that happened in the whole campaign, happened at the meeting with the California Democratic Council in Fresno.

California Democratic Council

Morris: That was a new organization at that time, wasn't it?

Graves: Yes, it was. It was the first full year of its working life, and it was full of all kinds of people, but mostly honest, dedicated people who wanted to do something good in politics, and it wasn't yet caught up (as it has been more recently) by all the ideological controversy.

Morris: Was Alan Cranston a part of that first group?

Graves: Yes, he was, but no supporter of mine.

Morris: Had he already gone into politics himself?

Graves: Oh yes. I'll come back to Alan Cranston at a

Graves: meeting with the Los Angeles County Central Committee -- that I must come back to.

Morris: We're back at the meeting at Fresno.

Graves: So things have gone well, and its apparent that I'm going to be nominated for endorsement -- it's obvious -- no real contest. And so we were considering who was going to put me in nomination -- who's known me for a long time? Who's somebody that had a reason?

Well, why not the congressman from Hanford, where I grew up?

Morris: And who was that?

Graves: Harland Hagan. So everybody thought this was a great idea and nobody really checked. They called him in Washington and he was delighted! "Great! I'll fly out and I'll get there in plenty of time."

So, everybody thought that was pretty good. He's a Democratic congressman, and he has liberal credentials, and he'd known me for a long time -- it was a good thought.

I never write a speech, I always speak extemporaneously. But this time I wrote a very short speech. Not of acceptance, but by way of advancing my own candidacy. And it was a short speech. I don't think it took more than ten or twelve minutes to deliver. I was so calm about the whole thing that I was over in the hotel taking a nap, and I had a deal with Pierre Salinger to bring me a double martini because I always make a better speech when I've had a double martini. So I'm having a nice nap and Bradley and Salinger knock on the door and they're not looking right. They don't look happy.

Pierre has the double martini, but he said, "I don't know whether I ought to give you this."

And I said, "What's going on?"

He said, "You'll find out soon enough."

I said, "Tell me what's happening!"

"No, it'll just upset you."

Graves: I said, "You've already got me upset!" But they didn't tell me.

What had happened was that Harland Hagan came there stone drunk to nominate me. And his whole speech was that you could smear Larry Cross, but you couldn't smear Dick Graves. And he was saying this to a liberal audience as a reason why they should endorse me. My political buttons were dropping like leaves from a tree in the fall --

Morris: And he had made this speech.

Graves: Oh yes, I wasn't there yet. The man who put my name in nomination for the endorsement was a drunken congressman friend. Everything wrong that you can think of, he said it -- plus. And when I walked in that hall, where an hour before I'd been the overwhelming favorite, not one hand clapped, not one. That hall was just dead still.

Can you imagine what that's like?

Morris: Absolutely incredible. You'd wish to leave.

Graves: Unbelievable! I walked up on the platform and Paul Ziffren came over to me and he said, "I don't care what else you say, you just say you speak for yourself."

They didn't tell me about Harland Hagan until afterwards. I never knew until it was all over what happened.

Morris: So all you got was this absolute dead room with no explanation.

Graves: Absolute dead room. He said, "You tell them you speak for yourself.

So I thought, oh boy -- but I learned as a speaker for the League of Cities some of the tricks of the trade. So I walked up to the microphone and said, "Well, at long last, and apparently none too soon, I will speak for myself." Whoom! My friends came back to me.

And then I read the prepared speach, and by the

Graves: grace of God, I had written, and right at the beginning of it, "never let it be said that a man should be disqualified from a nomination by the Democratic party because for some reason he can be smeared politically. And that place blew up, boy! And they knew I was reading. They had no way of knowing whether or not I knew what Harland Hagan had said. But there was a professor of political science at Berkeley who wanted to be a Senator. What was his name? Peter Odegard. And when it was over, he came up to me and said, "I don't know whether you realize it or not, and I know you wrote it, and I know that you really didn't know what was going on, but I have just heard the greatest political speech I have ever heard made in such circumstances. It was incredible. You had lost the whole bit, and you got it back in one sentence."

I said, "Paul Ziffren's sentence?"

He said, "No, the sentence in the speech."

So that's where it all started.

Morris: Did anyone ever have any explanation. Did the congressman have an explanation?

Graves: No. He got on a plane and went back to Washington before he ever sobered up, I think. I never did see him. So that was the dramatic moment in the long year.

Let me see, before I go into this business of the state central committee and Bill Bonelli and Alan Cranston and Liz Snyder, I think we will take a recess.

Morris: I think that's probably a good idea. We have covered a lot of territory.

[Dinner Break]

[Recorded: Evening 14 April 1971]

Graves: The thing that Paul Ziffren did which gave me the clue saved the whole situation. And what Paul said to me comes back to me at odd moments. So you see,

Graves: all the things that they used to say about Paul, most of which aren't true or are not important -- are irrelevant -- you tend to judge people by what they mean to you. And all I know is then and all the time after that, Paul was with me, and so no one can say anything to me about Paul and Micky Ziffren that has any affect on the way I feel about them. Paul is the political man that we have been describing from time to time, who has no wish to govern.

Morris: But he likes the political process.

Graves: Oh, he is a master. So when someone says to me "Why Paul Ziffren -- he's in all kinds of deals with the Republicans," I say, "Well, all of the truly political men I know are in both parties all the time" --

I remember -- now what's his name -- he was involved in my campaign, he's the most articulate political writer I know, he was with Kennedy, and he was with Brown. At the time that this was going on he was legal counsel for Southern California Gas Company -- I have a book out there called Booze which was written by his wife and the wife of the radio commentator, I'll think of his name later.

Morris: He was commenting on the campaign?

Graves: Well, he was involved in my campaign, but I was thinking about when Pat started to make his play for 1958 and I think this was late '57. So Pat had this friend of mine come to see me to tell me that Pat wanted me to be involved in his campaign. So I told this young man to go back and tell Pat that I would do everything for him that he had done for me in my campaign. Now I remember. His name is Fred Dutton.

And Fred said, "He'll scream!"

I said, "Then let him scream."

So he did. Fred told Pat and he called me. Do you know what Pat said to me? "You can't do that to me." Which is a way of saying, "You can't do to me what I did to you."

Cross-Party Campaigning

Graves: Pat never appeared on a campaign platform for me. He never once identified himself with me -- ever. So this is interesting to me. (And I have no bad feeling about Pat. He's a nice guy.) It has something to do with what this was really all about. In 1954, Sam Yorty was the Democratic candidate for United States Senator. I was surprised when I found in Democratic districts -- solid Democratic districts -- billboards and snipes which said "Knight and Yorty." Yes. And when at a great football game in Los Angeles Colosseum, the candidates who were introduced at that game over the public address system were Knight and Yorty. Yes.

Morris: So that Yorty was kind of working both sides --

Graves: No, totally divorced, running his own show, tied to Knight because it was apparent to the real pros that Knight was going to win. But you didn't hear much Knight and Kuchel.

And what I say I don't say in bitterness, really, I truly don't. Just terribly curious about, in my then innocence and naivete, what I now think I was really involved in. It's a very interesting thing.

Nobody knew they were really conspiring to do me a great favor. [Laughter] But Roybal --

Morris: Edward Roybal --

Graves: Knight and Roybal -- Roybal was the Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor. But in the Mexican districts you saw Knight and Roybal posters. That was a very interesting campaign, and I recovered from my innocence. But I would be interested -- because Gene Lee is a very wise, very astute young man, someday I would love to talk to him about what was really happening.

Morris: His position as he talked about it very briefly was that this campaign was the re-building of the Democratic party.

Graves: Yes, and I survived the primary only because of the

Graves: "D," but that was true of everybody else, or almost everybody else, and I ran behind in the primary by a total of about 750,000 votes. Knight had a total in both primaries of about 750,000 more votes than I had. And he won in the general election by something like 500,000 votes out of a total of four million -- something like that.

Morris: That's pretty close.

Graves: Well, as great a name as James Roosevelt was beaten in the primary by more than a million, but then the man was Warren, so you can't count that. But no, it was not a bad thing.

Labor's Political Effort

Morris: What about labor support in your campaign? When we interviewed Bob Ash he indicated that Neil Haggerty was out drumming up support for you because he didn't feel all that comfortable with the other candidates.

Graves: I wish that were true, but that is not so. Bob Ash and some number of people in the AF of L and some in the CIO gave me strong support. The CIO people did not pay a personal penalty, but they paid it in the AF of L. I think not less than three and perhaps more officers in the AF of L were removed from office because of their support of me.

Neil Haggerty had been my friend and we had had a real warm, personal relationship. I had a meeting with Neil Haggerty when I decided to run and it would be wrong to say that if he had known I was going to run he would have done something different, because it was very important to a Neil Haggerty that he be with a winner, and I think it was always reasonably apparent that Knight would be the winner -- it would have been a terrific upset if I had won.

I would have to say that based on all the evidence I had, and I was rather sensitive to the evidence at the time, that Neil Haggerty was not only committed to Knight, but that he went all out to win

Graves: with Knight. Because this question came up in a public discussion at one time, and I said, "With all my friendly feelings for Neil Haggerty as a person, there's no way he can get into my office if I am governor of California."

Morris: What did you mean by that?

Graves: I meant that they better get themselves a new boy if I was governor. He was totally committed to Knight, so there was nothing else that he could do, and I thought he might just as well understand that there would be no forgiveness on my part at all. So, I said, "If I win, get yourselves another boy."

And now he is the national head of the whole bit, so I obviously picked the wrong horse! [Laughter] Or he picked the right one.

But it was a curious thing, and it has something else to do with this business of the difference between what is essentially political and what is something different from that. I had support from a great many officers in labor, on a personal as well as a political basis. I didn't have the labor pros. The Retail Clerks Union -- Joe De Silva -- oh boy, he gave me a lot of trouble during the campaign. The Teamsters -- you see, Knight had all the political labor people. The only labor support I had was the people who had the courage (foolhardy as it was proved in some number of cases) to go against leadership -- and then lose, you see. It's all right to go against the leadership if you win, but you'd better not go against the leadership if you lose.

So I had a great many really fine supporters in the labor movement as individual local leaders. I had very little of the top -- very little.

Morris: Was this before the AFL had merged with the CIO?

Graves: Oh, I can't answer even that. I don't know, but it was at least separate in the discussion we were having. And the political leadership of the two great unions was quite separate. There was no one place to talk to both of them at that time.

Goodwin Knight's Strength

Morris: Whitaker and Baxter were also a factor in this campaign.

Graves: Well, I would think so. But I have no comment on it, because me memory is not that clear on the point, and so I don't know, but I would say that all the organized, professional political forces were with Knight.

Since I had no money -- our $185,000 was cigarette money in a political campaign -- I had only one thing going for me, and that was the very large number of people in our society who identified with the Democratic party.

Dick Graves got very few votes, truly. The Democratic party with an unknown candidate got about 1,750,000 votes. [Laughter] And Goodwin Knight and the Republican party and all the things that had been done carefully over the years got about 2,250,000 votes. It's very obvious that if I had had Neil Haggerty -- one man -- I would have won, God forbid.

No, it was the fact that -- and I must say this too -- it was the fact I didn't have the strong base of labor support which a Democratic candidate has to have to win.

But I must say this, that as a governor, Goodwin Knight, without selling out his Republican party support, earned and justified the support of the labor movement for his candidacy. Yes, he did.

Morris: So in a sense, if you equate union support with traditional Democratic party thinking, Knight did have a bipartisan kind of support.

Graves: Oh yes, he did! That's the whole thing. But you see, my point was different at that moment. I told you before that I thought he would be a very bad governor, and he wasn't. He was rather a good governor, by all the standards of the long years. And the policies that I forced him to adopt as a candidate he implemented as a governor. The labor support that

Graves: he acquired as a winning candidate he justified and earned as a governor. I have no bad feelings about Goodwin Knight as a governor after that election. I think he did very well, and I think he justified the support of the people who supported him. I couldn't have done any better in the labor area than he did.

Morris: What kinds of things do you think you would have done had you been elected?

Graves: If I had been elected?

Morris: Yes.

Graves: What would I have done? I haven't the foggiest notion. I don't know. If I answered the question just in terms of what I think, in the absense of all the pressures which affect the governor's office and all the politics of the situation to which I'd never <u>really</u> been exposed, certainly not in office --

Oh, I have a notion of what I would have done, but I cannot answer the question in terms of what I really would have done, because no man is that impervious to a new situation. I can't answer that. I haven't the faintest idea of whether I would have been a better governor in the over-all sense than Goodwin Knight turned out to be.

So I don't really know. I would have given some new directions to the state government. I think I would have reordered what we now call the priorities, as regards pollution, the environment, and in the broadest sense, the problems of the cities. My work in the League of Cities was directed to these areas and they would have been central to my program. But in specific terms, I just don't know.

I don't think that you can say what you would have done, because you really don't know -- because you weren't there.

Morris: Under those pressures.

Graves: Under those pressures, yes. I just don't know.

William Bonelli and the State Democratic Central Committee

Morris: Going back to the campaign, you were going to tell --

Graves: I was going to tell you about the impact of Bill Bonelli on my campaign.

I had been around Sacramento long enough to know Bill Bonelli and his works. Again, in this purist environment in which I had grown up, with none of the counter pressures to temper it, I was not an admirer of Bill Bonelli. And suddenly I found myself as an endorsed candidate confronted with the probability of the election of Elizabeth Snyder as state chairman of the Democratic party in my campaign year.

Now, without dealing in personalities, because I'm not commenting on the personal character or personal anything of Elizabeth Snyder, the fact was that her husband was a Bonelli henchman, and so here I was suddenly confronted with the fact that I would be running as a candidate with the newly elected state chairman definitely and irrevocably committed to Bill Bonelli, who was running for re-election to the Board of Equalization, but he had just changed his registration from Republican to Democrat.

There are some prices that an innocent abroad is not prepared to pay, and this was one of them.

Morris: You were already concerned about Bonelli's reported liquor license activities?

Graves: Oh, I knew Bonelli, and I knew that indictment was inevitable, and I knew that if he were indicted and it ever got to court he would be convicted. I knew the essential facts, I had been around long enough to know that.

So now I am at a meeting of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee. And the question before the house is the endorsement of Elizabeth Snyder for state chairman. And against the advice of my closest political advisors I said, "No." But not Don Bradley.

Morris: He was with you.

Graves: Yes. So I arose to my full height of five feet nine

Graves: and a half inches and I said, "Now, there is one thing I wish to say to you. I am your endorsed candidate. But I have no roots here, and you can repudiate me if you wish, but I ask you not to do this. And, if you do it I will oppose it again at the state central committee (the state Democratic meeting) in Sacramento, because whether Bill Bonelli is to be indicted now or at some later time, every knowledgeable person in this room knows that he will be guilty as charged, and you have endorsed a candidate for governor who would not live with that.

So they endorsed her, after Alan Cranston made the endorsing speech.

Morris: So did you take it to the state committee?

Graves: Oh, yes, I did, and lost. I went to every single county delegation meeting that I could possibly attend, and I said the same things: in the end, notwithstanding all that nastiness of politics, the only thing that's worth being identified with is an essential integrity in politics, and I will not identify with this situation -- and I lost. The Democratic state convention repudiated its brand new endorsed candidate for governor to go with Bonelli.

Morris: And so was Mrs. Snyder on the same ballot?

Graves: No, she wasn't on a ballot. She wasn't a candidate for anything except chairman of the State Democratic Central Committee. So I had created the situation in which I was a Democratic candidate repudiated by the state Democratic committee. Interesting.

Now if I had had roots that went back ten years in the Democratic party and I had worked at it and these people were my people, this couldn't have happened. This is like saying that a Republican or Democratic nominee for President can not have anything to do about who they nominate for Vice President. You know, that's inconceivable. But I suddenly found myself as a repudiated candidate by my own party machinery.

Morris: Still during the campaign.

Graves: Well, the finale as far as I'm concerned is that some months later, there was a great Democratic rally in the Hollywood Bowl, and the speaker of the evening was Adlai Stevenson, speaking, as it turned out, on behalf of my candidacy. And so we had a great tent, you know, and big cocktail party, and there's Bill Bonelli -- absolutely alone in the center of that great tent. And I went over to him, and I said, "Bill, you know the position I've taken."

He said, "Yes, I do."

I said, "I have no choice."

He said, "I know that."

And he said, "There are a great many people around me who feel very, very badly about it, but I really don't. What I respect is the fact that of all the people here you're the first man who has walked into the center of this tent to speak to me."

And one time in the Senator Hotel in Sacramento after Artie Samish had done that incredibly stupid thing in giving that article to that magazine, it died, what was it?

Morris: Collier's.

Graves: Collier's, with the dummy on the knee and all the incredibly stupid things that he said out of an unlimited arrogance (I thought he was smarter than that) -- here he was in the middle of the hotel that he had dominated like a king for twenty years and nobody was willing to walk up to him in a public place.

And I walked into the middle of the lobby and I said, "Hello, Artie."

And he said, "It would be somebody like you." He said, "These people that I have fed and I have clothed, and run their campaigns and handled them for years, and you have to walk in here to be the first man to walk up to me in a public place and say, 'Hello, Artie'."

Morris: Tell me about Artie Samish -- as a human being that you worked with.

Graves: Bad man, bad man, totally bad. It isn't enough when you have corrupted a whole government -- deliberately, willfully set out to compromise men and take pictures of them in a bedroom with a girl you've hired, and do all the horrible things that he did -- then to be in a room and say to the state senator from one of our great counties, "You walk over to me on your knees" and have him do it, and then try to say, "I'm good to my mother."

No, utterly bad man. Totally bad. So you're good to your wife and children. What does that excuse? Totally corrupt. But, because I had no reason to be afraid, I could do it. And when he said, "You would be the one," I said, "Well, look, the Christmas Tree Bill and Mark Noon," and he said, "So it does go two ways," and I said, "Yes, it does."

Adlai Stevenson's Campaigns

Morris: What about Eugene Lee's feeling that your campaign brought many people into active roles in the Democratic party?

Graves: Well, it did. But again, you see, these were Stevenson people, kind of standing in the wings, waiting for the second round with Stevenson, and it is a compliment that I give myself, that we had some things in common. So, I gave them something with which to identify in the interrugnum. And that's really what it was. It was not my campaign. I came exactly in between the two Stevenson campaigns. And it was my total disassociation from active politics which made it easy for them to identify with me, because even though Stevenson had been governor of Illinois, he was the most apolitical man I ever met in politics.

Morris: Is this why he didn't get elected?

Graves: Oh, of course, of course. He asked me once when he came out here to go with him to Oregon. What was the name of that Senator who died?

Morris: Neuberger.

Graves: Yes. To campaign for Neuberger. Well, he didn't

Graves: mean that I should campaign for Neuberger, he paid me the great compliment of wanting my company to go up to Oregon, so of course I did.

I remember as one of the highest points of my brief and unlamented political life, sitting with Adlai Stevenson in a motel room in Oregon while he told me for almost an hour why he did not feel he was qualified to be President of the United States.

Morris: That's fascinating, when so many people felt that he was the very one. What were his reasons?

Graves: Well, the best reason in the world. The epitome of the answer is Harry Truman and he used that. Earthy Harry Truman, a sign on his desk, "The buck stops here." The essence of the presidency is the ultimate, not only the right but the duty -- the obligation -- to make a decision, and then having made it, to stay with it.

The example that Mr. Stevenson used was the decision that Harry Truman had to make to use the atomic bomb in Japan. And what Mr. Stevenson said was, "If I had been President, and confronted with that decision, I could not have made it -- either way." I would have known that if I did not make it, some hundreds of thousands of our young men would die on the beaches of Japan, and if I did make it, some hundreds of thousands of Japanese would die. And, I would have been torn between the moral horns of the dilemma. And I don't think I ever could have made a decision. So that in the end, the American soldiers would have died."

He said, "My problem is that I am disqualified from the presidency because I see two sides of every coin, and I cannot make those decisions in the same way that a President must make them. I would be an indecisive President."

Now, this was between the two campaigns. "It takes another kind of an intelligence in which you consult with all your advisors and you listen to what they say, and then in the still of your room you make a decision, and in my room I would still be debating both sides of the same question."

Morris: Do you feel that this was true?

Graves: Yes, positively true. Yes, I do. And the greatest compliment that I ever got from Stevenson was an indirect one -- well, it was direct and indirect. But after my candidacy, and he was again a candidate -- so I did make one more political speech than I told you about -- I was for some incredible reason (because I lost my own county, Contra Costa, by a landslide because of the steel workers) invited by the incumbent Democratic hierarchy to make the introductory speech for Adlai Stevenson at a great rally in Richmond.

I made no notes, because this I could do out of a very full heart. When you speak from all the warmth and the love and the affection that I felt for him, you achieve an eloquence that you rarely achieve.

Now, it is notorious that Adlai Stevenson was always making minor corrections in his prepared text all during the preliminaries. So I started telling them why I thought Adlai Stevenson ought to be President, and I couldn't help peeking. He was doing the usual when I started, and then he stopped, and he listened.

I had a son who was then approaching military age. I had a list of things, and I recited them one by one. It was because I must entrust the future of my son to the President of the United States that I wished Adlai Stevenson to be President, and on and on and on, reciting the catalog of all the reasons why his election affected me personally. The ultimate compliment that I have ever received was when he told me "I have been introduced a thousand times, but never that well."

He was one of the greatest men who has ever been a candidate for the presidency, but I'm not sure at all that politics demands from its leaders this level of intelligence, this intellectual depth, his almost total awareness of the implications of the things you're asked to do and decide.

I think it's true at every level, from the mayor of the town to the presidency, and through all the private businesses of the country, that the one indispensible quality in an executive is the power to make a decision, and then implement it. It doesn't always have to be right, nobody is right all the

Graves: time. What immobilizes the whole machinery of a government or a company is the lack of a decision. And this is what he was saying to me in that motel in Oregon: that he might immobilize the whole machinery.

But I also remember that he was distressed by the constant press of people when a man is in public life, his saying that the continued pressing of the flesh was repugnant to him -- very different from the classic image of the skilled professional politician, a difference, indeed, which might be sensed by individuals.

New Deal Personalities

Graves: I told you that Raymond Moley came out here as a sometime professor in Sam May's agglomeration of people. He came out here in a summer session. He was very much alone and living in a terrible apartment at the corner of Telegraph and Durant. I was working in the field, and became associated with him, and so we spent a good many hours together talking about all kinds of things.

This was just before the Roosevelt campaign of '32. We became good friends -- teacher and student. So not long after that he came back in Roosevelt's entourage to San Francisco at the head of the Roosevelt brain trust. He was a nice enough guy at the time, he got a little lost later, but he invited me to come to San Francisco to the Palace Hotel, and meet the governor: Roosevelt.

Of course I did that. I went over and was exposed to two men there, both of whom lived up to one interesting part of their reputations, in my case, superbly. Here was a great big parlor, the biggest parlor in the Palace Hotel, I'm sure. This was just before Roosevelt's speech to the Commonwealth Club, which was one of the decisive factors in the campaign, and I heard it -- when he told the Commonwealth Club which was the essence of San Francisco business what he proposed to do as President. The fact that what he did and what he

Graves: said there -- there was no relation between them -- is irrelevant to my story.

So here were, oh, it seemed like hundreds of people, milling around in this great big parlor. Roosevelt was sitting in a great wicker sunburst chair, you know -- so when there was a moment, Moley took me over and introduced me to Mr. Roosevelt, and then I saw this personal thing he had, of total concentration. He just tuned out on the whole room. And the only people there as far as he was concerned were Raymond Moley and me. He was absolutely oblivious of everything else in the room. He was concentrated on us. And he said, "Well, you're a student of Ray's."

And I said, "Yes, Governor."

And he said, "Ray, is he a good student?"

And Ray said, "Yes, he is."

And he said, "Well, now, if we're successful in this venture, why, you better come back and see us."

It was this capacity not just to say, "Well, how do you do Mr. Graves." Just absolute concentration. You knew he wasn't thinking about anything else. So, of course, I was absolutely charmed out of my pants. Then Ray took me over to a man who was about six feet three, whose name was James Farley. And so I learned about his great skill. He had this same capacity to pay attention. So Ray gave me a nice introduction to Jim Farley and he repeated my name (which is the trick of the business) about three times in a minute and a half, and I went on my way.

The next day I'm walking down one of the corridors of the Palace Hotel waiting for the governor to make his speech and Mr. Farley came walking the other way. Now remember, that was about one and a half minutes in a room of about a hundred and fifty people. "Hi, Dick."

Morris: How delightful.

Graves: Unbelievable. I'm nothing, I'm nobody, I'm a student.

Graves: I'm of absolutely no importance. Bingo!

Morris: Mr. Warren has that same capacity, does he not?

Graves: Yes, but not to the same degree. Farley's recall was almost total. There was a Democratic leader in Berkeley before I got involved, Lucia delValle Grady, Henry Grady's wife. Henry Grady was a professor or dean at the university in Berkeley, and Lucia delValle (del Valle is one of the great Spanish land grant names around San Francisco Bay) was Mrs. Grady. She was very active in Democratic politics. She could come into a room with fifty or sixty women, and her hostess would start and introduce her, and thirty minutes later Mrs. Grady could go back and call everybody by their right name!

Morris: Now, is this a skill that can develop, or is this instinctive?

Graves: No, I don't think that anyone can develop it. I think that if you have this kind of recall, that you can develop techniques for it. I had to do my best to learn it in the League of Cities, and while I couldn't remember everyone, I developed many defenses so -- [laughter]

I think one of the tricks is that if someone you're introduced to calls you "Mrs. Morris" at the end of every sentence, repeatedly uses your name, what they're really trying to do is associate that name with your face.

But Governor Warren after all his years in public life -- no one has that kind of recall, so that it used to offend him and irritate him when someone would come up to the head table where he had been making a speech and instead of saying, "Governor, I am so-and-so," which would have been the courtesy of the situation, they would say, "Governor, you don't remember my name --"

And do you know what he used to say? "No, I don't."

Morris: That's an awful temptation given that kind of an opening.

Graves: I still have that lesson learned. Even when I think

Graves: somebody knows me, when I say hello, I say, "Hello, I'm Dick Graves," and take the pressure off.

But to embarrass a public figure like Warren by saying, "You don't remember my name." Oh, that used to aggravate him terribly. So he never flinched, he said, "No, I don't." [Laughter]

Graves' Supporters

Morris: Oh, my. Then what you're saying is that people like Roger Kent and Hale Champion and Libby Gatov had already worked for Stevenson and then worked for you?

Graves: Yes. I think you've picked a rather good group for the illustration.

Morris: These are names that Gene Lee mentioned.

Graves: Yes. Roger Kent is philosophically a really honest to God liberal in the context in which we used the term in 1954. Well-born, very much a part of the whole Marin County scene, Kentfield is --

Morris: That is his family?

Graves: Oh yes, that's all the original family holdings. A very good lawyer, very successful lawyer. While I'm not sure, I can't put a timetable on it, but I would guess that he was attracted into active politics by the Stevenson campaign. If he dabbled before, he was dabbling. When he got really committed I think, it was Stevenson. Libby, I haven't thought about her in a long time -- she was a lovely looking person and a lovely person. Yes, I would think so. Hale Champion? I woulun't quite say that. I identify him with the San Francisco Chronicle as a political writer. I think that it might be fair to say that he might not have been emotionally involved before Stevenson.

Morris: Was he on the Chronicle throughout your campaign?

Graves: Yes.

Morris: And working on advising on your campaign?

Graves: After hours. The managing editor (if that was the right title) of the San Francisco Chronicle at that time got fired because of me.

Morris: For doing what?

Graves: Refusing to destroy me and insisting on supporting me. Oh, lots of people paid the price of admission in my campaign.

Morris: He should be memorialized.

Graves: Well, he ended up in a comparable position for a newspaper in Chicago, and the only time I ever saw him he said, "Well, I don't know whether you got promoted, but I did." But he was dismissed. Oh, this was not easy. A great many people paid the price -- by dismissal. I told you there were at least several people in the AFofL, but a senior executive of the Chronicle was dismissed because of his position in my campaign. Oh yes, sure, yes.

Did I tell you that I got sued for a million dollars by Lyn Fox who was the political editor for the Call Bulletin?

Republican Maneuvers

Morris: Oh, that's a story that we should have.

Graves: It was the same night as that meeting in Berkeley where I produced my secretary and the telegram. Because I had just seen a letter from Judge Gittelson, a distinguished judge in this county with whom I have subsequently had business relations in a very amicable vein. In an earlier campaign, a candidate (I think it was Nixon, I'm not sure, so I wouldn't want to say that's a fact), in order to attract the liberal Jewish vote, had accused his opponent of having accused him of being an antiSemite. Then his friends in the Jewish community rallied to his support, so that the question of supporting him became a Jewish issue in the Jewish community, not a political issue.

So Judge Gittelson wrote a letter to the

Graves: leadership of the statewide Jewish community saying that I had accused Goodwin Knight of being an anti-Semite, which of course, was an absolutely blatant lie, but it was done in order to inspire this same reaction which had been used earlier by another candidate.

But the mistake he made (if it was a mistake, I'm not sure it was [laughter]) was to tell them to write their letters of protest to Lyn Fox in care of the San Francisco Call Bulletin. Now, that's extraordinary! That Judge Gittelson would say to send letters of protest to the political editor of a San Francisco newspaper.

Morris: From Los Angeles.

Graves: Yes. That's extraordinary, and I was full of this because Judge Isaac Pacht, who was a very fine man in Los Angeles, and who was very much a part of my campaign as were his two sons, called me. He was very disturbed -- almost asking me whether it could be true? And we rather quickly resolved the fact that it was not true. But the fact that it could raise doubts in his mind gave me some idea of the measure of the problem that such a letter could create in the very sensitive Jewish world.

I was just boiling with this when I went to Berkeley, and I had a copy of the San Francisco Call Bulletin with me. Standing on the platform in Berkeley, I said, "And now that we've resolved some other questions, --"

Morris: This was the same time --

Graves: Same night that I took on the problem of the Japanese, yes.

I said, "Now, let's deal with the problem of the Jewish community, because in addition to all the things that have been said here, I have been accused by a Los Angeles judge of being an antiSemite, because he has accused me of accusing Goodwin Knight of being an antiSemite. He has raised the issue, and now I will tell you. Any reporters present, please take note: "Lyn Fox is not the political editor of the San Francisco Call Bulletin,

Graves: he is part and parcel of, captive to the Knight campaign. Let the record read."

And immediately the campaign was over he sued me for a million dollars. For libel or slander, or whatever it was.

Morris: Was he in truth both managing editor and active in Knight's campaign?

Graves: Yes. He was obviously active in Knight's campaign. You don't get letters from the Jewish communities sent to you if you're not active in the campaign!

The lawyer for the San Francisco Call Bulletin was Garret McEnerney, who is a wonderful guy. He was about six feet eight (he should be on a basket ball team only he's too old). He's just a hell of a guy. And, along with a great many other things like Macy's and Southern Pacific, he was attorney for the San Francisco Call Bulletin. So McEnerney filed suit for a million dollars, on behalf of Lyn Fox. The campaign is over, and I'm faced with a law suit for a million bucks.

There was a first class lawyer in San Francisco who was involved in my campaign, so I went to see him.

Morris: Does he have a name?

Graves: Terrible that I should remember Garret McEnerney and forget my own -- it's awful, isn't it? [Laughter] Except that I've done business since with Garret McEnerney and I haven't seen my friend in all these years. So my friend and I talked about it. He talked about it as a lawyer, and I talked about it as a retired politician. And I said, "Inasmuch as they have filed suit, what are my subpoena rights? Evidence, documentary.

And he said, "Very broad."

And I said, "OK, you call Garret McEnerney, if you agree, and you tell him that in order to document the charge, we will subpoena all the records of the Knight campaign.

He said, "Oh, brother, that ought to do it."

Graves: I said, "Will it stand up?"

He said, "Well, I don't know if the court will allow it, but even the threat --"

Morris: Should create quite a stir.

Graves: So they decided in the interest of prudence to dismiss the suit. [Laughter]

Morris: The best defense is a good offense?

Graves: Well, yes. Yes, indeed [laughter]. Because it might not have proved that Lyn Fox was part and parcel of the Knight campaign, but it would have been an interesting record. Like any campaign. That's not directed at Knight. That's any campaign. Except mine.

Do you know what we did that had never been done before? We filed a campaign report and to the extent that it was possible, we went down to the level of the five dollar contributions with names. Some people gave me money without realizing that we were going to do this. We embarrassed some people, but that was the law and we did it. We filed pages and pages and the whole thing was a hundred and eighty-five thousand dollars.

So, where are we?

Lessons Learned

Morris: Was your experience as an executive in the League of California Cities a help or a hindrance in the campaign?

Graves: Well, when I said a while ago that if I had run against Knight on the Republican ticket I might have been nominated and elected, I can give you a couple of for-instances.

Immediately that I was a serious candidate, Knight's people wrote letters to every mayor and councilman in California who had known me, now, for all their incumbent official lives. And ninety

Graves: percent of them signed a petition for Knight. If you had asked them one month earlier about me, it would have come back as a paean of praise, but now I was a Democratic candidate, and they walked away from me just like that. They were Republicans first. Suppose I had been a Republican candidate? They wouldn't have left me in a thousand years.

The fact that I was a Democratic candidate immobilized the president of the University of California, Robert Gordon Sproul, but not if I had been a Republican candidate opposing Goodwin Knight. Earl Warren didn't appear on a political platform with Goodwin Knight while I was a candidate. If I had been a Republican candidate against Knight I think I would have been the Warren candidate. Tommy Kuchel, all the rest of the Republican incumbents, all my natural friends over the years -- I'm not saying this in distress.

To run is one thing, to win is another. But looking at it in retrospect, if I had truly wanted to win, if that was the whole thing, if I had sat down and thought about it just in those terms, I should have run as a Warren-type Republican against Goodwin Knight.

Morris: When you were talking to people about who could run as a Republican candidate, if they had suggested, "Why don't you run as a Republican, would you have accepted that?"

Graves: With the same evidences of support that I got from the Democrats, I think the honest answer to that has to be "Yes, I would have." Because it became apparent that this was the best course for me. Nobody suggested this and I'm glad they didn't. In the long view, I'm glad they didn't.

Morris: I can see that.

Graves: I believe that most of my natural political support was in the Republican party. I also believe that if that had occurred, and if I had actually taken the nomination from Knight, that there is no doubt at all that I would have been elected. Because then

Graves: the Democratic candidate would have been Larry Cross.

You wouldn't believe the number of my friends who were the leading Republicans who said, "Oh, Dick -- what are you doing as a Democratic candidate? We could have gone with you." No, it would have been a different thing.

Morris: That's a curious comment on the thinking of the people in politics.

Graves: No, it isn't.

Morris: That they didn't think of you as an alternative to Knight.

Graves: No, you think about it this way, and you must, you see, because at the beginning I thought that. Then, when I thought it through, the answer was obvious.

It was not me being elected governor, as a Democrat. It was the fact that it would have greatly strengthened the Democratic party. It would have meant that for four years at least I would be appointing (as, indeed, I would) qualified Democrats, judges, all the key positions, not hacks, but qualified Democrats. You look hard enough, you can find one. [Laughter] And that's the same with the Republicans, that isn't meant to be a commentary on Democrats.

Morris: I understand.

Graves: You can always find a qulified man of your own party, if you choose to. And this was not something that I reasoned out, this is something that I was told, by people who were embarrassed not to have supported me. It was not me, it was the impact on the entire political structure of the state.

Morris: Going back a couple of months. The Republican office-holders did not, themselves, see a need to --

Graves: Well, one of the reasons they didn't see me as a candidate was that neither did I.

Morris: But you were going around asking them to run and raising the issue that there should be an alternative

Morris: to Knight.

Graves: Yes, but it takes the devious political mind of a George Miller or a Don Bradley to turn this around the way they did. No, this was not likely with my friends who were Republicans. They thought of me as a professional, League of Cities kind of person. It would take a George Miller to think of this one. [Laughter] Machiavelli in the flesh.

No, I would not have expected them, nor do I now have any idea that they should have thought of this. It wouldn't enter their minds. I was so thoroughly identified in a totally nonpolitical area. No, it wouldn't and shouldn't have occurred to them. It takes a George Miller to think of one like this.

Morris: Well, another way to put this is to ask if city government people saw themselves as not having this kind of a role in statewide politics?

Graves: No, they became partisan.

Morris: On statewide issues?

Graves: Not on issues, they became partisan in terms of my candidacy. All the Democratic city officials were delighted, and they were all with me. As executive director, I made a speech at the League of Cities meeting in San Francisco in September of that year and the man who first stood up and brought the whole audience to its feet to applaud what I had said was the mayor of Oakland. He signed that petition for Goodwin Knight. I don't say that with bitterness. In statewide politics, and in national politics he was a Republican. As a mayor, he was with me, but as a Republican, he was not with me as a candidate. No. And I learned something. But the basis for it was partisan. If I had been a successful Democratic governor, I would have weakened the Republican party, as Warren neutralized the Democratic party.

Morris: By being independent?

Graves: No, by being a successful governor, and by controlling all the machinery of state government. By being

Graves: able to influence the course of events. By appointing supervisors to vacancies, and judges to vacancies, and boards, and commissions. Imagine the cumulative impact of the Warren appointees over all the years of his terms. It's incredible what the impact of that can be. And these were political people, and they understood it. And I didnt. [Laughter] I do now, but I didn't then. See, I had counted on them as a sure resource.

Morris: Your connections and your friends from your Cities experience.

Graves: Oh sure, I thought they would be with me no matter what, and I was never more wrong in my life.

Morris: Did this campaign experience shed any illumination on your thinking about Warren as governor, or any insights into --

The Financial Bind

Graves: No, I wouldn't think so. Except in one area. I wondered after I had been through this experience how he managed to survive it. The degrading, immoral, humiliating experience of being a supplicant for money while you're a candidate for a great office. The unbelievable experience that could happen to a man like Warren, sitting in the waiting room of an oil company with his hat in his hand to be rejected because of his posture on the fights with the oil companies. How humiliating that must have been to him as all the things I had to do to try to raise money were to me.

This is the greatest sickness of our whole political system. I don't know how to cure it, but there is no way to win public office, great office, without making compromises which are totally adverse to the public interest. And I wouldn't, and I didn't, and I didn't win. It's like a delegation from Nevada that came to me to ask me if I would commit myself to them not to allow gambling in California -- that they would give some money to my campaign.

Now, here's an easy one, isn't it?

Morris: It's easy to say.

Graves: Except for one thing. You see, all I had to do was enforce the law and not let it change. You know, impeccable position. The only thing you can't live with is you took money from Nevada gamblers.

Morris: They would give you a campaign contribution if you would promise not to legalize gambling in California. And that would be to their advantage?

Graves: Of course. Because then they have the only legal gambling around. So you get the borders along the Lake Tahoe shoreline and there's no gambling on the California side, and people spend all their money in Nevada. It's simple. And all I had to do was be an honest man -- honorable, moral, and say "I absolutely will not. Give me the contribution."

Only it's the second thing you can't do, you see. Because I wasn't committing myself to do anything that was wrong in terms of the law. The law said no gambling in California. All I had to say was "Sure, as a matter of moral principle, I wouldn't do it anyway." (Which I wouldn't have.)

There's only one thing immoral about that. You don't take money for that.

And the man that came to me and said, "I have here a check for x dollars and all I want to do is name the savings and loan commissioner." No problem.

No, the most disgusting thing about politics, degrading, just humiliating, is to be running for a great office, the governorship of the state of California, going around with your hat in your hand, on your hands and knees, begging for money. Disgusting!

Morris: How come legislative efforts to set up some kind of a campaign fund have not succeeded?

Graves: Howdo you think the lobbyists would feel about that? Aside from the fact that it would put them out of business, what else would they feel about it?

Morris: This is a question that we sort of talked around a couple times; where do the legitimate purposes of

Morris: advocacy for a cause cease and impure lobbying begin?

Graves: When money introduces itself.

Morris: And because lobbying is sufficiently a part of the scene it can be --

Graves: Well, let's put it this way. Artie Samish had millions of dollars to spend to elect legislators who were friendly to his clients' cause and to beat those who were not.

Morris: For their campaigns, over and above what he spent on legislation.

Graves: Oh sure, not counting all the other goodies. Just straight out-and-out campaign contributions. Sending a professional in, paid by Samish, to run the campaign, pay for the newspaper ads, pay for the billboards, pay for everything, run the campaign.

Morris: Samish's enterprises actually went that far. To actually running campaigns?

Graves: Oh, certainly. And while I have no personal knowledge of it, the money that used to go to Samish for this purpose reportedly was later controlled by Jesse Unruh as speaker. He directed the disbursement of those funds as speaker. He didn't put it in his own pocket, that I'm sure of, but in the sense of the munipulation of the system, Jesse Unrhu inherited the mantle.

Morris: In a recent magazine article, Unruh maintained that he did it to strengthen the machinery of government.

Graves: Well, I would say that that's fairly accurate because Jesse was a major part of the machinery of government.

Morris: To equalize the problem of raising funds. This is an article in this month's Harper's magazine. [April, 1971]

Graves: Where did he get the money -- individual contributions of $2.50?

Morris: No. His comment was that he sold a piece of himself,

Morris: but never enough so that anybody had full control of him. This is a loose quote.

Graves: I won't argue with that. I think that's true. But when you take fifty thousand or whatever from a private company are you supposed, then, to oppose them? Are you supposed to elect legislators hostile to them?

Morris: Jesse's point is that he took from so many people that none of them --

Graves: Pure sophistry. You can not honestly say that the speaker of the state assembly interposes himself as the fundraiser from all the powerful lobbyists and disburses the money to elect people to the legislature in such a pure pro bono publico fashion that he is not beholden to those who gave him the money, and the people he elected are beholden neither to him nor the people who gave him the money.

Nobody buys that merry-go-round.

Morris: It's a tightrope.

Graves: It isn't even that. It is nonsense.

Morris: And the legislators themselves have not been able to arrive at any equitable arrangement?

Graves: Why do they want to?

Morris: Pro bono publico.

Graves: [Laughter] Oh, come on! Not that there aren't legislators up there that do believe that and do practice it, but we're not talking about that. We're talking about the essential elements of control.

Pure sophistry. It made him the most powerful man in the legislature. So what are we supposed to believe, that he only used it pro bono publico? I'm not saying that Jesse Unruh ever took a nickel and put it in his pocket.

Morris: As you said earlier, you make compromises at one level to, hopefully, give you the muscle to accomplish

Morris: whatever your vision is of the things that need to be done.

Graves: That's totally foreign to what we're talking about now. Totally foreign. Different subject. When you become the funnel through which all the lobbyists' money goes to elect legislators (no matter what anybody says) this a funnel to buy people for your money. This is one of those places where the cliche fits: power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. And at that point in time Jesse Unruh had absolute legislative power.

At his point in time, Artie Samish had absolute power.

Morris: But weren't there also efforts, to some extent successful, by Warren and the legislature to break Samish's power?

Graves: Not until Samish walked out to the end of the longest limb in the world and then handed them the saw to cut it off. Nobody attacked him until that article came out in Collier's.

He and Warren had some bad times, but don't misunderstand me, as far as I know, there was no irreparable breach between even Warren and Artie Samish.

I don't know the answer to the problem of financing political campaigns, so that the candidate is not already bought and paid for. I wish I did. I can only tell you that it is the curse of the American political system. The absolute curse.

The British system has a unique quality in this particular respect. Nobody runs on the basis of the whole of Britain. Nobody. You have little districts.

Morris: And you're also rather limited --

Graves: -- yes, you have very little time, and you're really talking to your own people. You know, you don't have our kind of twenty-five million dollar campaigns for president of Britain.

Morris: Well, you don't have one hundred million voters.

Graves: No, and you don't run in the nation. You run in your parlimentary districts. If you're qualified to run, you can probably pay for it. You can meet everyone in the district.

We've got a different system. We've got a different problem, but it's a very serious problem. I can remember a call from sombody's presidential campaign entourage, "Got to raise some money by Friday night. We've got to go on the air and we haven't the money. Can you help us?"

I called a rich friend. And just for the pleasure of shaking hands with the candidate and spending three minutes alone with him he put up two checks for five thousand dollars (from two different sources, because five thousand dollars is the legal limit). Can you imagine being a candidate for the presidency, campaigning in a hotel suite, and having to say, "Gentlemen, if you'll excuse Mr. So-and-So and me, for just a moment" so that the candidate for the presidency can walk into a bedroom to accept two five thousand dollar checks? Can you imagine that for the presidency?

Morris: I believe you.

Graves: But isn't it revolting? Disgusting? That a man who is aspiring to the presidency of the United States can be put in a position where he has to walk into a private bedroom with somebody in order to flatter him into giving him two five thousand dollar checks?

This is the curse of American politics. Terrible! I don't know what you do about it. But it was the curse of my candidacy.

I may be the only living man who ran for governor that never promised to appoint anybody dogcatcher. I met once in Alameda County with five lawyers at lunch with one of my political people, and the heavy overtones of that lunch were so apparent, and I said, "Gentlemen, I have promised none of you that I would appoint you to the superior court of Alameda

Graves: County, and I venture to suggest that my opponent has promised each of you that appointment." And it broke up the lunch, because it was true. This has nothing to do with Goody Knight. It's standard operating procedure: promise everybody anything. And one of the reasons I was disqualified as a candidate was because I wouldn't do it.

Morris: You looked at it as a whole piece.

Graves: No, no, I just wasn't a political animal, that's all. I was raised on the other side of the fence, and to go into that office with these burdens and these commitments hanging around my neck would make the office intolerable.

Morris: You've also mentioned a couple of times people who have risen to their image of a high public office. And this ambivalence is interesting.

Graves: No, I don't think it is, if I understand the nature of your question. I told you that Warren would appoint friends to offices of no importance, but never to an office of importance. Warren introduced the whole concept of bar approval of judicial appointment in order to divest himself of the obligation to make political appointments to the superior courts. He introduced a device to make it nonpolitical, except for one thing: if his friend qualified, he could appoint him in good conscience. If he didn't, he could not appoint him in equally good conscience, because he had been judged by his peers.

At a meeting in Sacramento one night very early in my candidacy, a lawyer stood up, but it could have been anyone, who asked me, (not knowing me very well), "With your background as a Republican, why have we any reason to believe that you would appoint Democrats to office? Why wouldn't you appoint your Republican friends?"

I answered him by saying, "I refuse to believe that I have no qualified Democratic friends, but if you are asking me if my only choice was a qualified Republican or an unqualified Democrat, then I must honestly answer you that I would appoint the qualified Republican. But I still say, I do not believe that I cannot find a qualified Democrat."

Graves: I'm sure that wasn't the right answer, politically, but then, I was raised on the administrative side. [Laughter]

Cost of Political Support

Morris: Did you have any feeling of any major lessons learned, or major disappointments about the campaign?

Graves: Oh, my disappointments, I suppose, were directly related to the lessons learned, and that's what we've been talking about. They weren't all disappointments, that would be a very erroneous impression to leave -- I had thousands of people who worked hard, stuffing the mailings until two o'clock in the morning who asked nothing except that I be a good governor, and do what I said I would do. And this is the good part of it, the heartwarming part of it.

But when you get up into the higher levels of political support, the name of the game changes. And my disappointments were tied to my sense of moral outrage, I guess, that -- there are no substantial campaign contributions that come to you without strings attached. This was the bad part of my experience, to learn this lesson firsthand, and I had to learn it to the infinite despair of some members of my campaign staff, but not the Gene Lees, and strangely not the pros, not Don Bradley, who never asked me to take a dirty dollar. Or Pierre. We starved together in magnificent moral climate. [Laughter] But no, I would say that was the thing about it. The experience with the Bonelli matter and the obvious implications of it are directly related to the rest of it. What price do you pay for political support? With what kinds of elements in the political population are you really willing to identify?

This was where I learned the lesson of the sometimes subtle, and sometimes by no means subtle, corruption of our political system. It's corrupted not <u>after</u> you get in office, but before. And there are men who can deceive themselves, I think, that they can take money -- substantial money --(nobody

Graves: buys a piece of you for ten dollars, and the longest list of contributors I had was twenty-five dollars and less).

But when you get into money, there are always strings, always strings. With some exceptions. A fellow named Ed Lasker.

Ed Lasker is a man of many parts. His father, Albert Lasker, founded Lord and Thomas. He was the father of American advertising. Ed is a resident of Los Angeles County, in Beverly Hills. Movie producer, sometimes; sometimes shopping center developer, sometimes racehorse owner, and then, in his middle forties, completed the full course as a student of the law in two years and passed the bar with honors. Quite a fellow, and a rich man. He and his stepmother, Albert Lasker's second wife, Mary Lasker, she is a big thing in New York -- social, money, fine civic minded woman, also very involved with Mrs. Roosevelt. People like that, in politics. I inherited him from Stevenson. He not only didn't ask for anything, he didn't want anything.

He gave fund-raising parties at his home -- the glamor bit, you know, movie actresses as my dinner companions, and the whole thing. The most money I ever raised in one session was in his house, and I began my remarks to this very glittering and very loaded audience by saying, "You know, the question on everyone's mind is, who in the hell is Dick Graves?" [Laughs]

That helped, and we raised quite a bit of money. So one day I called up Ed Lasker and said, "I have a meeting downtown at the Statler Hotel. It's a money meeting, and it would help me a great deal if you would come."

Now, he had two Rolls Royces running around with Graves bumper stickers, and I assure you the only Rolls Royces in the whole state with Graves stickers on them were both in his garage! [Laughter] And he said, "Dick, do you believe I've done a lot to help you?"

And I said, "Oh, yes, you have. Yes, you have."

"Well," he said, "Now you pose for me a dilemma.

Graves: You're asking me to come into downtown Los Angeles, and if you persist in this, I should have to support Goodwin Knight, because I never go to downtown Los Angeles." [Laughter] He not only meant it, he didn't come.

There were lots of wonderful people who wanted nothing at all. I don't want this record to sound otherwise. It is just that when you get into the meat -- rather than the potatoes -- of the financial side of the campaign, you have to pay the price. And the price is too high. Much too high.

This aspect of our political life has immeasurable impact on the course of public events. There is no way to measure what this does in the Congress or in the presidency and how much it shapes the course of events. The fact that Eisenhower played poker in Georgia with a group (and I saw the picture once with a friend of mine who played in the game) of the very tops of the American oil industry had something to do with pulling the rug out from England and France when they went in to rescue the Suez Canal.

This almost sounds like make-believe, you know, but the oil companies, and, to some degree, the need for oil as a source of energy is not divorced from the critical requirements of our country, but I'm not prepared to say that it was all that persuasive. I remember that picture.

Morris: Even without the picture, I think this is probably a question in many people's minds.

Graves: Well, I saw the physical evidence of it. And this is not to condemn Eisenhower. This is only illustrative of the nature of the problem. I don't know the answer. I see grave dangers in the proposals for the federal government to make an appropriation to finance the campaigns of candidates for national office. The degree to which that is subject to political manipulation is frightening. I don't know the answer, I only know the questions.

Final Speech: 1955

Morris: You said that you made a speech again in Fresno in 1956.

Graves: Yes, I did. To the California Democratic Council. I was invited there, it must have been with at least the blessing of Pat Brown. I sound like we were antagonists, and I don't really mean it that way. The chairman of the National Democratic Committee was there and it was contrived to downgrade CDC --

Morris: At their own meeting?

Graves: Yes, and to restore the authority of the county central committees. So in order to divorce the attack from the local people they brought in the chairman of the National Democratic Committee, who spoke in terms of the hierarchy of political structure, and how important it was that its authority be maintained, etc. His name was Paul Butler.

Well, as is usual when I'm going to make a speech, when I got on the platform, I didn't have the foggiest notion of what I was going to say, because, it is a fact that something always happens, somebody always says something, or somebody does something, that triggers a speech focussed exactly at that audience at that moment.

Morris: That's quite a skill, to be able to pick that up and tack it on to what you want to say.

Graves: If I had spent as much time playing golf as I've spent making speeches, I would be playing in the middle seventies instead of in the high nineties on a good day. And this whole contrived situation set me off.

You see, they were talking to my audience, and they were saying all the wrong things. Remember that in 1954 my only real strength was that I identified with the CDC like a glove on your hand. So I took 'em all on.

Morris: The county committee --

Graves: Oh, I took on Butler, the whole group, and I said, "What is this? Why does the hierarchy of the party in the state have to be concerned about CDC? If they had done the job, done the work and had put in the sweat as this audience has done, they would not have to do this. When you surrender your authority to them, it should be because they have earned it."

Oh, I had this audience screaming. I was going to make a fifteen minute speech, but it went on for forty, because they wouldn't let me finish. I think the only thing that worried Pat at the time was whether or not I was going to announce my candidacy. And, oh boy, Butler was furious. So were some others on that platform. But it was ridiculous. Here was the only muscle that the party had.

Morris: CDC was the volunteer organization.

Graves: This was the volunteer group -- the only kind of unofficial group that could endorse anybody under the law. Here they were, just willfully downgrading it. Deliberately setting out to destroy its sense of purpose, its morale. Unbelievable. So I reacted and they reacted, and Bradley said to me, "Why is it you can only make a really good speech in Fresno?" [Laughter]

And that was the end of the line. That was my swan song.

Morris: You then retired to Contra Costa County?

Graves: I retired to Contra Costa County in 1955. I retired from all forms of political activity. But not out of any sense of defeat or pique or frustration. I had done what I set out to do, and I had truly helped the party.

So I disappeared from the scene, and I went to work as a private person in a private business, and returned to my normal way of life which was completely non-political. Only instead of being in government, I was in business as a real estate consultant and developer.

X PHILADELPHIA STORY: URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

Graves: And then in 1958 I got a call from the mayor of Philadelphia, Richardson Dilworth, and he asked me if I would be willing to come to Philadelphia and talk with him about how to set up an industrial development group. And I said, "How in the world did you ever find me?"

"Oh, it was Pat Healy." He was National League of Cities.

So I went back and talked to them. I thought they were on the wrong track, so I said, "I'll go home and write you a memorandum." They asked me if I would like to take the job and I said, "I wouldn't take a job set up like that but I will write you and tell you what I think you ought to do."

So I went home and I wrote them a memorandum, and told them, "You aren't going to get anybody who can do this job for the kind of money you're talking about, and you aren't going to get the job done if you do it that way --" and I told them how I thought it should be set up.

I didn't hear a word from them. Not a word. Not a thank you. Nothing.

And then, late in August, early September, I got a call from Dilworth, and he said, "If you will come back here once more, at our expense, I'd count it a favor. But you should come only if you are willing to entertain the possibility that if we adopt your program, lock, stock and barrel, including your salary range and the whole thing, you'll take the job."

Morris: That's a handsome offer.

Graves: It wasn't bad at the time. And it did have a couple of other attractive personal aspects.

So I thought, "Aha," so I went back and met with the interested public and private group. There was some divergence of opinion on matters of control so I said, "I'm going to stay overnight anyway, so I suggest we recess. And let's meet again tomorrow morning. But if you want me to do this job, the vote must be unanimous, honestly unanimous, or you can adopt the program, but not with me."

So we met the next morning, and the vote was unanimous, and so I came back here, packed my personal things, and I moved to Philadelphia. And that became, in terms of personal satisfactions, the best six years of my life.

Morris: Had you any family or personal ties in Pennsylvania?

Graves: No.

Morris: Is my impression correct that about that point, the Philadelphia area was doing some very interesting things in trying to turn things around in urban planning?

Graves: Yes, that's really why I went there. It was and is the only major city in which the highest levels of public and private leadership are personally committed and deeply involved. Anywhere in the country.

What they were doing was so exciting that this was the attraction -- it wasn't the money, I was doing that well out here. I was born in Philadelphia, which was interesting, but had nothing to do with it, except that I was able to walk down and see the old house where I was born.

Establishment Changes

Morris: Did it get redeveloped?

Graves: It will be. It is in a redevelopment area, Delancy Street.

Graves: Now, here was an extraordinarily exciting community where things were really happening, and where all the number ones were personally involved. There is a group called the Old Philadelphia Development Corporation. It has a large membership, but it has a board of about twenty. There is nobody on the board who is not the head of his company. There are no number twos, they are all number ones.

Morris: So that somebody who votes for something can, himself, say, "We are now going to do it."

Graves: "I commit." These men don't have to wait to ask someone else. "We want to do this, fine, I commit ten thousand dollars." Period. Don't ask anybody.

If you're on the executive committee of this group and you miss a meeting, you get a phone call. Why? Where were you?" You miss another meeting, John, that's two. One more and you're out." And you're talking to the president of a great corporation. "One more and you're out!"

Morris: Who brought this kind of organization together?

Graves: A combination of circumstances. I guess one catalytic thing was (or things) -- the banks and the financial institutions and their trust departments. A lot of people realized their mortgage interests, their interests in real property were in jeopardy. Business was declining, industry was leaving the city, resulting in growing unemployment. They finally saw the really serious problems of the city.

I remember Richardson Dilworth, and his predecessor as mayor, Joe Clark. Later he was a United State Senator, and he may still be. He was a Democrat, liberal. You see, the only way this could work at the beginning was that someone from Chestnut Hill with all the right family and educational background was elected mayor of Philadelphia.

Now, at the beginning, the establishment could not identify with a Democrat, but they could identify with a mayor from Chestnut Hill. So that all of a sudden, it came together. The city could now work

Graves: with the establishment and vice versa, because the mayor was well-born.

Morris: A Democrat and well-born.

Graves: Not a Democrat, he was well-born, and they could work with him in spite of the fact he was a Democrat. [Laughter] Oh, I'm very serious about that!

Morris: I believe you.

Graves: And then by incredible good fortune, he was succeeded by Democrat Richardson Dilworth, who was not only himself well-born, Ivy league, but also he had married one of the golden twins from Pittsburg.

Morris: Who were the golden twins from Pittsburg?

Graves: The vedy, veddy, veddy rich -- I don't remember the family name, but anyway --

So that it was this sheer accident of circumstances that created the environment in which the things that happened in Philadelphia could happen. It gave the establishment leadership an exposure to the working political people and government people that they had never had in their sanctuaries. And they found out that these were surprisingly able people.

Morris: And quite intelligent.

Graves: And very intelligent, and they made a lot of sense.

This doesn't carry over into the social life of Philadelphia, this doesn't carry over into the clubs. It doesn't carry over into what you do on weekends, or the parties you give at night because it stops at the city line, it stops at six o'clock. It's wonderfully effective up till then.

All these men live two lives. They live their business lives in town and then they withdraw in to the closed circle of their other lives, which is the Philadelphia Main Line, or Chestnut Hill, you know.

So that incredibly, the present executive of Old

Graves: Philadelphia Development Corporation is a former economist for a labor union. He also happens to be the finest municipal servant I have ever seen, and I've seen a lot. So, this strange marriage took place, and what city hall alone could never do before, once this new force agreed, "These are the goals" -- everything became possible.

Morris: What connection does the Old Philadelphia Corporation have with city hall?

Graves: It is the mobilization of the private establishment prepared to and willing to work with city hall for the accomplishment of agreed goals.

Morris: So that the mayor, then, would be a member of the board?

Graves: Oh, goodness no! Heaven forbid!

Morris: So they're two totally separate but equal negotiating --

Graves: Separate and equal, yes, that's pretty good, yes.

But anyway [laughter], they communicate. And they communicate personally. But, no, Mayor Jim Tate was not a member of the board of Old Philadelphia, no. And he shouldn't be. This is the private club, and so they can discuss the ways in which they're willing to go and the directions in which they are not. And there's no outside influence there. Except Bill Rafsky who is the guy I was talking about.

Morris: This is their executive?

Graves: Yes. When I was there he was part of the mayor's establishment, and then he became director of urban renewal, and then he became overall development director for the city. Then he became executive of the Old Philadelphia Corporation, when the previous director decided that he wanted to do something that was really a hard one, and went to India on a grant from one of the great foundations, I forget which one. He went to Calcutta to try to do something about the urban living environment there. That took dedication to public service, believe me --

Morris: You worried about <u>your</u> hair shirt.

Graves: What?

Morris: You worried about your hair shirt in 1943. [Laughter]

Graves: The change in Philadelphia was extraordinary. They were really doing urban redevelopment. Penn Center was coming into being; they were moving to relocate the old wholesale produce district and to create Society Hill in this place, restoring the old town houses and building new tower apartments. The whole program and plan was moving, and it was a very exciting thing.

Stopping the Industrial Exodus

Graves: They asked me to come to help salvage the industrial base of the city. So I wasn't a part of all of it, although we were always in consultation, but in terms of responsibility -- job responsibility -- I didn't have anything to do with urban renewal as such, or a lot of the other exciting things that happened there. I was supposed to create a situation which would stop the loss of industrial plants and their industrial jobs. Because I had learned out here how to do things through a quasi-public, non-profit corporation, I was soon building industrial plants on tax-exempt mortgages, and we stopped the exodus. So that, happily, my contribution was a success, and we accomplished something.

You know, it's really pretty good when you can build forty million dollars worth of industrial plants and not have any money at all.

Morris: Good heavens! Build it all on mortgages?

Graves: On mortgages, tax exempts.

Morris: Did the voters have to approve?

Graves: No, it was a non-profit corporation gimmick, and I got the last such ruling from the treasury, the last one. So, that was fortunate.

Going into Philadelphia in ordinary circumstances,

Graves: you wouldn't meet the people that I met and knew -- you wouldn't meet them in ten years. I met them in ten months. I'd lived around the San Francisco Bay for all those years, and I knew one bank president. There are no bank presidents in Philadelphia that I don't know personally. None. That was true of the whole establishment.

Morris: That's interesting.

Social and Ethnic Patterns

Graves: I was never really invited into (and I'm not unhappy about that because I wouldn't have fit) -- I was not invited into the private lives of the gentile establishment -- I was adopted by the Jews. They lived in town. I lived on Rittenhouse Square; they lived on Rittenhouse Square. I was invited out every night of the week.

Morris: Were there Jewish business leaders in this Old Philadelphia Corporation?

Graves: Not in the beginning, but this too changed. Before I left, I had something to do with the fact that for the first time, three major banks had Jews on their boards.

Morris: What part did the Jewish community, as a community, play in the projects that you were --

Graves: Oh, they had a great deal to do with it. One very rich Jew was the director of commerce for city hall as a civic contribution. He was one of the largest corrugated box manufacturers in the country, but he also organized Robin Hood Dell. He had the greatest musical set-up of any municipal enterprise in the country. He got all the Metropolitan people. He knew all the great opera stars. He financed the musical education of some of the greatest pianists and some of the greatest voices that ever sang in the Metropolitan. And, he was city director of commerce.

Morris: As an appointed, political job?

Graves: Freddie Mann, yes, sure.

He didn't take the salary, he gave it to his recreation director because he wanted to get the best man in the country, so he got Bob Crawford out of Oakland, and Philadelphia has one of the best recreational programs in the whole country.

And Freddie Mann just signed his salary check over to the director of recreation, in order to supplement what the city could pay. So he got the man he wanted and Philadelphia got the greatest recreation program you ever saw.

The Jewish community was involved in many ways. On my board of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation, there were Jewish leaders. The system from nine to six works, but that's breaking down, it's changing. It changed greatly while I was there. It continues to change. The city is growing up, yes.

Part of it is the fact -- it's kind of like saying, "How do you know you're not going to like a Negro neighbor if you've never had one?" How do you know that you can't work with the Jewish community if you've never tried? So these activities began to bring people together. A lot of the gentile establishment is third generation, and it isn't that bright -- it's that nice, and good, and well-meaning. But you put all the power it has together with the Jewish brains, and boy, you can move anything except the statue of William Penn, of course, you can't move that. [Laughter]

Morris: In view of what we were saying about California politics and its financial problems, did the Old Philadelphia Corporation have any influence on the political scene in Pennsylvania?

Graves: Oh yes, it did. It lost every election. [Laughter]

Morris: With all that money?

Graves: Well, Philadelphia is a little like New York. Philadelphia doesn't elect state officers. The rest of the state gangs up to make sure that Philadelphia doesn't elect anybody to statewide

Graves: office. So Dilworth runs for governor -- forget it. He was worse off than I was.

No, I would say that while the people who were involved in this joint enterprise (because that's really what it was, a joint enterprise between the city government and the private business establishments) contribute to the Republican party, they are not active in it. And this is part of the Old Philadelphia Main Line tradition -- politics is kind of dirty, and you don't dirty your hands. You give money, but you don't get personally involved.

So that the Republican politicans are not a part of this establishment, truly.

Morris: What's their base of support?

Graves: The establishment.

Morris: Their constituency just leaves them alone? Just gives them the money and --

Graves: No, they ask for whatever they think they're entitled to and sometimes what they're not. Although its not as venal in that particular situation. That's not so. There are exceedingly venal situations in Pennsylvania politics.

I'm talking about the individuals in this establishment that I worked with. I think they would be embarrassed to ask for something they weren't entitled to. This is truly the genteel, the aristocracy, of our kind of society. But I wouldn't say that rubbed off too strongly on some other influences in the state, like the coal industry and the steel industry, the industrial base.

We're talking about bankers; we're talking about lawyers; we're talking about third generation heads of companies and that's different. This group was very active in putting pressure on the people they had supported politically to do what was necessary legislatively to get this program going in Philadelphia.

Morris: Rather than for any --

Graves: -- personal advantage. They were involved -- they were really involved.

Community Leadership Seminar

Graves: I had another remarkable experience in Philadelphia because of my League of Cities background. I was invited by the University of Pennsylvania Institute of State and Local Government, Steve Sweeney, to become chairman of a great experiment, funded by the Fels Fund (Fels Naptha Soap), to organize a community leadership seminar.

The concept was that all the great companies, firms and banks, would nominate one of their crown princes to attend the seminar. We took in about fifty young men each year.

Morris: From their staff --

Graves: From their banks, law offices, accounting firms. But they had to pick someone they thought had the potential to be the president of the company if not next, at least next after next; or to be a leading partner in the firm.

Morris: Was this the middle-management level?

Graves: Upper management level. Let me illustrate the point. The major banks in Philadelphia that I can recall quickly: The present Philadelphia National Bank -- president was in the seminar. First Pennsylvania Bank -- president was in the seminar. Central Penn Bank -- president was in the seminar. Girard Trust Bank -- president was in the seminar. Et cetera.

They were then vice-presidents, but now they are presidents. President of Penn Life -- he was in the seminar. President of Fidelity Mutual Life was in the seminar. So, when I go to Philadelphia now, it's unbelievable.

Morris: The red carpet must be out!

Graves: I did that for four years, and I had an opportunity

Graves: to influence the thinking of two hundred men, most of whom now run their companies. This seminar was an experience to which they had never been exposed.

Because the concept of the seminar was that the then generation of private leadership were good men, but they didn't know what the real problems of the community were. The next generation might very well also be good men, but they had to know what the problems were.

Morris: And, "You gentlemen will be the next generation of leaders," --

Graves: -- and you must understand the basic problems of this city, if it is to survive.

So, I threw the book at them. I brought in all kinds of people as speakers; black president of Howard University; the state secretary of social welfare. We recruited the ablest people from each of the fields related to the social and economic problems of Philadelphia. The seminar was the most gentlemanly thing you ever saw. We met in the board room of the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society, the oldest savings bank in the United States. Every chair had a plaque listing the names of every man who had ever sat in it as a director of the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society. We were served dinner elegantly -- catered. Everybody paid his own way. A hundred dollars a season.

Morris: To be a member of the seminar?

Graves: Oh, yes.

Morris: In spite of the funding from the Fels foundation?

Graves: That was just the nuts and bolts of it: paying the speakers, paying their expenses, paying a fee, secretarial, this kind of stuff. But, no, the members bought the food and liquor. [Laughter] The most exciting educational experience of my life, in any capacity: to have such an opportunity for four years.

Morris: What kind of response did you get from these upper management hopefuls?

Graves: I'll give you the perfect illustration. The evening the secretary of social welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvannia was to be the speaker I did what I always did. I met him about an hour before the meeting to prepare him for the nature of the group. So I asked him to come in and give me a quick run-through of the content of his proposed remakrs and the way he was going to handle it. I wanted to make some suggestions, perhaps, because I understood the group, and the speakers had had no exposure to it.

So the secretary of social welfare, giving me a quick run-through, said something like "whereas 3.4 percent of the total number of people on direct relief in Pennsylvania are unemployable, it's 4.6 percent in Philadelphia."

I said, "Hold it. Can you document that?"

He said, "Of course."

I said, "Tonight?"

"Of course."

"You're going to be challenged."

"Well, I'm prepared for that."

I said, "OK, I just wanted to know. Now, tell me your definition of 'unemployable'."

He said, "I mean by any standard. The partially disabled are not in this group. Only the totally disabled."

I said, "Well, that's interesting. That's going to cause a riot."

We had a rule that you never interrupted a speaker. You reserved your question until he was through. So the secretary was making his speech and he said this. And one of the brightest young men in that room was on his feet -- instantly -- he said, "Mr. Chairman, I'm out of order, and I know it, but I can't wait. Mr. Secretary, I respectfully request that you repeat what you just said about the percentages of people on direct relief who are unemployable.

Graves: I said, "Mr. Secretary, it is important that you should answer the question even though the gentleman is out of order."

So, the speaker said it again. And this young man said, "Mr. Secretary, with no intent to offend, I do not believe that. Can you give me some evidence of that?"

The secretary said, "Oh yes, of course. So many are over the age of seventy (or seventy-five, some number like that). So many are medically classified as senile or otherwise mentally incompetent. So many are children under the age of such and such. So many are totally and physically disabled by medical determination." He went right down the line.

And he said, "Now, Mr. Graves asked me earlier where I classified the partially physically disabled and I classify them as employable." He said, "I'd be happy to give you these figures. I'd be happy to give you any further evidence you require to establish the fact that these are absolutely accurate data."

The young man turned to me and said, "Mr. Graves, I must believe the secretary. This is one of the most shattering experiences in my adult life." He said, "I have always believed, I have been raised to believe, that most of the people on relief could get a job if they wanted it. And now I am forced to change a basic conviction."

And I said, "You, sir, have just validated the entire purpose of this seminar."

This happened again and again in the course of the seminar. So that at the end of the second year, the seminar graduates created the community leadership seminar alumni. They still pay their own way. They still meet. They still have the same kinds of programs. They have three hundred members, and they are one of the most vital groups in Philadelphia. And the now presidents of the banks and the companies still come to the community leadership alumni seminar, they speak of it as the most intellectually rewarding experience of their daily lives.

Morris: That's marvelous.

Graves: Now, I didn't create this. I just acted as chairman.

Graves: The thing is that Philadelphia is a city, unlike any other city I know, where young men with families and obligations, and workloads and all the rest of it, once every month convene at five o'clock and stay until ten-thirty or eleven, trying to understand things to which they have never been exposed before. It's wonderful! And it underwrites the future of the city.

The second year I broughtin as seminar members, a Jewish industrialist and a Negro lawyer. They were startled. They didn't know quite how to take that in the board room of the PSFS. But they have learned a lot. White Anglo Saxon Protestants are hardly more than fifty percent of the membership of the seminar and the alumni seminar these days.

Morris: In what, five years' time?

Graves: No, no, more than that. No, it's like ten years' time. Think of the impact of that as this group takes full control of that city's professional and business life.

XI CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN

Morris: While you were doing this kind of thing in Philadelphia, did you ever see the Chief Justice and share with him some of these happenings?

Graves: No, no. No, I didn't. I'm not quite sure why, except that there is a point in time at which what was, isn't anymore. Everytime I went to Washington and I thought about it, I thought, I wonder why -- except for my own personal gratification -- Here's one of the busiest men in the world and should I inject myself into his already crowded schedule, and I just never did. It's kind of "what's done is done," you know.

As much as I love and admire him it would have been for my own personal satisfaction to call on the Chief Justice. Because, with all of the things that existed between us, remember, I told you that I had never had a purely personal, private, social, recreational relationship with Earl Warren. And it would have been a sort of -- injecting myself.

Morris: Yes, I can see that. We're coming to the end of the tape --

Graves: And the hour is late.

Morris: I wonder if in a few well-chosen words you might want to wind up with what you feel Warren meant to the state of California as governor and/or to you, as a person.

Graves: Well, To answer the second one first and very quickly, to me he was the very epitome of what the political leadership of the country ought to be

Graves: like. No man is perfect; he wasn't either, but he is so far above the average man that he has great influence in the public life of the country, that one of the tragedies of our society is that he never got to be President.

I think Warren has made more of a lasting impact on the future of the country and the direction of public affairs as Chief Justice than he made as governor. The Court and its orientation will never be the same as it was before Warren. It will never go back. I think it's impossible that it retrace its steps to the before-Warren time. So that that's a lasting impact on the direction of the country. Being governor is not, you see.

Warren had a great impact on this state while he was here. I'm sure that some of it is lasting, without thinking it through, but it's all reversible, and I suppose the judgment of the Supreme Court is reversible, but they aren't going to reverse the Warren Court out of existence. They may modify some things, but when you read the roll call of the Court and how many Chief Justices have made a lasting impact on the country, there have been only one or two other than Warren. I would say that Warren's great contribution to the country as a public figure is the thing for which he has been most condemed, most vilified, and that is as Chief Justice of the United States.

He has changed the direction of the country. So I would say that his whole earlier public life was by way of preparation to be the kind of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court he became.

Morris: Even though that wasn't what he had in mind?

Graves: Many men, perhaps, do their greatest work in something they didn't set out to do. But I really believe what I just said. If you think about it: Warren as district attorney, Warren as attorney general, Warren as governor -- always growing, always changing. Always getting a deeper awareness of the essence of the free society and its people and coming full flower as the Chief Justice.

Perhaps in more significant ways than he might

Graves: have even as President. Because as Chief Justice he suffered none of the restraints of politics. Warren as President would have been an extension of Warren as governor, growing into the larger responsibilities of the presidency. But Warren as President could not have ignored the political obligations of that office and to his party. The kind of man he had become could best articulate and implement his now mature philosophy in the free environment of the Supreme Court, as its Chief Justice.

Transcriber and Final Typist: Gloria Dolan

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Resume of
RICHARD P. GRAVES

IN EDUCATION:

A. B., Political Science - University of California, Berkeley, 1929; M. A. Public Administration - University of California, Berkeley, 1931. As graduate student was teaching fellow in Political Science. Research Associate, Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley, 1931-33. Lecturer in Public Administration, Graduate School, University of California, 1948-53.

Organized and served as Chairman, Philadelphia Community Leadership Seminar of the Fels Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, a remarkable and successful effort to expose a broad cross-section of the City's ablest young executives and professional men to public issues and problems.

IN BUSINESS:

Organized and as Executive Vice President administered the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation program, one element of Philadelphia's attack on the problems of urban renewal, 1958-62.

In California and Philadelphia spent six years as a private real estate developer and development consultant, concerned primarily with industrial and commercial real estate.

1964-67, the West Coast Vice President, Tishman Realty & Construction Company, Inc., of New York, at regional offices located in Los Angeles.

Organized redeveloper group to take over redevelopment project in downtown Sacramento. Partner and for the first year project manager, Downtown Plaza Properties, redeveloper of 8-block CBD commercial project in Sacramento.

Currently: (a) President, Unicon Parking Structures, Inc., headquartered in Van Nuys, and (b) Development Consultant, Kersey Kinsey Company, Studio City Builder. Member of Board of Directors.

IN GOVERNMENT:

Executive Director, League of California Cities, 1933-53, during which time this organization became the largest, most effective, best financed state organization of public officials in the country.

On leave, organized and administered the state-wide California Civil Defense Program, first under Governor Culbert Olsen, later under Governor Earl Warren.

On leave, organized and served as Regional Director of the Western Regional Consumer Division of the CPA.

Democratic nominee for Governor of California, 1954.

President, National League of Cities, 1941.

Honorary Life Member, International City Managers Association.

Member, California Intergovernmental Council on Urban Growth, by appointment of Governor Brown, 1964-65.

Chairman, California-Nevada Lake Tahoe Study Committee, 1966-67.

CIVIC: Served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of a special committee of the Board to develop a program of training for employment of the disadvantaged citizens. Significantly, this was a pioneer effort in 1962-63, and while it was not notably successful, it did help a real job-training pioneer and leader, Rev. Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia.

Chairman, Pennsylvania Committee for Vocational Training appointed by Secretary for Public Instruction.

Member, industrial development and task force committee for the District of Columbia, appointed by Mayor Walter Washington, 1967-68.

Member, Review Board, Redevelopment Agency, City of New Haven, Connecticut.

Won the rarely awarded President's Citation of the Franklin Institute of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) for volunteer service in securing a new Research and Development Laboratory for The Institute.

May 22, 1931

Mr. Richard Graves
1157 Spruce Street
Berkeley, California

Dear Mr. Graves:

Professor Fuller is returning to Berkeley within a few days, and I have made arrangements with him whereby you are to assist him in completing his study of court statistics in the State of California and prepare yourself for carrying on this activity during the next fiscal year. Between now and July 1, 1931, your compensation will be fifty cents per hour, and beginning with July 1, 1931, we are prepared to pay you $150 per month on a twelve months basis, or $1500 per year.

It is quite likely that this particular project will not take all of your time, and since the salary rate is for your full time services, you will be expected to devote your abilities to whatever other research projects upon which we may ask your assistance.

I would appreciate a reply from you as to whether this is your understanding of the verbal agreement reached a few days ago.

Sincerely yours

Samuel C. May, Director

Bureau of Public Administration

December 28, 1932

Professor Samuel C. May
Director, Bureau of Public Administration

Dear Professor May:

In answer to your letter of December 21 in which you request that information be furnished in writing concerning the arrangement which has in the past existed between the Bureau of Public Administration and the State Department of Finance relating to the division of my time and compensation, I am sending you this statement regarding the arrangement which has existed since last February, and the tentative agreement reached which will be in operation through the legislative session.

You will remember that last February Mr. Vandegrift requested that the Bureau make it possible for me to engage in the preparation of a report on crime which was to be submitted to the impending legislature. At that time it was agreed that I was to receive additional compensation in the amount of $50 a month for this added burden. It was also agreed between you and Mr. Vandegrift that any studies in which I played a part would be considered as cooperative or joint research projects of the Bureau and the State. I have been continuously engaged in this cooperative work since then, although my routine Bureau work in connection with criminal statistics has been carried on during the same period.

Last August Mr. Vandegrift and Mr. Charles Neumiller, Chairman of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, urged you to authorize me to assume responsibility for the preparation of a report on the operation of the parole system in California. Since the need was urgent, you agreed to this as well as to the fact that Mr. Vandegrift was willing to increase the contribution to my salary made by the State to $100 a month. This study of parole has been going forward and a report will probably be issued early in March.

Since many of the recommendations contained in the report on Crime, just completed, call for specific legislative action, and since many other persons interested in this problem are planning to introduce measures relating to crime and the administration of criminal justice, Mr. Vandegrift felt that I should be in Sacramento to follow the course of this proposed legislation and, where possible, to render such advice and information to the legislative committees as I might have at hand. This, of course, is only in case my Bureau work might be carried on without handicap. You will remember that I spoke to you regarding the finer mechanical statistical equipment available in the offices of the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation in Sacramento, and of the fact that since my study of criminal statistics had now reached the stage where the tabulation of the data was the next step, my work here would be done better in Sacramento than in Berkeley. Mr. Vandegrift then made a formal request of you that I be detailed to Sacramento. It is my understanding that any additional expense I might incur by this transfer, if it is to be offset at all, will be taken care of by the Department of Finance.

I do not expect to have any official status in Sacramento, or any official duties to perform for Mr. Vandegrift. I feel as you do in this matter, that it would be inexpedient and unwise for me to become involved in any political controversy. I go to Sacramento to offer what assistance I can to any member of the administration or the legislature who feels that what I have to say may be of value to him.

Future plans involving a relationship between the State administration and the Bureau have arisen out of the specific recommendations of the Crime Problem Advisory Committee. While it is apparent that some appropriation must be made by the Legislature to finance that portion of the expense which must be born by the State, I feel sure that some such arrangement will be made by the next legislature. I am very anxious that this relationship between the State and the Bureau be continued because I feel that such a program is a primary function of our Bureau. We have here an opportunity to do research that is concerned with public administration as we all see it, - research that has the backing of the state administration at the outset, and so a better chance to influence the course of actual administration. Notwithstanding the financial difficulties arising out of present conditions, I urge you as Director of the Bureau, as I have already urged Mr. Vandegrift, to make a special effort to continue this cooperative work without interruption, so that when conditions improve, we may expand in the scope of our joint enterprises.

Respectfully yours,

Richard Graves
Research Assistant

RG:LS

August 10, 1933

Hon. Luis M. Howe
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

We plan to build up and use as the basis for a graduate seminar in Federal Administration a complete current history of the National Recovery Program in all its aspects. While it is not difficult for us to follow developments since March 4th with a rather high degree of accuracy, we find ourselves unable to locate a complete file of the public addresses of the President beginning with the speech he made on accepting the nomination in Chicago up to and including his inaugural address. If you have as yet built up such a collection for distribution purposes we would be very anxious to get one; if not, will you advise what you believe to be the best possible source from which to secure what we desire?

No man in America would deny that in the space of a few months the Roosevelt Administration has left a permanent impression upon the administration of the Federal Government of this country. It is our purpose and our plan to present as much as possible of this picture to our students of Federal Administration. We would greatly appreciate your cooperation in this regard.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Graves

RG:GC

COPY

League of California Municipalities
223 City Hall
San Francisco, California

June 27, 1934

Professor Samuel C. May, Director,
Bureau of Public Administration,
117 Library Building, Campus,
Berkeley, California

Dear Professor May:

This letter is written to make a matter of record my resignation from the staff of the Bureau of Public Administration, effective July 1, 1934, with the further thought that you will so advise Mr. Robert M. Underhill, Secretary of the Regents. My reasons for submitting this resignation are well known to you since I was able to reach this decision only after thoroughly discussing all the factors involved with you.

The reason for this step is, as you well know, that I feel obliged to complete the organization and initiation of a division of information and research for the League of California Municipalities, by which organization I am now employed as Assistant-Secretary in charge of the above named division.

I should like to feel that in severing my connection with the Bureau I am not terminating my relationships with you and with the members of your staff, but that we shall all continue to work together for the improvement of governmental administration.

I should like to say also that I am deeply in your debt, first, for the inspiration received from your teachings in my undergraduate days, and finally, for the training in the method of research which has come to me both as a graduate student and as a member of the staff of the Bureau.

Very sincerely yours,

Richard Graves

He'll Be the Democrat Candidate

Graves to Enter Race for Governor

By HALE CHAMPION

Richard Graves, 47-year-old executive director of the League of California Cities, is about to become THE Democratic candidate for Governor.

Graves won't discuss it, but barring one of the most confounding political reversals in recent State history, he will follow this schedule:

1—He will either resign or serve notice of impending resignation from his $20,000-a-year post at a meeting of the league's Board of Directors in Berkeley today or tomorrow.

2—Some time next week, he'll take the formal plunge, announcing his candidacy and giving as his reason the conviction that somebody has to wage an all-out battle against Republican Governor Goodwin J. Knight.

THE MONEY

The last major obstacle to his final commitment — the $250,000 needed to conduct an adequately financed, slam-bang campaign against his No. 1 political enemy — was all but removed this last week.

Graves had told Democratic leaders—almost all of whom are committed to him, either publicly or privately that until enough money was on the line, he wouldn't announce. They got busy, here and in Southern California. After a series of conferences in which Graves often took an active part, some of the money was put on the line.

The party's first rank money raisers are still scrambling for more, but they hope and believe that their chosen candidate is convinced the campaign can be paid for.

MUDDY TRACK

If he isn't convinced? Well, he just has to be. He's been given a clear, if muddy, track, and, at this moment, there isn't another candidate of his potential in sight.

Dr. Henry F. Grady, another prominently mentioned candidate took himself out of the gubernatorial picture last weekend. And some backers of Berkeley Mayor Laurance Cross, the only announced Democratic candidate to date, are talking of a Congressional campaign instead.

In all the maneuvering that has gone on behind the scenes

RICHARD GRAVES
Last obstacle: funds

in the attempt to draw up a slate for official party endorsement, for candidates for Senator and Lieutenant Governor, as well as Governor, the Democrats have faced another major problem.

FRESNO CONVENTION

They are committed to a Fresno convention of the California Democratic Council, the endorsing instrument of the party in March—a convention at which final, official endorsements are to be made.

When State Senator George Miller Jr., chairman of the State Democratic Central Committee, disclosed some time back that he was for Graves, he drew harsh words from several rank and filers who felt there should have been prior consultation.

Brown and other party leaders are now trying to avoid more of the same criticism, although they privately sympathize with Miller who, they feel, was just performing a valuable and necessary party service.

BACKERS OF CROSS

Some of the criticism came from backers of Cross, a candidate who most party leaders believe wouldn't stand a chance against the well-financed, well-known and well-traveled Knight.

Here roughly is the reasoning of those who support Graves. These supporters, as a matter of cold fact, are preparing literature and building an organization and bankroll for him at this moment.

Graves, a Lafayette resident, is not well known to the public, but in 20 years in his present post he has come to know influential political leaders at almost every level of government in the State, from the Legislature, where he represented the League with force and ability, to the smallest of the communities represented by the inclusive League.

HE SUPPORTED WARREN

He is a Democrat who left the party to become a supporter of former Governor Earl Warren and a registered Republican during Warren's terms in office, then returned to the fold when Knight succeeded Warren.

As a consequence, he has as many personal friends of the Warren Republican persuasion as he has Democratic friends. (Graves has told Democratic party officials that his personal calls of support run about two Republicans to one Democrat.)

Democratic rank and file response to Graves' political history has been good, except in a few cases. A skirmish on the issue is expected at the Fresno convention, but the party's leaders expect to handle the problem without any great damage.

WHO LIKES HIM

Although only State Senator [illegible] committed to Graves, Brown is assumed to be favorably disposed, as are Alan Cranston, chairman of the California Democratic Council; Al Brundage, leader of the Democratic League here, several of the party's top financiers, and some other lesser but still important Democrats.

Then, finally, although there isn't much discussion of it yet, there is the question of an open split in Republican ranks between the old Warren backers and the rising tide of Knight supporters.

Many Democrats feel Graves is the most logical candidate to attempt to exploit this potential division.

Graves, who is already on the hustlings in a tentative way, telling local Democratic Clubs that he considers Knight "the worst important public official I know," thinks so too.

He said last week that of the offers of support volunteered to him privately, there were about two from Warren Republicans to every one from a Democrat.

Room 522, Sharon Building
55 New Montgomery Street
San Francisco 5, California
February 13, 1954

Mr. Donald F. Javette:
Dear Mr. Javette:

It appears that recent developments are going to preclude my appearance at future municipal government seminars (although in several months I may offer my qualifications for a course in politics and maybe in a year or so for one in state administration!).

Joking aside, may I honestly tell you that one of the most serious drawbacks to my change of career has been the necessary withdrawal from teaching. Over the past few years, my work with you and former students has been one of the most pleasant and challenging assignments of my life, and I shall miss our weekly sessions very much.

As you may know, the course is still to be offered this spring under the very expert guidance of Professor May and Mr. Gardner. Professor May has had long experience in the study and practice of municipal and state government. He was one of the committee of three who drafted the council-manager charter of Berkeley, was a Berkeley councilman, and has constantly been a member of one or another Berkeley commissions, principally the Personnel Board, since 1924. On the state level, he was chairman of the State Planning Board and executive vice-chairman of the State Council of Defense.

Howard Gardner is well-known to many of you as the associate director of the League of Cities. In his 18 years with the League, he has gained a great knowledge of all aspects of municipal government. You may be interested to know that he, too, is a product of the Bureau of Administration where, as a graduate student, he was a research analyst. Following his graduate work, he became Director of Information and Research of the State Board of Prison Directors.

If you found, and I hope you did, the field of municipal government of interest, I urge you to continue the course this spring under their very fine leadership.

Again, may I express my sincere regrets at not being able to continue with you this spring, and also may I wish you well as you continue with your work.

Sincerely,

Dick Graves

APPENDIX H_1:

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RICHARD GRAVES

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2. "Selective bibliography on the operation of the Eighteenth Amendment", with Dorothy C. Nicholson, June, 1931.
3. "Criminal justice statistics", with Hugh N. Fuller, 1933(?).
4. "Organizing the business administration [of universities] for economy", with Viola Avery, August, 1933.
5. "Education and the new economic and industrial order, including bibliography", with Milton Chernin and Viola Rohrs, March 22, 1934.
6. "Operating Cost of the administration of criminal justice in seven California cities", for U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the cost of crime (Publication no. 12). June 24, 1931.
7. "Personal injury litigation", a report for the Research Service of the Commonwealth Club of California, with others. Commonwealth Club of California, Transactions 26: 451-67, January 5, 1932.
8. "Report to the California Crime Problem Advisory Committee treating of the crimes defined in the state and the penalities provided therefor. Sacramento, October 26, 1932.
9. "Laws relating to psychiatric clinics", in Report of Subcommittee on Factors Contributing to the Causes of Crime, with Joseph Catton. California Crime Problem Advisory Committee, Sacramento, February, 1933.

The above work was, of course, done by Mr. Graves while he was a graduate student. Below is a sampling of articles and addresses prepared after more than twenty years of professional experience. Copies of these are among the papers he donated to The Bancroft Library to accompany his oral history memoir.

10. Address to the National Credit Conference of the American Bankers Association, January 23, 1959.
11. "Urban Industry and Commerce", address to Pittsburg Conference on Urban Problems, October 10, 1960.
12. "Planning for Better Industrial Sites", address, 1960(?).
13. "Effective Municipal Development Policies", Southern Cities, North Carolina League of Municipalities, February, 1963.
14. "City Hall Revisited - Observations of a Bureaucrat Turned Businessman", Public Personnel Review, January, 1966.
15. "The Creative City of Man", Proceedings of the 1966 Congress of Cities, 43d annual meeting, National League of Cities.

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